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Abstract
The primary emphasis of this research is the exploration and development of a Žižekian
lens of teacher reflection. This methodological exploration further considers how the Žižekian
lens can functions as a unique contribution to both teacher education and the philosophy of
education through the exploration of particular pathways of teacher consciousness and
misrecognitions of self-identity in relation to the discourse of education. Following Žižek,
teacher reflection is an act of resistance to this discourse that begins with uncovering the failure
of our own perception as the result of a misperception at the limits of being in/through the big
Other thereby reifying our own existence. Using various reflexive pathways and intellectual
trajectories, each of the chapters within this research examines my self-identity as a teacher in
relation complex system of philosophical inquiry within the daily reality of my classroom. Each
reflexive passage or point of reflexive analysis represents the transition from an epistemological
void (un-knowing) to an ontological one (being)—or, more precisely, the reflexive passage from
grappling with the inaccessible thing beyond the subject’s reach to an understanding of my-self
as subject itself, as the Thing incapable of being reduced that is the (Lacanian) Real of reality.
This empty point of negativity is the negation of all determinacy and it is within this space
devoid of all content that I am is able to reflexively encounter my true identity as a teacher.
One way of grasping this position is through the process of endless self-critique or
hysterical questioning that characterizes subjectivity as such. This subject position as the
Žižekian Real is an ontological difference that ruptures both the individual teacher and society,
particular and universal without lapsing into fantasies of completeness. Within this framework,
teacher reflection serves as a means of traversing our misrecognitions of being and is the inverse
of many common-sense approaches to reflection that aim to get rid of fantasies, false
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consciousness, illusionary prejudices and misperceptions, which distort teachers’ view of reality,
and finally learning to accept reality the way it really is. By envisioning teacher reflection
through the Žižekian lens we do not learn to suspend our phantasmagorical production–on the
contrary, teachers must identify with the excess of her/his imagination ever more radically, in all
of its inconsistency and failures. The ultimate wager of this formulation of teacher reflection is
that it is not only possible, but necessary, to conceive of this zero-level of subjectivity, as an
unconscious knowledge that awaits its moment to emerge, take shape and shatter the coordinates
within which we make sense of today’s educational discourse. This dormant teaching self lies in
wait, waiting for the surplus of our unknown and repressed knowledge to be translated into a
fearless vision of teaching and education yet to come. Our thought must throw itself beyond its
familiar course if it is to legitimize its disengagement and unthink the reality from which we
were ensnared. Teacher reflection as an act of subjective destitution involves the experience of
losing one’s self to finally disentangle the coordinates of our ontological being. Ultimately, this
experience of destitution is the subjective position this research seeks to explore, broadly
identified as Žižek’s negative ontology.
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Introduction: The Parallax View
For the past several years, I have started each school year by showing my students the
“spoon scene” from Lana and Lily Wachowski’s dystopian classic The Matrix.1 In the scene,
Neo, the film’s protagonist, encounters a boy (“spoon boy”) bending a spoon with his mind when
he visits the Oracle (a program with such insight into human psychology that she has clairvoyant
abilities) for the first time. As Neo waits for the Oracle, the boy attempts to teach Neo about the
nature of being as it relates to the self and its surrounding objects: "Do not try and bend the
spoon. That's impossible. Instead only try to realize the Truth... There is no spoon... Then you'll
see that it is not the spoon that bends, it is only yourself." At the conclusion of the scene, I ask
my students to write a brief reflection interpreting the boy’s message. Absent additional insight
into the film or any context into to what (“exactly”–as my students so often ask of me) I am
seeking as their teacher, my students (frequently) struggle to articulate a response. After allowing
a few anguishing minutes of silence to pass (i.e. pedagogical wait time), I begin introducing an
array of philosophical concepts. Rather than providing them a solid footing to engage the
problem each concept is meant to disorient them further. While the concepts I have deployed
have shifted throughout the years, a few constants have included: Lacan’s development of de
Saussure’s signifier, Foucault’s reading of discourse, Bakhtin’s heteroglossia, and Žižek’s
formulation of ideology–a Hegelo-Lacanian deviation from the traditional Marxist notion of the
term. As the students’ struggles crescendo, I commend them for “getting it!” I inform them if
they were to believe they understood the full complexity of what we were discussing, then I
would be suspicious that they were not opening themselves up to the possibilities of what lies
ahead on our journey together.
1

Lana Wachowski and Lily Wachowski, The Matrix (Hollywood: Warner Bros, 1999) DVD.
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I analogize this journey to my students as Alice ‘tumbling down the rabbit hole’2 in an
attempt to ‘unthink’ the ways in which we have been taught (largely through the processes of
schooling) to see the world. In much the same way, I view the process(es) of self-discovery that
are documented in this dissertation as an unthinking of my subjective self as a teacher–each
movement an attempt to unthink and problematize my own positionality. Broadly, this research
is connected by two concepts developed by Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek: looking awry
and the parallax view. To be clear, these terms are not the interpretive lenses through which this
research is conducted. Instead, like the sinewy tendons that bind our human flesh, acting as a
mechanical lever of automation, these concepts allow us to imagine here how each chapter is
bound together and structured as a unified being–although the complexities of each may seem
like a philosophical system unto itself. For Žižek, the term looking awry is a sustained analysis of
the sinthome–the piece of subject that is more than the subject her/himself. To look awry at
oneself or, in this case, to look awry at teacher reflection involves an analysis of the self beyond
our own fantasy constructions and misrecognitions of reality.3
The parallax view can be conceived of–in this context–as a/the next step in the reflexive
process. The parallax is a way of viewing ‘that which is otherwise’ by accounting for the very
multiplicity of appearances of the same underlying Real of reality. The parallax view, in this
way, is an attempt to shift my perception of the core of my being which appears to always persist
as the same. This piece of my being–which Žižek terms the “bone-in-the-throat”4–paradoxically
embodies both the lack that is the subject and is that which forever prevents the subject from
achieving its full ontological possibility. The parallax view, however, simultaneously pulverizes
2

Lewis Carrol, Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There (New York: Random House, [1871]
1992).
3
Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Lacan through Popular Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992).
4
Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2000).
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this sameness into a multitude of appearances by introducing a radical non-coincidence of
thought and being. This shift in view is a philosophical twist to standard philosophical readings
of

self

as

teacher–even

those

that

might

follow

seemingly

similar

Marxist

or

Lacanian/psychoanalytic trajectories. At the level of pure abstraction, the parallax is an apparent
displacement of an object when viewed from varying perspectives. When the self–as
teacher/subject–is viewed from an inverted parallax perspective an irreducible asymmetry is
generated between the two ontic planes–noumenal/phenomenal–thereby displacing the object of
perception and providing new observational positions. The gap between these positions is the
(Lacanian) Real of the subject insofar as our subjectivity is exposed as the gap itself lacking any
substantial consistency within the ontological horizon. Thus, “the Real [as] parallactic and…
nonsubstantial”5 can only be contextualized as the subjective self and emerges as a forced shift in
perspectives from fantasmatic teacher to Real being. My-self as Real teacher subject thus
emerges in the moments of betweeness–i.e. the gap itself.6
On a supplemental level, Žižek’s parallax theory highlights a larger philosophical thread
taken up in this research; mainly, the importance of ontological research within educational
theory. At its most fundamental level, this research seeks to uncover how shifts in the meditation
between the subject and object are such that an epistemological shift in the subject’s point of
view always-already reflects and ontological shift in the object itself. What this means is that the
parallax view uncovers how the subject’s gaze is always-already inscribed into the perceived
object itself as a blind spot.7 This construction develops a theoretical constitution of reality that is
dependent on the teacher-subject itself and reinscribes the teacher into her/his own ontological
5

Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006) 26.
Importantly, this reflexive twist is not the constitution of two perspectives (real and false) but an attempt to grasp
the Real of subjectivity itself.
7
Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
6
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image of reality. Importantly, as a statement of philosophical delineation, this position is not a
direct materialist position (the direct assertion of my own inclusion in reality) as there is no
assertion that the teacher-subject can grasp the whole of reality. Instead, following Žižek, the
subject is material only through a “reflexive short circuit” where the self is redoubled or
subjectively viewed from “outside and inside” inscribing itself in its own picture.8 In this precise
sense, the teacher as subject is able to reflexively grasp its own inclusion in material reality and
is–simultaneously–a part of material reality that always eludes the subject because it contains
missing pieces of the whole.
When considering the weight of this position, the notions of self as teacher-subject,
reflection, and reflexivity are radically destabilized. By following this framing, I am forced to
imagine the only true image of my teaching self as existing in the fleeting moments between two
worlds. While this view only momentarily appears, it uncovers the piece of my-self that is the
Real of my irreducible asymmetry. It is from this position that it becomes possible to see how the
negative ontological position of lack opens a pathway to a universal positivization of being.
Perhaps, more pragmatically, it is from this position of betweenness (or parallax) that I might
become aware that my understandings of self-identity have always-already been constructed by
that which eluded it and the other perspective which filled in the void that I could not see from
the first perspective.
The glimmering potentiality I seek to enunciate within this maddening and paradoxical
minefield is two-fold. First, by situating this research within the complexity (both the potentiality
and fallibility) of this perspective, I highlight the possibility of Žižek’s philosophical dialectic–
both as the paradox that sustains his method and the method through which his work functions as

8

Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006)17.
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a pedagogical contribution to teacher education. Unlike most philosophical examinations of the
ontic domain in education, the Žižekian dialectic does not create a (social) ontology of
humanism nor is it guided by a critical teleology of emancipation. Further, it avoids postmodern
slippages without abandoning the construct of the subject or circumscribing the individual by
paradoxical splitting the ontic domain–both as what is constitutive of the socio-Symbolic
structure of being and the ontological lack that sustains it. In more particular terms, the teachersubject that emerges in this reach is as a negative ontological being that is nothing but
misrecognition or lack and it is this alienation that locates the kernel of (universal) truth9 among
all subjective beings.
Within such terms, the Žižekian dialectic, as negative ontology, provides an-other lens to
view the daily realities of ourselves, schools, and classrooms. This runs counter to many of our
present paradigms where we might say it is only because we teachers fail to see ourselves and
each other in our true light (or at least we blind ourselves to these flaws) that we are able to work
through our respective character flaws and arrive at a common understanding. However, by
recognizing that there is no truth of meaning apart from alienation, teachers might identify with
one another in the primordial experience of (non)-being–i.e. the (pure) negativity in which the
subject loses or sacrifices her/his identity during the process of subjectivization. In the
maintenance of this alienated subjectivity, the neoliberal discourse(s) of education
(un)consciously inflects upon all teacher-subjects producing a substanceless subjectivity or an
alienated subject that is “part of no part.” The teacher-subject, as such, is proletarian. But, in
realizing that our precious fantasies of self, teaching, and resistance are shit, we teachers become

9

Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989).
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a collective swarm of resistance able to coalesce across time and space striking out of the
darkness as a decisive political act that transforms Symbolic subjectivity.
Secondarily, Žižek’s unorthodox use of dialectic engagement between self and other
(teacher/student, author/reader, etc.) opens the space (if even momentarily) for the interpretation
of gaps in understanding left open by interpretative threads splitting and spiraling in a multitude
of directions. Sharpe and Boucher suggest Žižek’s unsystematic approach to argumentation is an
example of a rhetorical method termed parataxis. Parataxis, in this lens, is a “style that
suppresses the logical and casual connections between clauses in a sentence, paragraph, chapter,
or work.”10 Pedagogically, the aim of the parataxic movement is to leave the interlocutor to infer
what is missing within the logical breaks and interruptions of thinking. Within Žižek’s own
argumentation there always remain an implicit space (or gap) that leaves the reader unfulfilled,
left to infer what might be. This approach suggests that one of the primary critiques levied
against Žižek–a lack of a directly articulated positionality or system of thought– is precisely the
point of the analysis itself. The pedagogical possibility of this positionality aims to subvert the
big Other (Master position) by rendering it a pointless desire for activity without an end.
Ultimately, the pedagogical possibility of the Žižekian dialectic, refers to the creation of a
constant perceptual tension when we (teacher/educators/intellectuals) have to look twice in order
to see things as they really are–simultaneously spelling the end and their beginning.

CH 1 Introductory Framing
Chapter one reflexively examines my own commitment to critical pedagogy and attempts
to uncover why, so often, acts of resistance feel anything but emancipatory. Within the normality

10

Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher, Žižek and Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 21.
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of the everyday, this chapter examines why pedagogical acts often become deformed,
manifesting as discontent and failure rather than true revolutionary politics. This state of
betweeness is akin to Žižek’s parallax gap, in that amid the two states of critical being–the
ideology of resistance and the ontological prescriptive orator (or, more simplistically, my-self as
critical educator but alienated teacher-subject)–there is no synthesis or meditation possible. The
problem is that unlike the potentiality posited within the negative spaces of betweeness qua the
parallax gap, the disjunction of my failure as a teacher is marked by a writhing discomfort of
placelessness–the placelessness caused by the impossible fulfillment of my (“the”) emancipatory
dream. Because of this, my descriptions and enactments of pedagogical acts and classroom
engagements often unconsciously become little more than moral platitudes transformed into
metaphors of struggle invoked to create an impression of an essential self (the Lacanian ideal-I).
Such formulations create a ‘truth’ of experience through the frame of struggle whereby a singular
right response would be problematic, and sympathy is garnered in support of the moral
objectification of the student experience. My personal identity, in this sense, is connected to the
story but any form of subject coherence is a fantasy rather than a form(ulation) of critical
consciousness. As a response, chapter one develops a negative ontological reading of teacher
reflection and a vision of radical pedagogy beyond the critical frame. This movement
destabilizes my reflexive framework as a teacher-subject by uncovering my own perverse
reading of critical praxis.

CH 2 Introductory Framing
Chapter two is an unthinking about my foundational understanding of teaching and
teacher reflection. Metapragmatically–broadly following Silverstein, both how the effects and

7

conditions of language use themselves to become objects of discourse and meaning comes from
their temporal contiguity with their referent–11 this chapter is a methodological reflection on
teacher reflection itself whereby each reflexive movement of the subject position is meant to
produce complications and inversions of my own subjective perception. Such inversions are
meant to generate an irreducible asymmetry between ontic planes (noumenal/phenomenal),
displace objects of perception, and provide new observational positions12–i.e. the parallax view.
As a way forward through the thicket, this chapter both outlines the existing literature on teacher
reflection/reflexivity and examines how the possibilities of problematizing my own perception of
self as a teacher-subject might open new pathways for understanding education–within the
shifting temporal spaces of the daily reality of my classroom. Here again we encounter the
underlying importance of examining the ontic domain in that the method itself uncovers how
epistemological shifts in the subject’s point of view always-already reflect the ontological
through shifts in the subject-object itself.
By drawing on Žižek’s philosophical corpus, I methodologically tarry with the outer
limits of my subjective frame and radically dismantle my understanding through progressively
shifting and often deteriorating stages of perception. Theoretically, this reflexive movement
allows me to disrupt the textual stability of teacher reflection/reflexivity by constraining my
positioning as a teacher–subject to a space beyond itself. While I cannot, as Lacan noted,
“literally” step outside of myself,13 the methodological intent of this research is to reflexively
force myself into positions that are radically disjunctive. Philosophically, this disjunction is akin
to the parallax view as the forced shifts in perspective from the subject of the addressee to the
11

Michael Silverstein, "Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description," in Meaning in Anthropology, ed.
Keith Basso and Henry A. Selby (Albuquerque: UNM Press, 1976).
12
Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
13
Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English (New York: Norton, 2006)
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addresser creates the short-circuit that allows the subject to momentarily grasp its own lack–i.e.
the position of the Real of reality in its alterity of finitude.14

CH 3 Introductory Framing
Chapter three functions as a methodological exploration of the theoretical frameworks
outlined in chapters one and two. In this chapter, I consider in what ways I as a teacher-subject
perceive reality by juxtaposing the subjective ontological plane qua virtual reality; or, more
specifically, various (re)presentations of technological education and Žižek’s negative ontology.
Using the film, The Matrix as an interpretive lens and pop cultural sign post, I work to develop a
Žižekian reading of the Real–the abyssal vortex which ruins every consistent structure–as a crisis
of teacher ontology. Metaphorically, the underlying question that threads this chapter is whether
what I (as teacher-subject) perceive as reality is the Matrix–in that it prevents the individual from
seeing reality as it effectively is? The trap to be avoided in education–just as in our interpretation
of the The Matrix–is that the Real we should be seeking is not a “true reality” found by
contrasting the virtual domain against material reality. Instead, understanding is found beneath
the fallacy that some larger structure impedes our access to the Real reality such that beneath the
opaque space of the virtual is the “desert of the Real.”
Here again, the parallax view is present in how the subject and object are ‘mediated’ and
the splits in consciousness and understanding between physical and digital modes of reality.
Against the notion that technology prevents our access to the Real of reality, I argue that the
problem of education is that teachers always-already misperceive the constitutive consistency of
the experience structuring reality. Thus, it is the teacher’s subjective fantasy that s/he

14

Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
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misperceives as reality generating a false understanding of the Real that is bearable. Given this
position, each methodological movement begins from the lack within every teacher-subject and
proceeds toward a radical pedagogy (beyond traditional and critical frames) by pathologically restructuring the failures of the subjective frame–highlighting how shifts in teacher ontology can
radically alter the reality of what we call education.

CH 4 Introductory Framing
Chapter four takes up the breadth of the preceding chapters by examining how far our
reflexive understanding has been extended and asking the Leninist question, what is to be
done?15 What is to be done with this newly uncovered perspective of self as a teacher? As a
concluding oeuvre I situate my subjective self in relation to Stanley Kubrick’s16 adaptation of the
dystopian novella A Clockwork Orange17–a cinematic cacophony of “ultraviolence” that
critically examines the perverse hypocrisy of modern society. Using Kubrick’s reading of the
narrative as a conceptual framework, this penultimate chapter formulates a series of unlikely and
disquieting parallels between Alex- the story’s primary antagonist- and my own enunciations of
being both as a teacher and within the larger structures of our modern socio-Symbolic culture.
As I have outlined this project at various academic conferences and shared my initial
findings with colleagues, my use of the film has been received with skepticism by some within
the field, viewed as little more than a theoretical sideshow used to grab an audiences’ attention,
when viewed from an-other (i.e. parallax) perspective, this criticism highlights the pedagogical
possibility of the Žižekian example. Examples can, of course, be suspicious when used as props
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in our line of reason. But Žižek’s particular use of the example as dialectical method
demonstrates how it can enable the audience to make sense of an argument that might otherwise
lack clarity or proper insight. In his own parlance Žižek notes,
I resort to these examples above all in order to avoid pseudo- Lacanian jargon,
and to achieve the greatest possible clarity not only for my readers but also for
myself— the idiot for whom I endeavor to formulate a theoretical point as clearly
as possible is ultimately myself.18
The importance of Kubrick’s reading of Burgess’ novella is uncovered both in his alterations to
the narrative itself and the possibilities that only exist in his re-presentations through the
cinematic lens. To fracture the bounds of this analysis further, Kubrick’s reading of violence is
read again along-side Žižek’s theory of violence–constructing the chapter’s formulaic structure
Kubrick avec Žižek.
In retrospect, I have come to view this chapter as something akin to Marcel
Duchamp’s Étant donnés. The installation occupies a closed-off room in the main Duchamp
gallery at Philadelphia Museum of Art (see Figure 1). The room itself is a dead end, it can’t be
entered. The entrance blocked by a pair of locked antique wooden doors, impenetrable except for
two small peepholes bore into their center.
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Figure 1: Marcel Duchamp, Étant donnés, 1946-66, Exterior View. Philadelphia, Philadelphia
Museum of Art.
Viewing the installation requires the viewer to peer into the peepholes–an act only one person
can do at a time–making the viewing experience intensely self-conscious. Simultaneously, there
are always other spectators waiting, creating a constant sense of being gazed up as if you are
momentarily subsumed as an object within the tableau. Inside, just beyond the door, you see
shattered brick and, in the distance, a painted autumn landscape (see Figure 2). In the
foreground, just beyond the fallen wall, the nude body of a woman is sprawled on a nest of dried
branches. With her face obscured by blonde hair and her legs spread, one cannot help but feel
that her genitals are the intended focal point. Immediately to the right, her left arm is raised at the
elbow and in her hand, she holds a small, illuminated electric lamp.
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Figure 2: Marcel Duchamp, Étant donnés, 1946-66, Interior view. Philadelphia, Philadelphia
Museum of Art.
There is a beauty and violence in Duchamp’s work that parallels the reading of Žižek that
emerges through Kubrick. Simultaneously, the odd alterity of being that exists when attempting
to view ourselves from the outside. Étant donnés frames the troubled states of reflexivity we
encounter throughout this chapter. Throughout the processes of reflexive exploration and
problematization of the reflective method, chapter four highlights an explicit implementation of,
or perhaps examination of, Žižek’s paratactic method. As such, this chapter is both intensely
theoretical and laden with pop cultural references to help unpack dense philosophical concepts.
The main point of differentiation from earlier chapters–and from most mainstream education
literature–is that this chapter is intentionally lacking in overt educative analysis. To reiterate the
proceeding, the intent here is not definitional laziness but to leave the reader space to infer what
is missing so that you might interpret and apply it to your own contexts. This does not mean,
however, the chapter is void of analysis. The antagonistic structure of the film is re-presented
through multiple readings of the structures of school(ing) and my-self as teacher-subject whereby
an array of perverse hypocrisies are unveiled exposing an inherently antagonistic and violent
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edifice. By problematizing the assumptive positionality and representation of the film’s key
figure– I situate myself, as a veteran teacher and administrator in a large U.S. city, aside Alex, a
controversial antihero and authoritative assailant within Kubrick’s exegetical minefield. The
notion of a teacher, as such, functions as a Lacanian object filling in the void that gentrifies the
terrifying Thing constitutive of Symbolic reality itself. Simultaneously, my own understandings
of being (as teacher, subject, etc.) are confronted with various iterations of Symbolic and
objective violence; a violence always-already unconsciously dismissed because it functions as an
invisible force inherent to the allegedly non-violent or “normal” state of things.19 However, by
remaining alongside Alex, I am forced to constantly question the assumptive normality of this
state of being.
The intentionality of this final journey is to confront myself with the role that fantasy
plays in my own subjective understanding–particularly, as it relates to various iterations of the
notion of violence itself. It becomes increasingly clear to me (as the chapter progresses) that
fantasies are not easily located within everyday experiences but within the trauma of disjunctive
experiences that become momentarily present. Picking up on what was uncovered in the
preceding three chapters, this final analysis highlights again and again that the universal (Real)
truth of being is alienation itself. The price for our access to what we experience as reality is that
somethings must remain unthought–this is the function of fantasy.

CH 5 Introductory Framing
As this collective project draws to an end, I highlight the collective toll of this research,
uncovering the full depth of my fantasies and the role they play in making the daily reality of my
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circumstances tolerable through the creation of multiple layers of (mis)perception. The notion of
violence is invoked as a methodological deathblow to my subjective self by creating a rapturous
missing link to open the radical potentiality of teacher reflection by placing the subjective self
under the extreme distress of the method itself.

Conclusion
In the end, I wonder–even under the extreme distress of this method–how effectively
teachers can change the circumstances of their reality? How does teacher reflection already
function as a system that produces, and at the same time is constituted by, parallax views–
multiple, incongruent, and self-contradictory–that suspend our sense of reality? As a teacher/researcher attempting to relinquish my grip (on the constructs of education, reality, etc.), even
unconsciously, how does this process involve a fear of loss and betrayal that saturates my
subjective experience? Is this sensation amplified on the left, as we view our-selves as protecting
a vision (version of the truth) that is “radical” in its purity? Does the constantly shifting terrain of
the educational complex cause a heightened sense of anxiety over the apparent loss of autonomy
spiraling outward in something akin to what we might call agency panic? As a teacherresearcher, I often find myself transforming similar feelings into a nervous energy that constantly
questions what lies beneath all things. I find myself engaging in fits of interpretive paranoia,
always reading between the lines trying to see through the bullshit of everyday reality. After
emerging from these interpretive fits, I find myself in a downward spiral, facing the
possibility/probability that my own failures within the classrooms are just as egregious as the
systematic failures I try to resist. After three years of research I now face the prospect that I am
not ostensibly any different as a teacher than I was in the beginning.
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Tarrying with the negative is, at its most basic, a process expressed in the withering of
idealism. The idealism that is the belief in the dream of teaching and the possibilities of what
might be over the course of my career. More than mere pragmatism, the decay of this idealist
position might serve as a fulcrum for radical change or represent the loss of my identity (in)to the
hegemonic abyss of the structures of education. To this end, Hegel’s argument is that the
“subject does not survive the ordeal of negativity: he effectively loses his very essence and
passes over into his Other.” The Other in this sense represents the hegemonic discourse of the
educational apparatus, and my essence is the dream I cling to—that a radical teacher can change
the world one child at a time. Over time, however, the system draws each of us into closer
proximity with one another until the Other subsumes the essence. Thus, as a teacher-subject I
must arrive at the violent realization that the system is beyond my resistance. But where does this
leave me/us? According to Agamben, within our present historical moment, the strength of true
philosophical thought requires the courage of hopelessness.20 Žižek goes on further to say:
The true courage is not to imagine an alternative, but to accept the consequences
of the fact that there is no clearly discernible alternative: the dream of an
alternative is a sign of theoretical cowardice, functioning as a fetish that prevents
us from thinking through to the end the deadlock of our predicament. In short, the
true courage is to admit that the light at the end of the tunnel is probably the
headlight of another train approaching us from the opposite direction.21
Perhaps then, as I stare into the abyss, do the feelings of despair and abject hopelessness that
torment me mean this methodological endeavor helped me arrive precisely where I need to be!?
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CH 1- My Precious Fantasy is Shit: A Negative Ontological Reading of Critical Pedagogy
The Trash Can of Education
In the 1980’s film They Live,1 a transient worker in Los Angeles, John Nada, discovers an
unusual box of sunglasses that function somewhat like a direct critique of ideology. When the
glasses are worn, they allow him to see the “real” messages beneath advertisements, public
messaging, and so on. As the film reaches its climax, Nada attempts to get his friend, Frank, to
wear the glasses but faces an unexpectedly brutal resistance from Frank. In response, Nada offers
an ultimatum: “I’ll give you a choice, either put on these glasses or start eating that trash can.” In
this moment, the oft-forgotten Hollywood cult classic unveils two unconscious and fantasmatic
distortions by paralleling the function of the critical pedagogical frame. First, as philosopher
Slavoj Žižek notes, we are already “eating from the trash can all the time … but the material
force of ideology makes us not see what we are effectively eating.” As a consequence, it is not a
false understanding of reality that enslaves us. Rather, the tragedy of our condition is that at the
moment we think we escape ideology into our dreams (and begin to think we exist outside
ideology), we are actually most within it.2
If we take a step backward and examine this example further, we find that in our
enlightened or perhaps cynical times it might be said that we are all always-already wearing the
glasses. Thus, the fight between Nada and Frank would never occur. Instead–like Tyler Durden
(Edward Norton) in Fight Club3 (–after putting on the glasses, Nada would only see his own
monstrous face and the blind automation as the truth of the cynical (i.e. post-ideological
position). In such a context, the function of the glasses provides an inversion of the standard
1
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critical pedagogical critique. From a critical pedagogical perspective, the wearing of glasses
often functions as an analogy for the distortion of the subject’s view;4 thus, by taking them off
(i.e. the emancipatory struggle), the subject can finally see things the way they really are. This
analysis, of course, follows a standard Marxist reading of false consciousness, whereby ideology
is an epistemological problem (a problem of knowledge). As an example of such a reading,
McLaren notes, “underneath their explicit and official purposes, curricular and pedagogical
processes are organized in the interest of elite groups, and […] they function to preserve social
structure and hegemony.”5 But the film’s inversion of the ideologic critique highlights the failure
of the epistemological claim and the ultimate illusion of critical resistance: ideology is not
simply imposed on the subject. Instead, we enjoy our ideology! This is why, according to Žižek,
Frank resists John’s demands to put on the glasses. 6 The subjective Real that insists within the
ideological critique is precisely the inverse of the critical pedagogical perspective—to put on the
glasses exposes the truth of the lie, shattering the illusion of emancipatory resistance. The Real
of our reality, as such, is that we must be forced to be free, forced to endure the extreme violence
of liberation, and the hurt of our own freedom.7
Over the years, I have come to imagine myself in a similar kind of brutal confrontation
with both the educational apparatus I seek to resist and the ideological disposition of my
resistance. As a way of contextualizing the, at times, paradoxical nature of these positions, I
situate myself as a narrative referent within the confines and contexts of my classroom. During
my thirteen years as a teacher and administrator in urban U.S. high schools, I have self-identified
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as a critical educator. From the vantage of the Žižekian lens, this analysis seeks to articulate how
my daily reality is intimately tainted by particular ideologies and beliefs that implicate what I
see, how I see, and therefore how I interpret various educational settings. While what has always
appeared to be at stake, within the critical pedagogical frame, is a kind of ignorance of the reality
I live in, instead, viewed through a Žižekian prism, teachers are acutely aware of their distorted
perception of reality. Because of this, critical pedagogy can no longer be interpreted through
Marx’s classic reading of ideology–“they do not know it, but they are doing it.”

8

Instead,

following Žižek’s reading of Sloterdijk,9 the teacher position is situated as that of the cynical
subject: “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.”10
To be clear, this reflexive movement does not mean we are living in a post-ideological
world; rather, it highlights the failure of teachers’ awareness of the reflexive frame, particularly
as it relates to questions of epistemology versus ontology within educational research. Questions
of ontological understanding are, of course, a part of the daily fabric of all teachers’ reality—in
both the way teachers see themselves as educators and in the development of their professional
persona. While understanding our sense of self as teachers, in this way, is critically important,
this research seeks to problematize the very nature of our ontological horizon that formulates
these understandings. By examining my own mis-understanding(s) and mis-projections of
teacher-identity and subjectivity, this analysis seeks to uncover the spaces of being that exist
prior to our understandings of self as a stable subject in reality. What this shift in perspective
uncovers is that the way we perceive a problem is always-already the problem itself.11 For
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example, as a critical educator, I know that standardized curriculum does not fully reflect
students’ experiences or reflect the circumstances of my daily teaching. Nonetheless, I still make
changes to my lesson plans and implement pedagogical strategies to ensure that my students are
able to score well on standardized achievement markers. Despite my resistance, as such, I am
pathologically anxious over meeting the terms of the system’s output demands (e.g., common
core, AP test scores, college admissions, etc.), which ultimately determine my “success” within
the machinery of education. Thus, I am forced to hysterically address the system as the big Other
such that the Symbolic serves as the standard against which I define my self-identity.12
From a Lacanian perspective, the big Other is the symbolic space and discourse that
forms our intersubjective network constitutive of all meaning.13 Extending this outward, the big
Other, for Žižek,14 is the social substance–or rules of the game–that mediates all relations
between subjects. It is on account of the big Other that the subject never fully dominates her/his
actions. Returning to the example of John Nada, after a prolonged confrontation, Frank finally
does relent and don the ideological glasses. According to Žižek, as was alluded to in the
preceding, this is because of the pain of freedom or the “extreme violence of liberation.”15
However, what is paradoxical about the nature of Nada and Frank’s fight from the beginning is
Frank’s very resistance to wearing the glasses. Earlier in the film, Frank relates to Nada that he
was forced to leave his wife and children in Detroit to relocate in Los Angeles for work. More
importantly, Frank states, “We gave the steel mills a break when they needed it. And do you
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know what they gave themselves? Raises! The golden rule–he who has the gold makes the
rules.”16
Based on the establishment of Frank’s character, it would appear his sense of outrage at
the systemic injustice and societal unfairness–a collective knowledge Gramsci17 defines as goodsense beliefs– indicates he is already aware of the images he is likely to see wearing the glasses.
Thus, the question remains why does Frank exhibit such resistance? On the surface, it may be
that taking the step from knowing to seeing is, in fact, a painful experience. However, if
examined in reference to the big Other, we begin to see how the big Other is not only a Symbolic
network mediating social relations but also the locus of belief.18 Belief, in this way, is
externalized insofar as it is always belief through the (big) Other. Even from Frank’s cynical
position, his belief in the injustice of the system, in order for reality to remain operative (i.e.
appear whole) it is necessary to believe in the belief of the Other. By returning to McLaren’s
quote in the preceding, the elite groups that “preserve social structure and hegemony” are not the
big Other. Rather, it is the subject’s belief in this structure that is the operative function of the big
Other.
As I will highlight at numerous points throughout this text, using myself as an example
and McLaren’s writing as an axiomatic peg, the critical pedagogical position necessitates that
someone, somewhere, still believes-or, more aptly, refuses to wear Nada’s glasses. In this way,
critical pedagogy necessitates a belief that subjects somewhere are still caught in the traditional,
Marxist dispositif: the subject (students/teachers) who does not know that they believe. As
teachers, however, many of us find ourselves in a similar position to Frank. Many teachers are
16
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well aware of the structural illusions undergirding the system’s failures but still do not renounce
them. Working among these constructs of the logic of the fetish, a fundamental problem that
undermines my teaching is that I am (un)consciously aware that standardized curriculum is (for
example) not a representative evaluator of learning or instruction. However, within the daily
context of my classroom, I continue to act–through its teaching–as though it is. Thus, in a strictly
codified way, whether I care or do not care about my students is rendered inconsequential
because I cannot offer them any real assurance (about their achievement) without the
acknowledgment of the big Other. This disjunction, not the ideological mystification of false
consciousness, typifies why it is necessary to reexamine the subjective sticking points of
ideology and challenge education’s predilection with questions of epistemology. In other terms,
what is unveiled in this movement is that the subjective illusion remains always-already written
into the situation itself. As with the above example, I maintain the appearance of a critical
pedagogue and radical educator while continually reproducing the hegemonic system I proclaim
to resist.
Foundational questions of education and resistance, as such, necessitate an examination
into the state of the subject’s being that are beyond mere questions of knowing. The necessity of
this re-examination follows the problematic nature of teaching itself, such that, every time I
speak, a “question mark” appears over what I have said because a piece of me (as teachersubject) is always lacking.19 While this lack is inherent to the Symbolic order, it is the function
of ideology to camouflage the Real antagonism within any system. For example, the underlying
logic of critical pedagogy is predicated upon a state of wholeness–Freire’s whole acting upon the
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world20–to which the oppressed could return if the hegemonic apparatus could be subverted.21 It
is, however, the big Other that unifies this discourse by imparting to it a performative dimension
thereby causing the subject to act upon a fantasy (societal unity) rather than the antagonism (a
priori lack/antagonism). As a critical educator, I fetishize the fantasy and garner a perverse
pleasure from continually trying to capture the lost object (object a), which offers a semblance of
subjective closure by always falling short.
By calling into question the ontological consistency of the radical position, the subject–
as a critical pedagogical teacher– is exposed as persisting only as long as the revolution
continues to fail. As I will exemplify through my own subjective search for wholeness through
pedagogical critique, the process will not and cannot result in the discovery of something lost
because such an object never existed in the first place. Instead, it is through fantasy that the
possibility of the object is embodied as an indefinable, rapturous something that we experience
as missing in our lives. That is to say, by enshrining what is believed to be missing, the loss
becomes possible by presupposing the loss itself. By way of contrast, in drawing on Žižek’s
“radical attempt to ground subjectivity qua subjectivity into objectivity,”22 this research does not
seek to find a hidden objective reality of thought but uses the Žižekian lens to ground teacher
subjectivity in its negative character in the Real. The importance of this grounding is that the
Lacanian Real represents that which exceeds what can be imagined or symbolized by the subject
but is manifest as antagonism within and between the Imaginary and Symbolic registers. My
consciousness as teacher, in reference to the Real, can thus be described always integrally linked
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to an experience of incommensurability–what Žižek calls the subject “out of joint.”23 This
experience of lack or negativity may indicate the subject’s proximity to the Real, but the Real
cannot be identified as a positively existing entity or property that we can define within the
banality of our everyday experience. The Real, as a consequence, is repressed from our
consciousness (i.e. is not simply a part of objective reality) and simultaneously represents a
critical point of reflexive analysis in our attempt to better understand our self-identity as
teachers.
Given the illusionary nature of my position as a radical educator–and of subjective
wholeness itself–the larger philosophical movement of this analysis seeks to develop a negative
ontology of teacher-identity. Following Žižek, a negative ontology of teacher identity, seeks to
avoid the radical contingency of the postmodern project by circumventing its relativism and
developing the universal–to be discovered by the subject–as negative a priori. Or, in other terms,
that which always returns as the “same” in any disclosure is the Lacanian Real as ontological
difference, the inconsistency or gap that divides any “one” from itself. For teachers, the ability to
distinguish between the daily life-world of existence and the Real necessitates a dialectical
understanding between universal necessity and particular contingency. Education, in such terms,
always-already involves what it is not and this universal is enunciated through a relative locus in
the constellation of social positions. Thus, instead of a conception of knowledge as universal
truth that pushes the postmodern subject to sift through competing forces of temporary truths24,
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universal truth, as negative a priori, is a dialectical process of becoming manifest as antagonism
and alienation.25
The paradoxical situatedness of the two positions I have outlined in the preceding–(1) the
subject blinded by (un)conscious desire acting upon a subjective fantasy and (2) the alienated
subject–calls into question the connection between my view of real(ity) and my subjective
understanding of self-identity. According to Žižek, the actuality of life is “structured by
reference to symbolic fictions,” such that any examination of the Real involves what he calls
“tarrying with the negative.”26 While symbolic fiction has a fantasmatic quality, it nevertheless
possesses the power to structure identities and prevent the subject from realizing the void that is
inherent to reality. As we have discussed previously, this is the function of the big Other; but,
regardless of whether Nada and Frank are wearing the glasses, the void in the Symbolic register
(that is the Real itself) only emerges by tarrying with the negative. Education qua the
pedagogical has a similar quality. Education, as a structure, functions like the Symbolic big
Other–defining the rules of the game that mediate social relations and the standards against
which I define myself as a teacher. Education, in this way, is intertwined with the unconscious
materiality of the teacher-subject becoming increasingly invested with the fantasy scenarios that
drive the subject’s sense of identity. What was once pure negativity now “acquires a positive,
determinate being”27 (reality) for the subject. This intrusion then presents itself as an outward
manifestation qua the pedagogical thereby projecting the fantasy ideal that resides in the
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unconscious; or what is inscribed into the structure of the educational apparatus, now appears as
truth itself.
By tarrying with the negative, this chapter attempts to articulate a reflexive position from
which teachers can resist this perverse logic. The violence of this reflexive position is based on
Hegel’s logic of reflection28 where there is nothing before the loss. Thus, each illustration both
deteriorates the ideal of a primordial unity and moves me closer to an ontological space of
nothingness wherein my teaching self persists only as self-relating negativity. From such a
position, for example, it becomes possible for the critical teacher to act in opposition to the
formulation of the fetishistic disavowal, announcing the fetish itself thereby exposing the teacher
as the fetishist unable to accept his or her own impossibility. The fetish object, as such, is
uncovered, functioning as the reflexive point through which the teacher can begin to articulate
her/his own emptiness in the Symbolic (negativity) and the illusion of subjective wholeness. The
trauma of such an encounter is a questioning of the validity of all teachers’ perception(s) that
highlight how shifts in teacher ontology can radically alter the reality of what we call education.

The Stupidity of the Name Teacher
To begin from the proceeding definitions of alienation, however, would be to proceed too
quickly. Instead, it is necessary as Lenin compels us, “to begin again from the beginning”29 so
that we have no illusions about our position. On this condition I frame this text with the most
banal of questions: why did I become a teacher? My response, as my narrative will explicate,
uncovers a fantasy structure that defiantly propagates my desire to teach. Located in the
28
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unconscious, my story begins with a disproportionate attachment to my own fantasmatic story of
ineffective teachers perpetually failing students (like me) within an Orwellian like system of
(re)production. My own teaching, in response, was driven by a desire to resist the hegemonic
structure(s) I perceived as the bedrock of the educational system itself—a desire hyperbolically
amplified by my personal leftist (political) philosophy. Following this frame, we might tersely
define the root of this research with the following question: how it might be possible to (1)
deconstruct (non-Derridean) my own perceptions of self, relative to the critical pedagogical
frame and (2) articulate a basic conceptualization of how Žižek’s notion of tarrying with the
negative might be reflexively entangled with teacher research. In view of this position, the
specific intent of this analysis is not a critique of critical pedagogy; rather, it is an unwinding of
my understanding(s) of self in relation to the critical pedagogical frame and my failures as
critical educator as a movement toward the articulation of a coming after–a radical pedagogy that
is beyond traditional and critical frames.
Arriving for my first day of school—wearing jeans, boots, and a worn military jacket—I
manically prepared for my first lesson by both politicizing and propagandizing the everyday
images of our space. Being of from a large midwestern city, includes an (un)conscious
understanding of being that involves both a daily and historical reality of violence, power
inequity, and corruption that are specific to that city. We might imagine this perspective, again,
through the viewpoint of John Nada. Just as Nada’s glasses allow him to see beyond the veil, the
people of the city have a distinct knowledge of the grime beneath the city’s picturesque beauty.
As a teacher, I assumed my students’ temporal horizon of knowledge and experience would be
easily sutured to critical readings of the world—from which there could be created a visceral
mode of inquiry for the class. But beneath this hopeful and idealistic frame, I was, of course,
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further fueled by the rage of striking out against the system I believed had failed me. Perceiving
myself as having already been cast out of the system I was re-entering, I was desperate to define
myself in opposition to this structure–i.e. as a radical educator.30
This formulation of subjectivity follows Rancière’s reading of the part of no part31 in that
I believed I was always-already lacking an individual sense of identity in the system. Not
dissimilar to Freire’s32 oppressed, the part of no part within any social system has no voice or
place within the social system. For Rancière, both politics and its resistance revolve around this
position in response to the systematic distribution of visible and invisible positions in what he
calls the distribution of the sensible:
A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time
something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts
and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that
determines the manner in which something in common lends itself to participation
and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution.33
In Lacanese, this distribution is the function of the big Other whereby the subject is the lack in
the order of being. It can be said that the subject is always lacking because there is no signifier to
express the subject-in-itself and the subject is always seeking that which it lacks. On account of
my perceived dislocation from a determinate place within the educational apparatus, I began
fetishizing externalized objects and images in an attempt to suture the cracks in my ontological
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horizon. In Capital (Vol. 1), Marx anticipates Lacan’s reading of lack through his formulation of
commodity fetishism: “only by being reflected in another man–that is, insofar as this other man
offers it an image of its unity–can the ego arrive at its self-identity; identity and alienation are
thus strictly correlative.”34 From my position as a teacher, I turned toward other teachers–just as
Nada turned toward Frank–desperately seeking any confirmation of my identity. However, while
this intersubjective exchange creates a fantasmatic reflection of wholeness (the body of B
becomes for A the mirror of its value) each projection only deepened my sense of alienation and
anxiety. This reflective displacement also fed the (un)conscious belief that not only could I be
replaced by individuals, but also replaced with them.35
As an explication of the critical pedagogical perspective, this position is easily described
within the neoliberal discourse of education such that all teachers face a substanceless
subjectivity—alienated from Symbolic reality; the teacher, as such, is proletarian.36 From a
Marxist position, Althusser describes alienation as the subject’s participation in some social
program. But, for Lacan, misrecognition occurs in a much more fundamental way. My
construction of self-identity as a teacher is an attempt to reconcile my view of self with the view
I suppose others have of me. For example, as a new teacher I needed to believe I was making a
difference in the lives of my students to be able to function in my professional role. This, of
course, is a primary motivation behind many new teachers’ actions and beliefs. This personal
need becomes the primary impetus behind teachers’ alignment with whatever collectively
defined ideological program through which they self-identify and establishes an (un)consicous
vision of teaching (e.g. pedagogical strategies, teacher/student relationships, etc). It is within this
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formulation that I identified with the critical pedagogical frame and understood my-self as a
response to externally imposed performative criteria. While Marxist notions of consciousness
account for this movement/moment of misrecognition, through the Žižekian lens, when we
encounter our failure, there is no redemption. The Lacanian mirror, in this sense, is broken: every
reflection is an awkwardly located fragment of self, failing to reconcile with each other. As a
consequence, teachers are caught in a never-ending attempt to capture an understanding of
his/herself identity in relation to the world.
While I do not take up the traditional, critical (i.e., Marxist) critique of neoliberalism
here, this formulation situates my-self, as the subject of this text, within the larger political
terrain of educational research—particularly within and against the philosophical complex of the
AERA.37 The complex of the AERA represents an attempt to control what Hardt and Negri call
the commons–the shared substance of our social being whose privatization is a violent act that
should be resisted by force.38 The discursive enclosure of our thinking is often represented in
education through Foucault’s theory of subjectivation39 whereby the subject (as teacher)
recognizes, internalizes, and constructs him/herself in accordance with scientific discourses and
norms of behavior. Under the conditions of modernity, the subject is a product of such regimes
of normalization inside which the self (dis)appears. The teacher, as a result our subjectivization,
becomes an alienated correlate of mechanisms of power/knowledge which the individual
formulates as an external identity.40 Thus, there is no subjective place outside the manifold
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discourses of power as resistance in inextricably entwined with power. This implies the subject
cannot posit itself effectively beyond discourse or assert itself beyond the mechanisms of
power.41
For Žižek, subjectivity is, instead, an obscene joke of our reality repeated every time we
see our reflection. For him the subject is less than nothing (and more than everything) and in our
reflection there is an unconscious horror prior to the moment of our own recognition.42 But it is
in this moment of delay, the gap between being and knowing, that the subject experiences the
self in its purest form.43 This formulation of subjectivity is based on the Lacanian thesis that the
self is empty and unable to match its own substance to itself because of an “obstinate repetitive
fixation on a contingent object that subtracts the subject from its direct immersion in reality.”44
From this position, it is possible to see how a teacher is alienated from the daily context of their
reality, divided from itself, and able to dream only through a fantasy object. The primordial
experience of my-self as a teacher was (/will always be) thus an experience of (pure) negativity.
This negativity was, at its most basic, expressed in the withering of idealism–the belief in the
dream of teaching–over the course of my teaching career. More than mere pragmatism, this
decay in my reflexive positionality served as a fulcrum for change by representing the real loss
of my identity (in)to the hegemonic abyss of the structure of education.
Hegel’s argument is that the “subject does not survive the ordeal of negativity: he
effectively loses his very essence and passes over into his Other.”45 The Other in this sense
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represents the big Other or hegemonic discourse of the educational apparatus, and my essence
was the dream I clung to—that a radical teacher can change the world one child at a time. Over
time, however, the system drew each of us as teachers into closer proximity with one another
until the Other subsumed my essence—i.e., I, as a teacher-subject, arrived at the violent
realization that the system was beyond my resistance. My subjective self–as critical pedagogical
teacher–was always-already searching for something within me (whatever this it was) more than
itself. This is a classical reading of Lacan’s objet petit a: I perpetually search in vain for a
positive reality because reality has no such positive consistency.46 My ontological self, as a
teacher, was thus nothing but an objectification of the void that is reality itself. Or, the reality of
my classroom was nothing but a series of discontinuities masking my own alienation in the
signifier–bestowed upon me by the Symbolic discourse of education itself. It is in this way that
there is no truth of meaning apart from alienation.
As

a

new

teacher

then,

what

I

missed,

by

positing

a

Symbolic

representation/identification as a radical educator, was my (un)conscious submission to critical
ideology itself. In Lacanian terms, my embrace of the critical pedagogical perspective provided
an alternative pathway offered by an-Other. While this place provided a sense of acceptance that
restored the ego (false self) in the form of fantasy—i.e., I (un)consciously perceived the Other as
having a positive view of me—it paradoxically reinforced the failure of my representation within
the system itself. Because ideology creates particular effects in the libidinal economy, I
unconsciously attached myself to the permanence and self-identity of the “I” in language.47 My
resistance, as a consequence, was always in part a response to an insufficiency in language and a
forced choice caused by my inability to imagine a “real” self against the Symbolic mandate.
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Being a critical educator, in response, necessitated my readiness to give all of myself for the
radical realization of change and a commitment to knowing that is constantly dissolved,
(re)constructed, and turned back on itself. McLaren calls this idea(l) of radical change the “daily
poetics” of teaching whereby the individual violently asserts his/her own subjectivity, creating a
narrative space against the naturalized flow of the everyday.48
What this problem exemplifies, however, was that as a teacher I lacked the ability to
separate reality from its symbolization—a condition which fundamentally undermines the
paradigm of teaching. As a question of enunciation, “our descriptions do not naturally and
immutably refer to things”; rather, things in retrospect begin to resemble their description.49
However, in the daily context of my teaching, I continued to uphold a modernist logic of
school(ing): there is a reality out there to be found and “we” (teachers) can teach “you”
(students) a language to accurately represent it. Just as Kant was unwilling to accept that the
sublime is the same as the monstrous (all that changes is the subject’s perspective on it),50 I was
unwilling or incapable of accepting that there is no necessary relationship between the reality we
(teachers) perceive and its symbolization—i.e., my epistemological reference points did not
immutably reference objects. Even within the critical paradigm, reality appears as somehow
beyond the ideological (e.g., I convinced myself that if only my students could learn X, they
could overcome the misapprehensions of false consciousness).
The totality of this interplay represents an attempt to construct an ontologically consistent
world based on a logic of truth51 that accepts as a given the ontological limits of being. However,
because I was never able to definitively know what the big Other wants, I am always faced with
48
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a gap, unsure of what was submission and what was resistance–or who I was as a teacher and
what I was (ideologically and systematically mandated) to be. Within any school, there are
multiple stories of what it is to be a good teacher to be negotiated. While no story will
necessarily lend itself to any form of reconciliation, as a teacher, I still experienced the demands
of each of them. Fantasy attempts to fill in these gaps between who I am and who I am supposed
to be by unconsciously answering the question of who and what I am for the Other. From a
critical pedagogical perspective, it is easy to imagine the other as the oppressed students I was
working to serve. But, for Žižek, the image of the o/Other carries with it the massive weight of
the ontological Real, forcing us to confront our ambiguous repulsions and fascinations–the
forced insights into the non-existence and changeability of the big Other.52 Regardless of my
intentions, this gap always remained as a psychic inconsistency that plagued my
(un)consciousness, the reflexive gap where everything falls apart.
Using the notion of my teaching persona, as an example, my subjective identity is an
ontological response to the fantasy of my desire that fulfills the unfathomable X of the Other’s
desire. While I perceive this persona, the ideological and pedagogical stance of a radical
educator, as what makes me worthy of the Other’s desire, in actuality, it veils the irresolvable
lack that terrorizes my subjective (un)consciousness. Rather than serving to close the breach in
my identification within the Other, this position highlights how the subject is in the most radical
sense “out of joint”— constitutively lacking its own place in the Symbolic.53 Because of this
incongruity, my position as a teacher must be understood as following the formula of the
signifier—a stand-in for the stupidity that a name (teacher) refers to an object (the subject)
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because that is what we call it (teacher).54 This impersonal form announces the dimension of the
big Other—the intersubjective network of signifiers—beyond other subjects. The oblique
differentiality of this formulation leaves the teacher as always displaced by a minimal difference
from the place he/she occupies. For example, as a teacher, the structure of the field of my
understanding (signifier) is predicated on the redoubling of the object (the self-objectified) into
itself and the place I occupy in the structure—i.e., the phenomenon of symbolic reduplicatio.55
Consequently, as a teacher I can never absolutely “fit” in a place because there always remains a
gap at the level of enunciation. Thus, I am never fully what my Symbolic mandate tells me that I
am because I am always that thing (excess) and my own failure (void).
While on the surface this out of joint subjectivity might appear to overlap with the logic
of domination that informs critical pedagogy,56 the barred subject ($) is significantly more
compromised. For Lacan the barred subject is represented by ($) because the subject is split
between the ego–as false self– and the unconscious.57 More specifically, the subject is barred and
represented by the ($) because the subject’s identity is divided (alienated) from itself–i.e. there is
no thing (signifier) in which the subject can fully identify and, simultaneously, this lack is the
subject. The teacher, as barred subject, is barred because he or she subjected to the Symbolic
order beyond the intentionality of the ego’s false identity. The teacher’s consciousness, as such,
is always divided between an-other object (image or person) and the ego itself as pure
nothingness. As a teacher this resulted in (1) a narcissistic investment in external representations
and (2) a continual repression of any awareness I encountered as a result of my failures or lack of
54

Slavoj Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989) 3.
Slavoj Žižek. Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle (London: Verso, 2004).
56
Peter McLaren, Rage + Hope: Interviews with Peter McLaren on War, Imperialism, + Critical Pedagogy (New
York: P. Lang, 2006).
57
Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1995).
55

35

representation. In order for the ego to avoid a traumatic encounter with its own lack, this
nothingness is (un)consciously projected into the place of the big Other creating the lack–or what
Lacan calls the objet (a)–thereby reinforcing subject’s own desire and anxiety. In view of this
position, rather than being an epistemological matter of distortion or even the hegemonic
encasement of meaning to be overcome through pedagogical praxis, Lacan’s reading of the “I” is
deprived of its innermost fantasmatic kernel, rendering the subject “a nothingness counted as
something.”58 Within the daily confines of my classroom, my obsessional quest to attain the
impossible object (objet a) through knowledge (the Symbolic) resulted in a barred subjectivity
($) in the form of universal negativity. In my reliance on a knowledge that is always-already
there but inaccessible to me, I was left in the position of the obsessional teacher with no
possibility other than to alienate myself in the dominant social system–education itself.
In L’envers de la psychanalyse, Lacan describes this form of Symbolic (re)production as
an a priori matrix of passages from one discourse to another.59 The discourse of education
functions such that knowledge comes to legitimize forms of domination by positioning power
beneath the “neutrality” of knowledge. Education, therefore, functions as a discursive matrix of
representations and significations that obfuscates its structure through a constitutive formulation
of the “factual state of things.”60 Within this structure, the organizational discourse of education
(re)produces a split mode of subjectivity–the barred subject ($)–qua a universal negation
whereby the subject’s unknowing is captured within the obsessive struggle to find the Real
within the Symbolic. According to Lacan, this is the position of the obsessional subject or the
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subject that identifies with an Ideal Other who is already dead.61 This position means that as a
teacher I was alienated from my own desire and, because of my reliance on the idea of
knowledge itself, I could never escape the fundamental alienation in the system.
As a critical educator, I believed the way out of this paradoxical position was tied to the
belief that everything can be known, and alienation could be overcome by unveiling, reappropriating, and remixing ideas for our own particular usage(s). What this position misses,
however, is that since knowledge is located before the object, the limit of the Symbolic order
(objet a) is itself shown to be produced by the Symbolic order. Thus, while the subject obsesses
about capturing the Real within Symbolic knowledge, the Real constantly resists this
symbolization. On this point, many in the field of education turn toward Judith Butler’s
psychoanalytic reading of symbolization whereby the Real is a “failure of discursive
performativity to finally and fully establish the identity to which it refers.”62 While Butler’s
reading appears similar to Žižek’s on the surface, there is a divergence over the fundamental
consistency of the symbolic; particularly, as the symbolic relates to formations of subjective
identity. In their collaborative text Contingency, Hegemony, Universality this split is explicated
as residing at the point of “negativity” or how each understands/interprets negativity – identified
as a gap in self/identity – as it relates to hegemony and resistance.63 By situating subjectivity
within a point of negativity each renders the subject incomplete by way of an internal limit(s).
The difference, however, ultimately lies in the limit itself. For Butler, this antagonism is located
outside of symbolization in a pre-discursive material realm; while for Žižek, the Real is produced
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by the failure of the Symbolic.64 The antagonism, as such, is the gap of negativity that is both the
meaning of internal limit and the very meaning of the (Lacanian) Real.
Following Žižek, the critical pedagogical position, consequently, is really just tantamount
to an avoidance of the fundamental impossibility of the teacher’s subjective position and an
avoidance of such a traumatic encounter with the Real. Following Freud, Britzman escribes
teaching in similar terms, it is, for her, an impossible profession because of its constant
uncertainty. The teacher’s ineluctability is a structural incongruence, a position of pathological
uncertainty between the concepts of aporia (unavoidable, unresolved dilemmas at the heart of
our practice) and praxis (a teacher’s rightful action that is at once good and just).
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The

disturbance of this encounter, rather than being a failure of positionality in itself, provides a
glimpse at the subjective condition of ontological deadlock. By momentarily gazing into the
nothingness that is the subject itself, the teacher is able to grasp the root alienation and selfcontradiction that is the drive of dialectical thinking.66 This empty point of negativity is not
nothing but the inverse of everything, or the negation of all determinacy. No-thing is not nothing
but the void(ing) of the internally situated world of appearances that is subjectivity itself. A
teacher’s subjective passage, in this way, represents the transition from an epistemological void
to an ontological one; or, more precisely “the passage from the inaccessible Thing beyond the
subject’s reach to the subject itself as the Thing incapable of ever being reduced.”67
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Radical Pedagogy
Once the violence of this position is established it becomes possible to imagine negative
ontology as a perverse reading of critical praxis. The ontological deadlock of the subject
condition subsequently creates a pedagogical space beyond critical pedagogy whereby a praxis
of nothingness reflexively liberates the subject in its understanding of self-identity as the Real of
failure itself. Žižek reminds us of the socio-political potentiality of finding zero, or the void;
positing a collective goal of self-negation that voids all determinate meaning. The normality of a
reflective teacher, in contrast, is an apocalyptic subject whose inaction is both a “no” and a
“yes,” a feeble gesture that binds the teacher to the liminal definitions of Symbolic ideology.68
To proceed outside this position necessitates a pathological reflexivity fixated on the pure
indeterminacy of our own position. This opening wrenches at the subjective mask, exposing a
subjectivity that is neither being nor non-being, but the unrealized that is the teacher as the void
itself.69 From a position of pure abstraction, the radical pedagogical frame provides the
coordinates for the teacher to obtain distance from the fantasy within the traumatic core of
radical contradiction.
The subjective destitution of this reflective possibility makes it imaginable to proceed
toward a radical untethering of my own pedagogical frame, a space beyond the critical where
shared understanding(s) emerge from the possibility of enunciating the otherness of the Other.
This position, far from marking the end of my own necessity as a teacher, opens the possibility
of redefining the coordinates of my ontological horizon through the exploration of the liberatory
potential of loss itself. Following Žižek, the empty space of primordial loss is a substantiation of
Descartes’ withdrawal into self as universal doubt. Or, my self-reflexivity as a teacher is an
68
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intentional movement toward the madness of absolute negativity that preserves the necessity of
the reflexive subject itself. The madness of self-reflexivity, in this way, serves as a vanishing
mediator between the thing and its representation such that my withdrawal into self culminates in
a radical negativity from which I can no longer attempt to escape without accounting for the
terrifying deadlock of the Real.70
Returning to interplay between Nada and Frank as narrative exemplar, as the film
progresses Nada’s character increasingly emerges as an oppositional signifier, a kind of template
for other identities to use as an imprint. In this way, Nada serves as a vanishing mediator
between the thing (Frank) and its representation– a process we see played out in the following
dialogue:
Frank: I got a job now and I plan on keeping it. I'm walking a white line all the
time. I don't bother nobody. Nobody bothers me. You better start doing the same!
Nada: White line's in the middle of the road. That's the worst place to drive.
The Žižekian twist, however, is that even once the subject encounters its own deadlock and
posits this experience as such, the alienation of the Real is masked again by the objet petit a.
Thus, despite Nada’s appearance as having accepted his position of negativity, it is necessary to
consider his return to a position of alienation. Is Nada’s fantasy of resistance not similar to my
own fantasy construction of wholeness that sustained my self-identity? The delineation,
however, is that after an encounter with the Real, the reflexive position does not return to the
beginning but begins anew with an (un)conscious sense of being. The reality of myself as a
teacher, because of this, began to fissure while trying to maintain an ontologically consistent self
through the fetishization of my teaching as a means of fulfilling my desire. Desire, at its most
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basic, is the essence of Symbolic subjectivity and the non-acceptance of our ultimate closure of
being.71 In the classroom, this emerged as a fetishization of my students (as the objects of my
desire) and a concretization of my own Symbolic function in an attempt to produce a selfidentity I (mis)recognized as without gaps. Here again we see Britzman’s tension emerge as I
struggle to construct a sense of self-identity but the gap that is my self-identity serves as a
constant source of torsion that cannot be resolved without at least partial compromise. In the end,
the mounting strain of this internal conflict created an overwhelming desire for substantiation.
In response, critical pedagogy, as both a method and a process that grapples with the ever
contradictory and contested nature of self,72 appeared to provide me with an external unified
structure in which I could identify both aspects of my-self. The problem, however, was that
within the daily context of my teaching, my desire for resistance was translated into the demands
of the big Other compelling me to account for my success through the correlative achievement of
my students or risk being cast as a failure. More simplistically, my radical identity was a cover
story I sought and produced to make the daily reality of my existence more tenable. This
subterfuge made it possible to believe I was engaging in acts of radical, pedagogical departure
but, in actuality, I found myself in a position that was at least partially caught in the dominant
gaze. The big Other, in this way, governs the performative dimension of reality so that the
subject must (un)consciously appeal to it for knowledge (i.e., the rules of the game) because the
subject is both alienated from direct access to reality and believes the big Other has (control of)
the answers.
From a Kantian perspective, the world of teacher’s experience is a kind of illusion or an
inferior version of what is real. Experience, as such, is based on what appears to them, and
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appearances, as appearances, can only be of the subject—not in the objects themselves. As a
consequence, the Kantian thing-in-itself allows for an awareness of a subjective space between
what is experienced and the subject doing the experiencing. On this condition, the application of
Kant’s transcendental turn allows us to imagine the teacher’s ontology as both her/his
intelligibility in which being exists and the recognition of her/his subjectivity as irresolvedly
divided from the nature of things (pure negativity). It is this role of ontological lack itself that
grounds our being absolutely by uncovering the subject’s epistemological limitations as the
conditions of possibility in knowledge or what might be called the necessity of self-ignorance:
The paradox of self-consciousness [in Kant] is that it is possible only against the
background of its own impossibility. I am conscious of myself only in so far as I
am out of reach of myself qua the real kernel of my being.73
As an endeavor to “heal the wound of the primordial repression,”74 Kantian metaphysics
“retroactively creates the conditions of its possibility by instituting the illusion of a fully
transparent self-consciousness via the primordial repression of the subject’s self-splitting.”75 The
notion of self-consciousness therefore always-already implies the subject’s decenterment. The
problem, however, for Žižek, is that Kant allocates the ontological gap to the domain of
epistemology by locating negativity in the space between the subject’s experience of phenomena
and the thing-in-itself. Instead of forcibly identifying the contours of the ontological crack, this
formulation allows the teacher to remain in the position of the obsessional subject and naively
believe that they are located beyond the Other.
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My Precious Fantasy is Shit
In response, the final movement necessary in imagining a radical pedagogy is the
articulation of how subjective ambiguities are not merely epistemological but always also
ontological. For Žižek, this undertaking is a parallactic reading of subjective perception that
renders “the subject’s gaze [as] always already inscribed into the perceived object itself”76– in
the very manner by which the world relates to itself, no matter how paradoxically. By tarrying
with the pedagogical in this way, the teacher metaphorically glimpses the Real of its own
subjectivity in the incommensurability between the subject’s ontic life world and it’s a priori,
understanding of reality. These moments become visible in the perceptual displacements that
screen out perceptions of reality.
To expose the pisaller tensions and problematic nature of my subjective vantage point, I
explore Žižek’s analysis of Polish film director Krzysztof Kieslowski.77 Examining the lives of
people in Poland in the 1980s, Kieslowski started his career as a documentary filmmaker. But as
Kieslowski captured the emotional testimony of his subjects, he became uneasy about the
intrusiveness of its portrayal on film. His solution was to create fiction films rather than
documentaries because the former would allow him to better access the emotional content of the
lives he wished to explore. Žižek argues that the real-life actors in Kieslowski’s films create an
uncanny overlapping between real and fiction: “[the actor] does not immediately display his
innermost stance; it is rather that, in a reflective attitude, he ‘plays himself’ by way of imitating
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what he perceives as his own ideal image.”78 The resulting interplay is an expression of the
reality of life that can only be mediated through the subjectively produced fantasy of it. In my
own reflections as teacher, I played out the Kieslowski documentary by (un)consciously
distancing myself from the Real of the moment through the invention of stories about the reality
of reflections I sought to capture. Like Kieslowski’s subjects, in my very attempt to camouflage
the irreconcilable intrusions at the core of my subjectivity, I brought them into existence. In other
words, even in my descriptions of avoidance, I brought the Kantian thing-in-itself into being.
While it is never possible to seize the Real, each momentary glimpse into the horror of
my teaching accounted for an understanding of reality that was anamorphically distorted and
fragmented beneath a multiplicity of appearances (of the same ontological position). The
reflexive object, as such, does not exist objectively outside of this distortion because it is, in
itself, nothing but the embodiment of nothingness.79 While critical pedagogy acknowledges that
there is no neutral position, it falls short of acknowledging the truth of the Other and the
subject’s a priori alienation. The difference in positions–between critical pedagogy and a
negative ontology–is thus in the act of pushing the teacher’s perception beyond his/her present
understanding. Even from a position of pedagogical resistance, an object must be understood
positionally as only assuming clear and distinct features if viewed from an angle. Even then, the
undistorted image is only momentarily brought into full view of the teacher’s temporal existence.
Lacan’s analysis of the skull floating at the feet of Holbein’s Ambassadors (see Figure 2)
exemplifies how difficult it can be to see an object even if it is located directly within our gaze.
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The undistorted image of the anamorphic skull exemplifies how a thing can only be truly seen by
looking awry, the cost of which is that the rest of the image momentarily appears out of focus.

Figure 1.1: Han Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533. London, The National Gallery.
Thus, the manifestation of any distortion, though viewed from a certain perspective, is nothing
that assumes the shape of something.80 The scene of my own classroom, as such, was alwaysalready compromised and out-of-focus. My reflections of the scene, like Holbein’s painting,
contained the traps of the gaze, making visible to me something that can only amount to the
subject annihilated.81
With this in mind, the radical pedagogical position is imagined here as a mode of teacher
reflexivity whereby the object of subject’s eye is gazing back upon itself. From such a position,
the teacher is confronted by the primordial reflection of their own nothingness–momentarily
exposing the fragility between the Symbolic and the chaos of the Real. Lacan intimately traces
the relationship between the two such that the gaze threatens to undo all desire through an
outburst of the Real: “at the heart of desire is a misrecognition of fullness where there is really
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nothing but a screen for my own narcissistic projections.”82 From this position the object that had
transfixed me to critical pedagogy emerged as I clung to the potentiality of an ontological state of
wholeness. As a positivization of being, critical pedagogy appears possible through the
dismantling of oppressive systems of knowledge thereby opening spaces for the production of
horizons of non-alienation—the Freirean whole acting in the world.83 This wholeness, as the
object of irrational injunction, propagates a fantasy (inseparable from the formation of the ideal
ego) where human beings are no longer abstracted and oppressed, forced to live a fragmentary
existence, under asymmetric systems of power.84 Thus, the underlying logic of the critical pathos
posits a state of being to which the subject could return if hegemonic paradigm could be
subverted.
This fundamental idea(l) allowed me as a teacher to cling to vestiges of a non-fragmented
self-identity. In this falsification, the ego effaces its own otherness by constructing the fantasy
image of wholeness, thereby masking the subject’s very alienation in the image that constitutes
it. By concealing the inconsistencies and gaps that occlude the void of the Real, my ideological
fantasy of a critical teaching self unfolded, progressively unmasking my inner lack, and
presenting the lost object as in the possession of the big Other. Within the structure of this frame,
I perceived the big Other as having access to this lost object, further reinforcing the ideological
belief that “they” are a threat to “my” being. The ideological fantasy, as a result of this, continues
to occlude the incompleteness of reality, allowing me to behave as if it were possible to grasp the
lost object (objet a) and reconcile the part of inner being lost when I became a subject. With each

82

Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.
trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1981).
83
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Ramos (New York: The Continuum International
Publishing Group, 1970).
84
Peter McLaren, “Critical Pedagogy and Class Struggle in the Age of Neoliberal Globalization: Notes from
History's Underside 1,” Democracy & Nature 9, no. 1 (2003) 65.

46

act of resistance, I perceived myself as retrieving little bits of the object—for example, by subtly
undermining my own administration or by teaching my students the “truth” about the system that
will always oppress them. But after each act, I was always left searching, questioning my own
pedagogical potentiality, asking, why doesn’t this feel emancipatory?
It was precisely this failure of the emancipatory, however, that bound me to my students
and the ideological potentiality of critical pedagogy. Each encounter with the Other was driven
by the unfulfilled desire for wholeness, but in each failure, I experienced momentary jouissance.
For Žižek, jouissance is a surplus-enjoyment that emerges in response to the anger caused by my
lack of fulfillment and wholeness in the Other. This distress generates enjoyment through a
“reversal-into-itself” by means of the subjective expressions of pain and discomfort.85 The
ultimate paradox of my critical positionality was that it is only in the Other, whom I constantly
resist, that my resistance registers in the Symbolic network. Unlike the subjugating gaze of the
critical lens, the gaze of the big Other, before which I (un)consciously imagine myself
performing, provides the point of symbolic identification. The Other’s gaze, in this way, enabled
me to act by suturing my understanding to my teaching practice. For example, instead of
experiencing the state and education as a labyrinth of branches and regulations in my daily
activities, I was able to posit the state as a singular hegemonic big Other that is aware of what I
was doing. Within this framework, I understood myself in relation to an enemy to whom I was
responding.
Critical pedagogy, consequently, functioned to bind me to a particular set of social
relations and a horizon of understanding, making it very difficult for me to break out of the
situation. Even in my perceived radical resistance, I was only ever acting in accordance to my
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desire—the mythical return to “it”—a desire attached to a seemingly inescapable set of
hierarchical relations and patterns of domination. Unconsciously, I was perpetually tormented by
the closeness of the Other because such closeness threatened to reveal the Other as never being
able to accommodate my desire for wholeness. Thus, in my subjective position as a teacher, I
could only thrive by longing for closeness itself because it preserved the fantasmatic illusion that
the Other had the key to my identity and provided an opportunity to a sublime wholeness if
resisted. The maintenance of my-self as a radical educator thus required that the revolution
always failed. This failure, as such, allowed me to keep up appearances because the narratives I
constructed could never quite catch up with me thereby allowing me to continue on in resistance
indefinitely.
In Lacanian terms, the essential point of impossibility is the motivation behind life and is
located in a desire that always mistakes its object.86 My teaching, as such, was constructed
around narratives that could never be actualized, displaced in a future that could never be
satisfied if I arrived at my destination. As Žižek notes, the subject derives a perverse pleasure
from working toward particular formulas of being as a behavioral manifestation of what Freud
calls drive: “a closed, self-propelling loop of repeating the same gesture and finding satisfaction
in it.”87 While new teachers may find satisfaction from following the rules, thereby relieving
them from making decisions in unfamiliar spaces, it might be said that the critical theorist finds
comfort in the perpetual failure of her/his own resistance. By being marred in the act of rebellion
itself, I ensured my own indefinite status as a revolutionary educator.
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Žižek warns, in this vein, against the attainment of our desires: “we don’t really want to
get what we think that we desire.”88 For example, as I was repeatedly faced with the glancing
images of the negative, I was left to experience the absence of the anaphoric big Other which
caused a short-circuiting in my ontological edifice. In other terms, such a position caused
glitches in my everyday perception of being that exposed the fantasy structure of my selfreferential importance. With each deteriorating representation of reality, the chaos beneath my
own paranoiac fantasies returned a nothingness mirrored by the terrifying Real of the unmasked
teacher standing before me. It is here, in the gaze turned inward onto itself, that I saw the
horrifying substance of my critical pedagogical practices. The truth of my reality was that the
primary impetus behind my “radical” teaching had never raised students’ consciousness or a
liberatory critique of the system that subjugates them. Rather, my motivation had been the
fulfillment of a fundamental narcissism, a pedagogical stance that realized my political desire to
be a radical, and that consummated my engagement in a critique of the system that both created
an Other to be resisted and perpetually (re-)defined my role in its resistance. By grasping at what
I desired, I was forced to realize the entirety of my teaching career has been fraudulent, and not
only had I not been acting on my students’ behalf, I had also, in actuality, been furthering their
subjugation.
Utterly debilitated as a teacher, I realized my very identity was supported by the structure
of educational apparatus I sought to resist. Further, I derived a perverse pleasure from being
forced to implement the hegemonic mandates of my subjugation because they ensured both my
Symbolic obscura and my fantasmatic ideals. Thus, it was only outside of this structure that my
sly smile deteriorated, and I was forced to acknowledge that real subjective freedom had always
88
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been unattainable from the beginning. The reflexive consequences of this realization are
catastrophic as the entire fantasy structure falters, uncovering the ideological falsity of the
subject that is a part of a greater wholeness. What both notions “repress” is the fact that there
never was a balanced (or self-enclosed) whole to be thrown out of joint by the subject, nor was
there a harmonious position for the subject to adopt.89 Instead, the subject has been barred from
the beginning and the only truth of the subject position is its traumatic lack. In Kantian terms, the
teacher is rendered disturbed by virtue of its very being, and behind the layers of philosophical
abstraction lie the terrifying emptiness that is the nothingness of the teacher his or herself.

Conclusion: A Negative Ontology of Teacher Reflection
By destabilizing a teacher’s subjective framework of understanding, this text follows
Žižek’s reading of Lacan through Hegel toward a determinate negation that attempts to open an
emancipatory space for thinking. By “undermining the coordinates of the system from which it
subtracts itself,”90 Žižek’s formulation of subject consciousness creates an ontological space
where a teacher’s awareness of their own condition stems from a malfunction in the subjective
fantasy. Such a failure is the result of unintentional encounters with the Real that cause traumatic
fissures in the teacher’s perception of self such that an authentic moment of reflection becomes
possible. The reflexive self, within this negative ontological plane, is a violent analysis of the
teacher’s own agency and constitutive lack. As a method of radical reflexivity, this movement
brings the subjective condition into focus by creating the conditions to negate previously
understood notions of self thereby becoming its opposite through the “annihilation and
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retroactive restructuring of the presupposed contents.”91 Ultimately, the re-formed teacher, as
any form of autonomous being, can only come into existence within the spaces created by such a
radical outburst of reflexive violence—the violence to impose a “new order on quotidian
reality.”92
To reframe the preceding in Žižekian parlance, it was not until I realized my precious
treasure is shit that I became able to look beyond the coordinates of my own subjective frame.
The point to be gleaned here is relative to the necessity of my own subjective destitution. In
Žižek’s description of Althusser’s autobiography L'avenir Dure Longtemps,93 he notes that
Althusser’s greatest fear was that others would become aware of his own non-existence. This
fear, rather than being a point of avoidance for Žižek, is the critical movement of psychoanalysis
demarcating the subject’s loss of anxiety about his/her own subjective position in the Real. That
is to say, material reality outside myself definitely exists; the problem has always been that I
myself do not exist.94 However, by accepting one’s own destitution, the subject is able to
relinquish the fetishization of the objet a or the belief in a hidden treasure that is responsible for
her/his unique worth in society. In Lacanian terms, this is the intimate moment that conjoins
madness and freedom,
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when it is possible for the subject to become un-glued from a direct

referential relationship. “The moment of decision is the moment of madness”96 precisely in so far
as that there is no big Other to provide the ultimate guarantee, the guarantee of an ontological
cover for the subject's decision.
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To fully withdrawal the self into the void of the Real necessitates a final speculative turn
toward Hegel. As a final short-circuiting of the teacher’s ontological horizon, the Hegelian turn
is an antagonistic wounding that allows for higher planes of consciousness through the violent
confrontation of the subject with its own presuppositions and the final disavowal of the desire for
wholeness.97 This disavowal necessitates a reflexive break from comprehending teaching
through a perspective codified by the illusionary fantasy of ontogenic (mis)recognition offered
by a predefined pedagogical framework. Radical pedagogy is imaged here as an encounter with
this dark side of the ontological edifice, a final act of teacher reflexivity that necessitates a
confrontation with the terrifying imagery of Real, wherein I disengage from my own “radical
pathology.”98 Methodologically, this reflexive endpoint is, for Žižek, a movement toward
ontological failure whereby the abyss beyond emerges as a groundless nothingness out of which
everything springs ex nihilo. Nothingness, in this sense, is a subversive transformation wherein
the subject encounters the radical alienation of an asubjective opacity rather than her/his own
self-image:
Reflection always fails [when] the subject … encounters in a mirror some dark
spot, a point which does not turn into his mirror-picture—in which he cannot
“recognize himself.” It is, however, precisely at this point of absolute strangeness
… that the subject is inscribed into the picture.99
Thus, the subject qua the subject of the look (reflection) is precisely the “inherently incomplete
pathological stain”100 from which the teacher is able to perceive itself against the chaos of its
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own (mis)recognition. Ontologically, this is the moment the “true” Žižekian subject emerges
because it is within this recognition that the “event” is doubled and the alienation of the Other
becomes present.
Within the nothingness of shifting educative experience, the recognition of my teaching
self as a pathological stain of ontological finitude exposed me to the ephemeral temporalities that
triggered me to seize within the vortices, gaps, and voids in the fabric of reality. For Hegel, this
is the night of the world where “the human being is the night, the empty nothing, that contains
everything in its simplicity—an unending wealth of representations and images, of which none
belong to him.”101 What this means is that the fantasmatic phenomenon of “seeing one’s self
seeing” as the disembodied “pure gaze” of ontogenetic experience collapses the fantasy frame
into the abyss of radical negativity at the heart of the subject.102 Radical negativity, as such,
cannot be sublated into a stable social edifice. That is to say, it is a self-relating negativity that
puts at risk and dissolves the social structure that supports both the finite status of the teacher
subject and the ideal of the discourse of education.
Regardless of the depths our (mis)recognition, the Žižekian lens asserts that there always
exists an indivisible remainder, or “bone in the throat,”103 that resists symbolization. Radical
pedagogy, as such, is centered on the teacher’s ability to understand and enunciate the conditions
of his/her circumstances, allowing for far-reaching reconceptualizations of the problems and
possibilities of educating. Therefore, teaching, like philosophy, “begins the moment we do not
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accept what exists as given.”104 By metaphorically glimpsing into the spaces of betweenness that
elude our ontic horizon, a negative ontology of teacher reflexivity highlights a way of thinking
about education without prescribed answers, where answers can only ever be partial and may
result in a violent passage à l’acte. Experiencing the excessive remainders of subjectivization
allows interlopers to envisage displacements in the Real as a gap or shift between perspectives
that “pulverizes sameness into [a] multitude of appearances.”105 Within this multiplicity,
pedagogical movements emerge within the gap separating objects in reality from the temporal
simulacra. In this absence, it is possible to articulate a radicalized ontology of education by
reformulating Descartes’ cogitio ergo sum to read, I think where the self is evacuated.
If educators are to take seriously the possibilities of this frame, we must not be so
arrogant to presume an answer and offer a plan of action for others, but tarry with the negativity
of our own ideological condition. The task, then, for all ‘radical’ educators is to begin looking
awry at our own subjective condition, encountering the trauma of the Real again and again. It is
through the trauma of our destitution that we can begin autonomously, inverting the current
system of education into a state of negative universality, a universality of irreducible Symbolic
inconsistency. As expressed through the linking of violent experiences and common
antagonisms, not the neutral translations of postmodernity, the true radical position is not just the
readiness to save ourselves or our students but also the “ruthless dedication to annihilating those
who made the victims,”106 even if this involves the thorough decimation of our own position.
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CH 2- Reflexive Wounding: Teacher Reflection as an Act of Nothingness
Introduction: Quiet Moments of Disruption
“…It is your privilege that allows you to sit around all day and think about this
kind of postmodernist bullshit.”
This intentionally combative lucubrate was directed squarely at me following the first conference
presentation in which I used Žižek’s philosophical corpus as my primary lens of analysis. The
bon mot that drew the ire of my interlocutor–both a senior academic and fellow panelist–was my
invocation of Herman Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener: “I would prefer not to.” My refusal, a
philosophical position familiar to readers of Žižek,1 was, specifically related to a request by an
audience member to articulate a possible solution to the economic and/or educational problems
that plague many U.S. cities. Having spent a decade of my career teaching in a large U.S. city,
my interlocutor was appalled by my “arrogance” and noted I was just another “wanna-be
philosopher,” a “young intellectual sipping the postmodern kool-aid…who didn’t care about the
causes I claim to resist.” Despite the relative distance of time since this moment, two pieces of
our interaction have lingered with me during my early struggles in academia: (1) his implicit
assertion that thinking itself is not an act and (2) his misinterpretation–despite his academic
standing–of the philosophical foundations of my thesis.
I offer this brief narrative as a way a foregrounding how a narrow piece of Žižekian
theory might add to teacher education; or, more broadly, the philosophy of teacher education.
While much of this research is necessarily speculative in nature, this chapter seeks to engage the
existing literature in the field–specifically around the notion of teacher reflection. By way of
offering a rough scaffolding, I begin this process by offering a ‘loose’ literature review of the
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notions of reflection and reflexivity. I use the term ‘loose’ because, in keeping with the thematic
structure of this research, I develop the notions in relation to my own understandings of the
methods throughout my career (academic and professional). While this may be atypical, it more
closely aligns with the larger goals of this research related to the understanding of subjective
being and constructs of fantasy. The middle portion of this chapter offers a Žižekian response to
this ‘standard’ formulation of teacher reflection. Rooted in Žižek’s reading of German Idealism,
particularly Kant and Hegel, I consider a methodological movement beyond teacher reflection
which I term here: reflexive wounding. The intent of the reflexive wound is to force teachers into
disjunctive spaces where each individual teacher-subject is confronted with the lack of being that
lurks at the centre of every shifting subjectivity. This truth of being is found in the trauma of
reality itself (negative ontology) or the realization that there is no positive content, the subject
can only be located in alienation and antagonism. From this position, it becomes possible to
imagine the mind as always-already possessing the ability to disrupt its own function thereby
generating a temporal space of subjective autonomy. Further, by recognizing a universal truth of
alienation inherent to subjectivity itself, the teacher-subject is freed to connect with others
(students, teachers, parents, etc.) and resist false and arbitrary Masters of truth–i.e. the discourse
of education as the Lacanian big Other (Symbolic order).
Before proceeding, however, let me conclude my opening narrative by offering a
manifestly Žižekian interpretation. At the root of our disagreement was the Leninist question:
What is to be Done? –a pathology at the heart of the political and philosophical Left (a position
to which both I and my colleague from this anecdote ascribe). I evoke the term pathology
because (more than a question) the spectre of the ideal causes so many leftist educators,
agitators, and would be conspirators to become lost in the rhetoric (of identity politics and so on),
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demanding a frenetic output of pseudo-activity to avoid the public shaming of being labeled “one
of them.” Like a car spinning its wheels in a ditch, we remain stuck in a kind of paralysis, but
revel in the resulting permanent state of emergency. However, if we are to take seriously the
possibility of the Žižekian frame, we must not be so arrogant as to presume an answer or offer a
plan of action for others. As intellectuals today, what might happen if we were to take a step
back and abstain from answering the Leninist question; instead, unashamedly, responding, “Fuck
it! What do I know?” How might this allow us to open the space to resist the urge to act simply
for the sake of doing something, a space where resisting the compulsion to act might mean
disrupting the reproduction of the existing social order? According to Žižek, practicing
nothingness is a means to act, as nothingness opens up the space for a different kind of activity.2
The act of nothingness is not a hopeless predilection toward nihilism but a necessary
presupposition for the emergence of an alternative order of things. Negativity, in this way, can be
understood relationally to the negative ontology threading chapter one; the absolute negativity
that always-already exists as the underbelly that structures the Symbolic order.
Such a negativity, from a strictly Lacanian perspective, is a necessary gesture of
withdrawal that precedes any positive gesture of enthusiastic identification with a cause.
Negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility allowing for truly uninhibited, fervent
identification–that is to say, it lays the ground, “opens up the space for it, but is simultaneously
obfuscated by it and undermines it”3 As educators, academics, and intellectuals at this point in
history, our duty is to open up our field of research to questioning and at the same time
undermine the field itself. The explicit absence of a plan, according to Žižek, is Brechtian in
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ideal: “[T]hinking always proceeds acting… acting without thinking is an impotent act.”4
Thinking is the formulation of an empty gesture; a gesture through which the space opens for
people to not only “realize their old emancipatory dreams… [but] reinvent their very modes of
dreaming.”5 Regardless of the discomfort of this position, the chaos and possibility of
unknowing are preferable to the wretched despondency and false freedom our present system
affords us. Or, to quote one of Žižek’s favorite passages from Mao Zedong: “[T]here is great
disorder under heaven [and] the situation is excellent.”6

Teacher Reflection: Reflecting on Teaching
It is from, and within, this space that I began to reflect on my own teaching and how I
engage in the act of thinking. The most overt and constant representation of this thinking has
been, of course, the act (method) of teacher reflection. Beginning with my Social Studies
methods courses, the value/necessity of reflection was vehemently instilled in me by my
professor–a former Marine who was intrigued by my septum ring and Russian history minor.
According to Dr. Byford, reflection offered us (pre-service teachers) an opportunity to evaluate,
refine, articulate, and engage our teaching practice while constantly re-evaluating our teaching
philosophies.7 Admittedly, during my first few years as a teacher, my reflective practices were
lacking at best. Day-to-day survival became imperative and the act of reflecting was reduced to a
series of post-it notes haphazardly placed around my desk describing how I believed I could be a
less shitty teacher tomorrow.
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As I read educational scholarship now, I am frequently baffled by the number of articles
describing the “theory-practice gap.” But, if I pause for a moment, theory was of little
importance to me early in my career. Thus, the presence of such a gap was simply not a reality
for me as a young teacher. However, as I have advanced through my career the intersections of
theory and practice have taken on new meanings. Perplexingly, I had been reading dense
(continental) philosophy since I was a teenager but struggled as a reader of educational
philosophy and/or theory. As a result of my comfort with similar philosophical texts, I began to
view my difficulties not as a question of understanding but in terms of transference into
application. Even now, I vividly remember my first encounter with Nel Nodding’s Philosophy of
Education,8 how I underlined far too many passages (an affliction that lingers to this day) while I
imagined how I would begin reconstructing my classroom. But the next morning when I arrived
at the main office, a sub duty was waiting for me. My frenzied will toward change was deterred
by the daily rigors of the bureaucratic apparatus and by the time my students arrived Nodding’s
work seemed like a veiled memory of a moment long forgotten. Over the course of my career, I
came to realize bridging the gap from intellectual understanding to the practical application of a
theory while simultaneously managing a classroom was much more difficult than I had expected.
As an issue of learning, one of the great ironies, of course, is that this struggle (i.e. alienation) is
experienced every day by our students–but I wonder how often teachers pause for a moment and
listen to students’ narrative. Over time, I found reflection was the most productive means of
bridging the gaps between philosophical foundations and the daily realities of my teaching. In
these quiet moments of disruption, I was able to start, stop, and rewind the narrative, allowing
me the space to make (more) practical connections.
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According to Day, Pope, and Denicolo, a large percentage of teacher thinking is tacit, a
knowledge that exists through experience that is rarely articulated.9 Considering this notion, the
method of teacher reflection would seem to function as an invaluable tool to articulate these tacit
understandings or what Wagner terms “knots in thinking”–the subjective and intellectual
experiences of conflict that impact teachers’ professional practice.10 The problem with this
notion, however, is that we yet again (often) encounter a theory-practice gap but in ways that are
decidedly more convoluted. In this instance, we might say that teachers encounter the opposite
side of the same coin; but instead of encountering the abstract temporality of theory, teachers’
face the bureaucratic concreteness of the educational apparatus. For example, when emanating
from the mouths of school administrators, reflection has most often been presented to me as a
prescriptive tool linking ‘best practice’ to a box on my daily/weekly lessons plans. Under such
conditions, the method is a means of demonstrating ‘effective’ teaching practice as measured
against a broad range of rubrics and standards. But the same method, as it is described by
theorists and qualitative researchers, is intended as an examination of one’s (un)known values
and beliefs–revealed through complex tapestries of data such as (but not limited to) personal
narratives, journal writing, action research, and (auto)ethnographies. Admittedly, as I am now in
the midst of my second decade of teaching, my reflections often spiral so far down the
philosophical rabbit hole that I frequently lose perspective on how any of what I have reflected
on might apply to the daily reality of my classroom.
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What is Teacher Reflection Anyway?
Realizing the potentiality of the method but facing the apparent hope/helplessness of its
usage, I have, at various moments throughout my career, engaged in extensive literature reviews
on the topic. As a philosophical starting point, Dewey’s work on how educators think provides a
useful anchor for an examination of the concept and method of teacher reflection. For Dewey,
reflective thinking was a cognitive process of discovering where a problem originated followed
by an intentional act of searching to resolve the difficulty.11 As a veteran teacher, if I were asked
to define teacher reflection on a post-it note as a part of a larger professional development
activity, it would be something akin to Dewey’s definition. In fact, when I ‘Google’ “teacher
reflection definition” an amalgamation of what the search index returns might read as the
following: a systematic inquiry into a teacher’s own practice. It should be noted, however, that
Dewey’s vision of teacher inquiry was not a prescriptive skill. Instead, inquiry and reflection
were meant to develop a teacher’s mind-set whereby the individual would constantly question
their own assumptions and uncover various aspects of who they are as practitioners.
Perhaps because of my familiarity with the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, I was
unaware that modern notions of teacher reflection emanated from Dewey; instead, my
understanding of the method was rooted in the work of the theorists Max Van Manen and Donald
Schön–both of whom were influenced by Habermas’ domains of knowledge. According to
Habermas, knowledge is gained through reflection such that reflection leads to transformed
consciousness or a transformation in the individual’s perspective.12 Habermasian models, such as
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Schön’s reflection as critical inquiry,13 developed a reflective practice meant to deal directly with
critique and social interpretation. By extending the boundaries of reflective practice, Van
Manen’s formulation placed an increased emphasis on critical understanding and a tripartite
differentiation of location:
Technical rationality – empirical reflection on how to best obtain an education
and thereby administer its instruction;
Hermeneutic phenomenology – examines the interpretive assumptions a teacher
makes within the context of their daily reality;
Critical reflection – analysis of the ethical and political dimension of educational
goals as a potential means for consensus about its ends.14
Both Van Manen and Schön attempt to anticipate the constant tension between teacher reflection,
interpretation, and its application thereby placing a particular emphasis on the examination of the
unknown during the reflection process. According to Schön, the development of an
“epistemology of practice”15 makes explicit the tacit processes of thinking which accompany
doing. As a result, Schön’s reflective method forces the teacher to constantly interact with and
modify their practice such that learning consistently takes place. On the surface, both Schön’s
and Van Manen’s descriptions are akin to the theoretical enunciations I described at the outset.
Yet, the concepts of hermeneutic phenomenology and an epistemology of practice appear to
provide a reflexive space to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
Extending these notions, or perhaps viewing reflection from a shifted perspective, the
notion of critical reflection itself would become–and remains presently–an area of great
13

Donald Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
Max van Manen, “Linking Ways of Knowing with Ways of Being Practical,” Curriculum Inquiry 6, no. 3 (1977)
205.
15
Donald Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (New York: Basic Books, 1983)
49.
14

62

emphasis in qualitative research. According to Norman Denzin,16 critical reflection necessitates
an emphasis on the sociocultural privilege and/or lack of privilege that the researcher carries into
the field as a foundational factor influencing their performance. In Searching for Yellowstone:
Race, Gender, Family, and Memory in the Postmodern West, Denzin goes on to examine critical
reflexivity as method for problematizing popular representations and scholarly discourses in the
creation of new versions of the past. Here, critical reflection–turned reflexivity–becomes a tool
for examining how personal experiences collide with hegemonic discourses and histories putting
bodies in motion toward the creation of both subjective and cultural memories. As a teacher, this
means one must be attentive to their own daily practices and how sociocultural and historical
structures have shaped their situatedness over time and space. Succinctly, Tony Adams and
Stacey Holdman-Jones note, “critical reflexivity is the labor [reflection] will perform upon
itself.”17 The critical lens, as such, necessitates the teacher being personally accountable for their
own situatedness in systems of power and privilege.
To highlight any specific theoretical lens of interpretation within this movement risks the
continuation of the hegemony each seeks to resist. Acknowledging this, I believe it would
imprudent and insincere to fail to acknowledge the tremendous impact Critical Race Theory,
Feminism, and Queer Theory have had on the development of this research. While each lens of
resistance may not be present in this current embodiment, I would not have arrived at this
destination without these narrative frames and the extraordinary research being conducted in
these fields. As a way of proceeding, it is important to highlight two major shifts that become
increasingly present within these frames: (1) the increased usage of term subject and/or
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subjective experience and (2) the transition from the term reflection to reflexivity. Shifts in the
usage of each of these concepts have led to major deviations in research surrounding the
potentiality of the reflective method. In the following section, I will document the difference
between the terms reflection and reflexivity, briefly describe how reflexivity has impacted the
field, and begin to construct a Žižekian response to the ideas of reflection and reflexivity.

Reflection and Reflexivity: Is there a Difference?
To briefly reiterate the preceding, teacher reflection is a systematic inquiry into one’s
own teaching practice. The term reflexivity differs from reflection in its bi-directional linking of
both internalizing and externalizing (e.g. structure and agency) factors that are both prospective
and retrospective.18 Within the terrain of teacher education, reflection is most often framed as an
act of looking backward to access or struggle to understand a failed part of our teaching or an
elusive portion of our subjective self. In short, teacher reflection describes a process of backward
or inward contemplation on one’s teaching or what it means to be a teacher. While reflection and
reflexivity are often–mistakenly–used to describe nearly identical methodological processes, this
characterization is more closely in line with the process of reflection not reflexivity.
In a recent guide on learning developed for teachers, the authors avoid the conflation of
the two terms (reflection and reflexivity) by defining reflection as “thinking with a purpose” and
reflexivity as “an awareness of personal involvement in meaning construction.”19 Throughout
this research, the primary focus of my analysis can thus be identified as teacher reflexivity rather
than teacher reflection; in particular, the movement from personal, to epistemological, and
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ultimately ontological reflexivity. For Carla Willig reflexivity involves a particular selfawareness that must be understood in one of two pathways:
Personal reflexivity involves reflecting upon the way in which our own values,
experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and social
identities have shaped [us].
Epistemological reflexivity encourages us to reflect upon the assumptions (about
the world, about knowledge) we have made in the course of our [examination],
and it helps us to think about the implication of such assumptions.20
Reflexivity, as such, is a heightened level of self-awareness gained through the recognition that a
teacher’s understanding cannot be developed apart from their own knowledge of self, identity,
and position in the world. This process of meaning making is the basis for the “reflective project
of the self;”21 a reflexively organized description of self-identity. Such understandings of
reflexivity involve a highly conscious monitoring and adjustment to given social conventions in
an attempt to construct a coherent narrative–even if it is only on a transitory basis.
This increasingly complex definition of personal understanding creates shifts in a
teacher’s epistemological reflexivity and opens the possibility for substantive growth in their
epistemic knowing. Reflexivity, at this juncture, however, remains marred in the circularity of
epistemological issues such that any theory of knowledge presupposes knowledge of the
conditions in which knowing takes place. Pierre Bourdieu, pushes this notion of the
epistemological calling for examinations of epistemic reflexivity as systemic forms of reflection
aimed at making the unconscious conscious and the tacit explicit.22 With this in mind,
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Bourdieu’s reflexive approach is intended as a theoretical approach/methodology to address the
problems that concern the nature of knowledge; or, in this context, the difficulties teachers have
in grasping the ways in which our understanding (i.e. knowledge itself) is itself socially and
historically situated. But it is on this notion that we arrive at an interesting tension in the
philosophy of education. This tension centers on the split between epistemology and ontology or
how do we go about knowing things (epistemology) and what is the nature of existence
(ontology).
Throughout my research, I found research situated around the notion of teacher
practitioners and/or teacher education often remained located within the domain of epistemology.
Even when the word reflexivity was evoked, descriptions were rooted in concerns about the
nature of knowledge. According to Joe Kincheloe, teacher ontology itself is often framed
through a lens of knowing concerned with “the way teachers come to see themselves as
educators” and “how they develop their teacher persona.”23 By collapsing the ontological into the
domain of knowing, questions of being are translated into frames of critical inquiry and then
written back into the texture of epistemological knowing through references to the nature of
teachers’ knowledge. This knowledge then becomes an amalgam of what a teacher claims to
know about his/her self, the world, and other claims s/he must justify against or within the
current educational paradigm.
Kincheloe identifies this as a primary reason why mainstream teacher education
programs are relatively uninterested in questions of ontology.24 As an example of how this frame
presents itself, if pre-service teachers are being prepared for the rigors of a systemic model of
23
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standardized school(ing)–officially mandated and scripted curriculum, uniform perspectives,
institutionalized standards and assessments, etc.–then teacher education programs would
logically place a high emphasis on what can be known within this system. This, of course, does
not factor in other structural interests that might impact a university’s decision–for example,
neoliberal interests. Kincheloe’s framing gives credence to the reality I have witnessed and
experienced first-hand in K-12 schools for years. Many teachers, including myself, identify
feeling an unrelenting pressure to meet the output demands of standards-based curriculum and
assessment, respond to constantly shifting pedagogical and curricular expectations, and a
carnivalesque environment predicated on the whims of administrators. The collateral impact of
this environment is the creation of a system where teachers believe they lack the time and space
for reflexive inquiry in their classrooms.
But in my own quiet moments of reflection, I have wondered if philosophical or
ontological inquiry is genuinely lacking or if its looks and feels different than how I might
expect? If, for example, we strictly constrain reflexivity to the domain of the ontological,
reflexivity about the nature of being opens a pathway to examining the foundational nature of
neoliberal society itself. The risk, in this scenario, is that the teacher-practitioner/researcher
losses all semblance of the epistemological and how teachers/teaching relates to the daily
contexts of knowing. In less abstract terms, when reflexivity is applied to approaches that put
into question what teachers’ take for granted (i.e. critical theory/reflection), the dilemma often
becomes strictly an ontological matter, concerned with the best way to understand the nature of
the concept. As a method of teacher inquiry, much of the initial epistemological concern with
problematizing how the teacher makes sense of the concept is lost for the sake of developing the
best theory of the concept itself. As such, it becomes increasingly less clear what reflexivity was
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doing in relation to the teacher and the positivity of the method is lost in the abstractness of the
theoretical implications.
For Deborah Britzman, however, these tensions provide the very spaces we seek for selfdiscovery by keeping open reflexivity as such in relation to the teacher. What happens, for
example, when teachers reflect on problems associated with their own narration of experience
and understandings of reality while asking what conditions or structures drive the narrative
impulse? For Britzman, reflexive inquiry implicates teachers in their own narratives causing
psychic conflicts that provide greater insight into the unconscious and highlighting the
philosophical, pedagogical, and ideological tensions that are always present within a teacher.25
Similarly, by highlighting the shifting nature of identity and the subject’s attempt to construct
an(y) consistent reality, Anthony Giddens theorizes about how we might imagine reflexive shifts
toward the realm of the ontological.26 As an example, if reflexive epistemology is what it means
for a teacher to know her/his subjective identity, then the ontological horizon might be imagined
as how this knowing is bent back upon itself to consider the primordial question of being.
Bettie St. Pierre and Patti Lather, under the broad rubric of the ‘posts’ (poststructuralism/
postmodernism), push this questioning further by considering what it might mean for a research
process to always-already be in the process of becoming. ‘Post-qualitative research,’ as such,
pushes and problematizes the ontological limits of being in a way that is similar to Donald Judd’s
postmodernist description of sculpture, “a gesture toward thinking of the new where there hasn’t
been enough time and work to see the limits but it is a space to move into where its
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characteristics are bound to develop.”27 By continuing to follow St. Pierre and Lather, what
spaces might I find myself in as a teacher when the intent of the research itself is “to produce
different knowledge and produce knowledge differently.”28 Perhaps the task of research ceases
to be providing answers and instead becomes the ability to demonstrate how the way problems
are perceived is itself part of the problem. How then do I situate my-self as a teacher within a
method where the shifting terrain is precisely the point and the problem?

A Žižekian Lens of Reflexivity
In Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, Žižek provides
a framework for conceptualizing alternative pathways of reflexive thinking. This methodological
movement of thinking otherwise has its foundation in Žižek’s exploration of the Hegelian
relationship between understanding and reason(ing)–a relationship that uncovers a conflict
inherent to the logic of reason itself. Rather than serving as reflexive blockage, this tension–
between what G.W. F. Hegel terms the madness of reason and its inverse the excess of
unreason–is a constitutive means of problematizing our very subjectivity. This interpretation runs
counter to standard interpretations of Hegel wherein the Hegelian dialectic culminates in a
rationalistic moment or a harmonious synthesis free from contradiction. According to this
standard interpretation, the goal of any reflexive method would be a movement toward this
synthesis. In terms of teacher reflection, we might think of this standard interpretation as
resulting in a moment of subjective wholeness whereby the teacher arrives at an understanding
(of the self and her/his conditions of existence) that is free from conflict (contradiction).
27
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Instead, Žižek’s reading of Hegel counters this interpretation by holding that reason is
itself the locus of conflict and rationality is the fundamental antagonism. Methodologically, this
terrain is not entirely dissimilar to St. Pierre and Lather’s formulation in that this position forces
me as a teacher-subject to confront the potential falsity of all phenomena and appearances– i.e.
the failure of the reflexive method is inherent to the inner-narrative and perception itself. But, as
a re-formulation of the reflexive process, the Žižekian lens forces the teacher-subject to consider
her/his own subjective fallibility while maintaining the primacy of the subject itself. The burden
this places on the teacher, for example, is in overcoming my own understanding in relation to
things, conditions, and perceptions while, simultaneously collapsing the subjective frame (qua
methodological narrative). While the intent–and ultimate cost–of Žižek’s proposal is abject
destitution, what emerges is a new ontological horizon of possibility as a teacher.
In placing a special emphasis on Žižek’s reading of German Idealism through Lacanian
theory as a broad framework, the remainder of this text develops a reading of teacher reflexivity
meant to disrupt all notions or possibilities of locating a consistent subject or moment of
harmonious synthesis (i.e. subjective wholeness, or non-contradiction) through the
methodological process. It is through the development of a contested view of teacher subjectivity
or the negative a priori position of lack that the Žižekian lens begins to deviate from the
preceding frameworks by postulating that all subjective understandings of identity are fantasies–
or mythical points around which teacher identities evolve. Teacher identity, as such, is imagined
here as both false–as it might be imagined in Marxist terms of false consciousness–and a gap in
being that is positivized through the actions of the teacher-subject. To explicate the function of
this fantasmatic structure, when a teacher identifies with a particular ideology, for example, with
critical pedagogy, the lack (or gap in being) in the teacher-subject’s identity is filled in by a
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performative dimension signaled from the ideology itself–i.e. the Symbolic big Other. In this
movement, the teacher’s identification with the ideology itself, retroactively creates the illusion
that her/his identification with the characteristics of that ideology were always-already there;
thus, preventing any recognition of the lack or gap in being. In other words, s/he “automatically
overlooks the fact that this very formal act of recognition creates the content one recognizes
oneself in.”29
It is against this point of misrecognition that Žižek clarifies how Lacanian theory disrupts
postmodern relativism by reinvigorating the concept of universality. For Lacan, the universal
truth of any situation is revealed through contingency. According to Žižek, “Lacan accepts the
‘deconstructionist’ motif of radical contingency, but turns this motif against itself, using it to
assert his commitment to the Truth as contingent.”30 In Tarrying with the Negative, Žižek
indicates that postmodern relativism is self-referentially inconsistent insofar as it implicitly
offers a synoptic view of the Whole while it explicitly denies the possibility of any synoptic view
of the Whole as such.31 By making thematic the negativity inherent to both German Idealism
(Kant and Hegel) and psychoanalytic theory (Lacan), Žižek seeks to formulate an account of
universal T/truth that avoids this failure. The Žižekian lens, to this end, offers a new
methodological approach that hinges on the insight that any totality (or Whole) is always
internally inconsistent but this inconsistency is the universal Truth of alienation.
In order to fully understand Žižek’s development of this position and its possibility as a
philosophical frame for teacher reflection, the remainder of this chapter focuses on Žižek’s
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interpretation of the philosophical period known as German Idealism–both in-itself and through
Lacanian theory. In addition, to provide greater clarity, each sub-section includes examinations
of individual pieces of philosophical inquiry and its implication for the act of teacher reflection.
By way of outlining the proceeding, this examination proceeds through the following order of
inquiry:
(a) the Kantian transcendental turn and the fundamental nature of knowledge and reality,
(b) Hegel’s dialectics and the asymmetry of the Hegelian subject, and
(c) Žižek’s subjective destitution and destitution as a zero level of reflexive
understanding.
As a connective thread, I consider the individual and convergent impact of these theories as
various theoretical states and subjective positions of negativity that uncover the true (Lacanian
Real) nature of the subject. Finally, I consider Žižek’s reading of the Hegelian wound as means
of (re)invigorating the act of teacher reflection qua subjective reflexivity.

Kant’s Transcendental Turn
According to Žižek, Immanuel Kant’s transcendental turn is the epochal event in modern
philosophy. Žižek describes Kant’s revelation in the following terms:
The world is not simply the universe or everything that exists… understanding
what the world is means, in transcendental terms, understanding some preexisting, at least historically, a priori structure which determines how we
understand how the world is disclosed to us.32
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant frames this idea noting that “knowledge begins with
experience”33 and that transcendental knowledge is “not so much occupied with objects as with
the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a
priori.”34 In terms of teacher reflection, this means that experience is possible because of the
teacher’s senses; what we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste, according to Kant, is where
knowledge begins. But as the prior definition notes, knowledge is also a prior and the
transcendental can be taken to mean that which comes before experience. Thus, by following
Kant, it is necessary to understand that my view of the world as a teacher is mediated and that
reality itself can never be directly accessed. In this first philosophical movement, Kant provides
us with the framework for grappling with the fundamental nature of knowledge and reality. In
essence, as we reflect on anything as teachers, we must ask ourselves, how do we know or
understand the nature of our reality, let alone the nature of our reflection?
Žižek extends this question by attributing to Kant’s transcendental turn, the detection of a
“crack in the ontological edifice of reality.”35 What Žižek is highlighting in particular is Kant’s
division of reality into two distinct orders–phenomena and noumena–and the consequent
differences between things in themselves and things as they appear to us. In reflexive terms, a
teacher’s senses provide them with something (some knowledge) about the world outside of
her/himself. This knowledge, however, does not mean that what s/he intuits is a real and
unqualified awareness of whatever it is (the thing-in-itself) that causes the teacher’s senses to
experience something in the first place. Rather, by transforming what a teacher intuits into the
knowable physical world of appearances and combining these appearances with our concepts of
33
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understanding, Kant identified the order reality called the phenomenal. Phenomenal reality, as
such, is comprised of appearances or a teacher-subject’s concepts of understanding in the form of
thoughts that Kant calls categories without which the world would be unintelligible. Such
categories, examples of which are the concepts about which knowledge is believed to exist a
priori, possessed for Kant, a truth that is presupposed.36 These categories of thought are not
generated through processes of abstraction based on subjective experience but spontaneously by
the teacher-subject’s understanding. In this way, they do not mirror the true nature of an object
but insist upon the subject’s consciousness as what can be counted as an object.
Objects, as a consequence, can only be known to teachers through the way they appear in
accordance with her/his subjective forms of thought–they cannot be known in themselves. But
given that teachers are able to think of the idea of things-in-themselves (though not through our
senses), Kant thought it was reasonable to give a name to such a concept. Kant’s term for this is
noumena, the plural form of noumenon. Noumenal reality refers to things-in-themselves about
which the teacher-subject can think but never truly know. Noumena, in this way, are presumed
things-in-themselves (Kant’s das Ding an sich),37 or objects (/events) which constitute what we
perceive as reality but exist independently of human senses. In terms of traditional forms of
teacher reflection, the Kantian division of reality can be seen as identifying a disconnect in the
relationship between thought and reality–i.e. a teacher’s conceptualization or perception of
reality (phenomenal) and a ‘real’ (or noumenal) reality.
The logic of Kant’s unknowableness of being is thus the first state of subjective
negativity. This negativity is both an epistemological obstacle as the ‘unknowableness’ of the
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subject is a reference to the split subjectivity of the teacher-subject qua thing-in-itself and
ontological as the Thing (-in-itself) can only be located in the Real (noumenal). In other words,
the teacher-subject and object of reflection are inherently ‘mediated’ so that any
‘epistemological’ shift in the teacher’s point of view always reflects an ‘ontological’ shift in the
object itself. The teacher’s unknowing, as such, is framed as the way all understanding is an
ontological misperception of the subject qua being–or, the (in)ability to grapple with what the
subject ‘is.’ Kant’s identification of the subject as dialectically split (or void) is a representation
of the thinking subject (as a response to Descartes outlined below) that implies the subjective
enunciation “I think” is always empty on the phenomenal level.38 For Žižek, Kant anticipates
Lacan my beginning to formulate the dislocation of subject from the Real and the failure of the
Symbolic universe of representations: “there is no way for us to imagine in any consistent way
the universe as a Whole; that is, as soon as we do it, we obtain two antinomical, mutually
exclusive versions of the universe as a Whole.”39
The implications of this, as a teacher practitioner are such that any object of my
reflection, including my-self, cannot mirror the true nature of that object. Instead, that object can
only appear in accordance with my thoughts–i.e. the object cannot be known in-itself. The
reflexive trap to be avoided, however, is imaging the world I experience in the everyday context
of my classroom as some kind of illusion or some inferior version of what is really ‘real.’ Rather,
Kant’s point is that what I experience as my daily reality as a teacher is necessarily based on
what appears to me and appearances–as appearances-in-themselves–can only be located in me
and not in the thing-itself. In this way, Kant’s reading of unknowing is far more radical than
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standard Marxist formulations of false consciousness whereby (un)knowing is a problem of
ideology–they do not know what they do but still they do it. Instead, following Kant, knowledge
for teachers–as infinite human beings–is limited to the way things appears to us in phenomenal
reality and what a thing is in-and-of-itself remains inaccessible. But this limitation
simultaneously provides the context for thinking of the difference between my-self as
dialectically split object and what a thing is in-and-of-itself. On this condition, Kant provides to
the study of teacher reflection an awareness of a subjective space of betweenness, a paradoxical
gap between what is experienced and the one doing the experiencing.

In Defense of Cogito
Before proceeding to G.W.F. Hegel’s radicalization of Kant, it is important to explain
how Kant advances Descartes formulation of cogito and, for Žižek, provides the basic foundation
for the defense of the subject. This is of particular importance when this research in read in
parallel to, or against, post-qualitative research (see St. Pierre and Lather) or Lacanian theorists
(such as Britzman) who have and continue produce meaningful research on narrative inquiry and
self-reflexivity. While much of this research may read with a similar tone and possess similar
philosophical threads, this research defers in its continued attachment to the subject of, and
beyond, the cogito. Although, when St. Pierre and Pillow speak of “working the ruins” of
qualitative research to open up new planes of thinking (i.e. post-qualitative research) beyond the
cogito, I often wonder if we are using different terms and philosophical trajectories to describe
strikingly similar narrative landscapes. According to Žižek, however, “a spectre is haunting
western academia; the spectre of the Cartesian subject. All academic powers have entered into a
holy alliance to exorcise this spectre… the postmodern deconstructionists [for example]…for
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whom the Cartesian subject is a discursive fiction, an effect of decentered textual
mechanisms.”40 The Žižekian lens, as such, is a response to philosophical positions that attempt
to subvert notions of universality and subjectivity. In particular, postmodern and poststructuralist
formulations that attempt to locate being in a specular image of fluidity–often following the
narrative slippages41 of Derrida’s deconstruction42 and Deleuze and Guttari’s “BwO: Bodies
without Organs.”43 Instead, this approach to teacher reflection and reflexivity is a defense of the
‘teacher as subject’ that locates truth in the subject as a priori alienation.
This enunciation of cogito beyond Descartes begins with Kant’s transcendental turn
providing a horizon of intelligibility within which the subjective being exists and is irresolvedly
divided–i.e. reality is both noumenal and phenomenal. Kant’s formulation, according to Žižek,
works to undermine the idea that the “I think” of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I
am)44 constitutes the subject as a substantial self:
Through this I or he or it (the Thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented
than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X. It is known only through the
thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any
concept whatsoever…45
Thus, by distinguishing between phenomena (things for us) and noumena (things in themselves),
Kant is the first to articulate the paradox of Cartesian subject as res cogitans (thinking thing).
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That is to say, Kant shows that the subject cannot be located within any hierarchical system nor
as the element of some Whole in which everything has its natural place. In such terms, Kant, for
Žižek, anticipates Lacan insofar as the subject is lack (i.e. constitutively lacking its own place in
the Symbolic)–as is designated by the Lacanian mathem $, the ‘barred S.’46
The distinction between the “I” as Cartesian thinking substance and the “I” as Kantian
transcendental appreciation is captured in the following logical failure. “I think” cannot be
legitimized as a complete phrase because it calls for a continuation–“I think that…(the student
was wrong, the test was easy, we are treated unfairly).” This distinction (between the “I” and “I
think that…”) exposes Descartes reification of consciousness: “he wrongly concludes that, in the
empty ‘I think’ which accompanies every representation of an object, we get hold of a positive
entity, … which thinks and is transparent to itself in its capacity to think.”47 In short, Kant’s
revelation (beyond Descartes) is uncovering the asymmetry between the unknowable substance
which thinks and the empty form “I think”–this position of negativity locates the subject (as
cogito) in a position of a priori alienation.

The Subject as such…
As noted previously, Kant provides a framework for understanding the topological
discord within the teacher-subject her/himself and the notion that the mere existence of thoughts
in our consciousness does not imply that I have access to myself as a thinking substance. Thus,
while Kant anticipates a split (negative) subjectivity, he fails to overcome this split because any
notion of freedom or autonomous state of being would require direct access to noumenal reality–
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i.e. the Thing-in-itself. From this position, we arrive at a fundamental question (problem) of
philosophy–related to the Kantian split–how is it that at one moment the subject can be
immersed in nature (objects/objectivity) and in the next moment we are speaking subjects
supported by culture–able to adopt subjective attitudes about our surrounding world
(subjectivity)? Broadly, this is the philosophical question of transformation.
For Žižek, the missing link between nature and culture is explicated, not in Kant, but
something missed in Descartes. What Žižek highlights is Descartes’ personal withdraw away
from society in which he severed all links with the social world as a process of self-reflection.
Žižek calls this process of Cartesian doubt or skepticism a mad gesture of withdraw into the self
in which Descartes removed all Symbolic dimensions of his personal identity until all that
remained was the cogito. In this way, Descartes’ isolation of the cogito anticipates the negativity
of the subject in German Idealism and the split subject ($) in Lacanian theory. Standard
interpretations of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I exist), as a consequence, miss
the negativity implicit to Descartes’ project of radical doubt. By reinterpreting Cartesian
subjectivity in terms of this radical doubt, the Žižekian lens frames the teacher-subject not as a
positively existing thing, but in the familiar terms of a kind of split subjectivity that lacks
symmetry. The teacher-subject as such is only unified or whole insofar as both the teacher and
Symbolic reality are split by the Lacanian Real.48 It is in this moment of total withdraw that
Žižek locates the passage from nature to culture as a gesture of madness.

48

Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1993).

79

This madness, for Žižek, is best characterized in a passage from Hegel’s Jenaer
Realphilosophie,49 where Hegel characterizes the subject’s experience of pure Self qua abstract
negativity:
This night, the inner of nature, that exists here–pure self–in phantasmagorical
representations, is night all around it, in which here shoots a bloody head – there
another white ghastly apparition, suddenly here before it, and just so disappears.
One catches sight of this night when one looks human beings in the eye–into a
night that becomes awful.50
In Žižekian terms, the ‘night of world’ is the kernel of subjectivity that is the moment of the
contraction-into-self of the subject, the radical dimension of subjectivity that is cogito and
madness. What Žižek seeks to highlight is that it is only when reality itself is eclipsed by this
‘night of the world’, that the subject is able to experience the world (i.e. reality) as nothing but
loss–as an absolute negativity where it becomes possible to (re)construct the Symbolically
mediated universe–i.e. transform the nature of subjectivity itself. On this point, I would note that
when the subject experiences this state of negativity and nothingness it becomes reflexively
necessary–not only possible–to (re)construct the Symbolic self; a point I will exemplify in both
chapter three and, more poignantly, in chapter four. Descartes withdraw-into-self as methodic
doubt is the experience of this negativity which reifies, not the substantial ‘I’ of the individual,
but an empty point of negativity. This empty point of negativity is not nothing or no-thing but the
opposite of everything, the Hegelian negation of all determinacy. And it is exactly here, in the
empty void, that Žižek locates the subject. Thus, it is in the movement from Kant to Hegel, that
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the teacher gains access to her/his subjective self free from illusion, if only momentarily, and is
able to (re)construct a self-identity without the constraints of the (big Other) Symbolic register.

Signifiers, Absentials, and the Power of Zero
We can imagine this void and the subjective state of negativity as the opening of a
reflexive space for subjective transformation. If there were no gap between a thing (object) and
its representation (word–as object in the world), the two would appear to be identical and there
would be no room for the emergence of a transformative subjectivity. In The Function and the
Field of Speech and Language, Lacan expresses this movement in reference to the Hegelian
phenomenological ideal (relating to phenomena as distinct from that of the nature of being and
consciousness of objects of direct experience) noting that words can only exist if we first
“murder” the thing. Specifically, Lacan notes:
the word is a death, a murder of a thing: as soon as the reality is symbolized,
caught in a symbolic network, the thing itself is more present in a word, in its
concept, than in its immediate physical reality. More precisely, we cannot return
to the immediate reality: even if we turn from the word to the thing - from the
word 'table' to the table in its physical reality, for example - the appearance of the
table itself is already marked with a certain lack - to know what a table really is,
what it means, we must have recourse to the word which implies an absence of
the thing.51
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The implications of this statement are multifaceted and complex. First, the withdrawal-into-self
which culminates in the cogito has to be presupposed as the vanishing mediator52 between the
two, the missing link around which the transition is organized. 53 In Lacanian terms, the subject
has to ‘get rid of’ or repress the Real before we can assume (or construct) a substitute for it in the
form of the Symbolic big Other. For Žižek, the subject–which is the vanishing mediator in this
structure–must pass through madness in an attempt to grasp the normalcy of being a…civilized
human subject, a teacher, etc. Thus, within the Žižekian lens, the true nature of the subject is
madness (the inner nature of being that expressed in Hegel’s night of the world and found in the
Lacanian Real) while the subjective self we (typically) encounter in moments of teacher
reflection is the subject of the Symbolic (in the word).
The reality I ‘experience’ as a teacher is similarly mediated as each of its objects–
including human beings–have always-already been minimally gentrified or adapted to fit a given
Symbolic narrative. At a minimal level, the teacher-subject is such an object in its encounter with
the function of the signifier. Žižek makes a dialectical point about the ontological contingency of
reality itself whereby I am called upon to establish a suture (or quilting point) in reality by
stitching together the edges of the ontological cracks in the Symbolic order. In so doing, I trigger
my own subjective signification as a teacher. My signification represents my alienation as a
teacher in the Symbolic order where I face, for example, the problem that “descriptions do not
naturally and immutably refer to things;” rather, things in retrospect begin to resemble their
description.”54
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The failure of reality gains greater clarity when we consider how any notion of subjective
or social wholeness is strictly a fantasy; there can be no co-naturalness of subject to her/his world
because the subject is always already subjected to the signifier–a name refers to an object
because that object is called that.55 Because of this incongruity, my position as a teacher must be
understood as following the formula of the signifier—a stand-in for the stupidity that a name
(signifier/teacher) refers to an object (the subject) because that is what we call it (teacher). A
teacher’s conscious understanding, as such, is always-already fragmented as the teacher is
subjected to the tautology of the signifier which announces the dimension of the big Other
beyond the subject. Incapable of any Real, harmonious, or unproblematic state of being, the
teacher-subject is nothing but lack itself. This presents a basic problem for how teachers can
understand themselves in relation to reality as it is always-already mediated by the Lacanian
Symbolic order. The Symbolic–as an intersubjective network of meanings–exists as a structure
precisely to force teachers into these agreements. Therefore, the Symbolic function is, at a base
level, how teachers understand their being in the world.

Content & Curriculum
As an example of this idea, education and educational research (often) remains orientated
toward the epistemological and the validation of claims of knowing. In the classroom, this
manifests itself through teachers’ im/explicit treatment of curriculum/content as a direction
representation of reality. The nodus of this generalized connection between reality and knowing
is that teacher-subjects are ill-equipped to address the overlapping connections, or lack thereof,
between reality and its symbolizations. Further, through our daily interactions with students–
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even when approached from the standpoint of critical thinking– teachers construct an
ontologically consistent world based on a “logic of truth”56 that accepts as a given the
ontological limits of being. Using a standard reading of the nature of teaching science, as an
example, serves to explicate this logic whereby science curriculum (frequently) functions as a
series of precise formulas that ‘prove’ the material status of reality. The totality of this
understanding (re)presents the modernist logic of American schooling: there is a reality out there
to be found, and ‘we’ (educators) can teach ‘you’ (students) a language to accurately represent
it.
The paradoxical complication of teaching and the ‘truth’ of our content is not only that
descriptors do not naturally refers to things but even the nature of science itself, at the level of
quantum physics, begins to dispute the concrete nature of reality. Even as a student who hated
math and science, I have always been fascinated by the idea that at the quantum level material
reality is unimaginably reduced to ephemeral pseudo entities that can only be descriptively
captured through abstract mathematical formalizations. What can be observed through the lens of
quantum physics is the inherent limitation of the observer (teacher doing the reflection) and
her/his knowing about the world (content/ discourse of education). An-other way of stating this
failure would be, the only adequate formulation of this quantum level would be to replace all
enunciations that relate to the universe and our everyday experience, with a kind of jabberwocky,
so all that would remain is a loose syntax of relations.57 In this example, we can see the
emergence of the split subject between our everyday existence in reality and the systemic
expressions that allow our everyday (pre-)comprehension or cognition. What quantum physics,
in particular, exposes is the inherent deadlock of our understanding, in that, in order to enter the
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circuit of communication (toward understanding and knowledge, i.e. education), it has to rely on
the terms of our everyday language. In this process, language unavoidably calls to mind objects
and events of our ordinary, sensible reality. From here it becomes easier to see why it is
necessary to take such care in unpacking how we (human-subjects) come to formulate, interpret,
and understand reality. It is only by grasping the depth of our own failure and the nature of
unknowing that we can begin to formulate what it might mean to be in this world.

Subjective Destitution: The Zero-Level of Understanding
Quantum physics highlights how teachers qua science curriculum are reduced to the
logical structure of a virtual being—the simultaneous reduction and limitless potentiality of
perception at the intercept of experience. Following Žižek’s ontological development of the
subject, teachers face a similar position within the structure and discourse of education. Because
of this, the question to ask ourselves is how can we reflexively reach the position of Hegel’s
night of the world? The answer, for Žižek, is by risking it all. That is, by risking the noumenal
kernel of our phenomenal existence, the subject is able to traverse their own fantasmatic and
false understandings of reality and enter a state of subjective destitution. Subjective destitution,
in this context, is the realization that my Symbolic identity as a teacher is meaningless.
Reflecting on this statement as a teacher involves acknowledging the traumatic kernel that is at
the core of my identity and the utterly meaningless nature of my previously held understandings
about reality. In many ways, what this means is accepting the things that I cherish most about my
identity are (likely) false and what is really real has yet to be discovered.
To summarize a bit of the preceding, the primary failure of Kant, uncovered in Hegel, is
that the Kantian subject cannot contend with the negativity inherent to its own ontological being;
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or, the teacher-subject’s self-reflexivity is always-already strictly limited. In Žižek’s reading of
Hegel’s dialectic of reason, Žižek identifies a movement beyond Kant that enables the teachersubject to comprehend subjectivity without reducing the subject itself to another empirical
positive object. To put this in other terms, Žižek seizes on the failures of Kant by developing a
subject that is both noumenal and phenomenal. As an illustration of this, whereas Kant’s
approach to freedom implied that the teacher-subject have immediate access to the noumenal,
Hegel never implies a movement from the phenomenal to the noumenal. Instead, Hegelian
dialectics grapples with the problem of how–within being–phenomena, or appearances, ever
arise as such. Or, if teachers only have access to appearances, how could the term appearance as
such have meaning, since there is nothing that is not an appearance? Thus, Kant emphasizes the
split between phenomena and noumena, while Hegel (re)introduces this split throughout
existence itself.
In The Ticklish Subject, Žižek outlines the importance of the shift from Kant to Hegel as
uncovering how being is an unstable absence of a cohesive, unifying oneness of the cosmos.58 As
Žižek sees it, this reflexive realization leads us to the understanding of two different formulations
of the Hegelian absolute. First, Hegel’s absolute knowledge (das absolute Wissen) is the
acceptance of the irreducible incompleteness not only of the teacher’s own understanding of the
world (as per Kantian epistemology), but also of the incompleteness of the reality of being in and
of itself.59 Next, the position of absolute knowing–as opposed to that of absolute knowledge–
involves the reflexive insight into the interminability of the restless dialectical movement.
Instead of marking a stable point of knowing, Žižek describes it this way:
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The subject does not ask if the content (some particular object of inquiry) meets
some a priori standard (of truth, goodness, beauty); it lets the content measure
itself, by its own immanent standards, and thus self-authorizes itself. The stance
of Absolute Knowing thus fully coincides with thorough (absolute) historicism:
there is no transcendental “big Other,” there are no criteria that we can apply to
historical phenomena themselves.60
For the reflexive teacher, there is no outside. We are always-already included in the world that
we construct in our modes of coming to know it–e.g. teacher reflection. The possibility of this
process is the completion of a teacher’s world decentration (decentering) which leaves the
teacher face-to-face with the gap separating reality from the real. By stripping the teacher of its
customary support structure, reflection becomes a means to disrupt the social identity and
challenge the personality of the teacher. This radical reduction of being to a zero-level of
understanding is the position of subjective destitution.

The Zero-Level of Understanding
The problem, as we experience it, is that teachers (within the daily reality of our
classrooms) are subject’s in a socio-Symbolic matrix that never truly approach a spontaneity of
being at a zero-level (subjective destitution). My understanding (prior to the fall) of reality, in
such terms, is always supported by a priori assumptions about self (students, teaching,
education, and so on) and about the world (my classroom, school, etc.), even if I have not yet
realized this at a conscious level. To exemplify how far we (educators) are from understanding
this zero-level of being, I often raise Frederic Jameson’s thesis about nature of capitalism in
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conversations with my colleagues. In Future City, Jameson writes, “it is easier to imagine the
end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.”61 Žižek frequently repeats this claim in
books and interviews urging his audience to think about the strangeness of today’s situation:
Thirty, forty years ago, we were still debating about what the future will be:
communist, fascist, capitalist, whatever. Today, nobody even debates these issues.
We all silently accept global capitalism is here to stay. On the other hand, we are
obsessed with cosmic catastrophes: the whole life on earth disintegrating, because
of some virus, because of an asteroid hitting the earth, and so on. So the paradox
is, that it’s much easier to imagine the end of all life on earth than a much more
modest change in capitalism.62
In our current epoch of neoliberal education, one might use Žižek’s logic to paraphrase Jameson,
it is easier to imagine the end of world than to imagine the end of our current educational system.
While on the surface this statement might seem hyperbolic, but I cannot help but think of how
often conversations about real systemic and radical change in education end in deadlock. Of
course, educators are quick to cite the progress we have made in x or y, the emergence of
alternative and charter schools, and developments in curriculum and pedagogy but, in all of these
instances, the systemic structure remains in place.
In response to Žižek and Jameson, Mark Fisher notes that their slogan captures precisely
what he means by capitalist realism: “the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only
viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a
coherent alternative to it.”63 Is Fisher’s capitalist realism not analogous to the consistent failure
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of our (educators’) individual and collective imagination, what we–teachers/educators–
experience in our conversations about the failures of our past, present, and future education
system, and (often) the (un)conscious reality we experience in our schools? But how did we
arrive at such an understanding of reality? The process and function of how narrative becomes
naturalized and immutable was Roland Barthes’ emphasis in Mythologies.64 For him, bourgeois
ideologies were “the process through which the bourgeoisie transforms the reality of the world
into an image of the world, History into Nature”–this is “the very principle of myth…it
transforms history into nature.”
My point here is not to engage in a debate over the possibility of reforming the systemic
structure(s) of education but highlight the importance of reaching a zero-level of understanding
as a way creating the reflexive space for thinking an-other perspective. As I have outlined in the
preceding, the discourse of education (as a representation of the Symbolic or big Other) is split
and/or always-already compromised by the Lacanian Real (as social antagonism). Instead of
finding some ahistorical governing principle at the centre of this structure, we find the signifier–a
meaningless X which sutures the entire field of symbolic reality. Yet, we cannot find our way out
of this discursive abyss. While functioning as the site of our alienation in the Symbolic, the
empty signifier is also a zero-level symbol that represents a site for political contestation and
contingent articulations. It is a traumatic kernel and fundamental antagonism which can be and is
expressed as ideology in the form of a social “zero-institution.”65 Teacher reflection, as such, has
the potentiality to function as a fundamental site antagonism and resistance by generating a space
to consider both (1) the self in relation to the zero-level institutions and, more importantly, (2)
the self at this zero-level of being.
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Zero Level & Absentials
In his exploration of how the mind emerges from matter, Terrence Deacon examines the
ontological incompleteness of nature as the only way to scientifically account for the emergence
of the mind from matter. As a way of contextualizing this movement, Deacon highlights the
striking potentiality that is uncovered through the introduction of the number zero. Deacon’s
starting point is that the subject cannot relate the phenomena of a value or function to physical
matter because all of these phenomena are in some way incomplete.66 Similarly, as an example,
my desires, passions, or aspirations as a teacher cannot be explained in physical terms because
they are in some way incomplete or contain an intrinsic without-ness.67 Deacon labels this
without-ness an absential feature–“a neologism for which something is missing from our
understanding of the physical dimension of these phenomena.”
In Deacon’s exploration of absential features he focuses on two aspects. First, absence in
the sense of a higher-level invisible from the vantage point of a lower level. What this means is
that when we divide an organism into its parts, we search in vain among these parts for what
creates the unity of the organism. In order to grasp any such unification, we first have to
conceive of the organism as reproducing itself through the continuous transformation of its parts.
The structure(s) of education, for example, functions in this form. The second of Deacon’s
features is absence in the sense of an imminent teleology of an organism. This is absence with an
orientation toward the future such as the acts of an organism which can only be accounted for by

66
67

Slavoj Žižek, Disparities (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).
Terrence Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2012).

90

reference to its future states. When we do something in order to achieve something else, we are
accounting for these future states and are, by definition, acting in absence from the present.68
In Žižek’s examination of disparities, however, he notes that there is a much more radical
potentiality which underlies Deacon’s parallel between absentials and the incorporation of zero
into mathematics:
The difficulty we face when dealing with absences that matter has a striking
historical parallel: the problems posed by the concept of zero … One of the
greatest advances in the history of mathematics was the discovery of zero. A
symbol designating the lack of quantity was not merely important because of the
convenience it offered for notating large quantities. It transformed the very
concept of number and revolutionized the process of calculation. In many ways,
the discovery of the usefulness of zero marks the dawn of modern mathematics.
But as many historians have noted, zero was at times feared, banned, shunned,
and worshiped during the millennia-long history that preceded its acceptance in
the West. And despite the fact that it is a cornerstone of mathematics and a critical
building block of modern science, it remains problematic, as every child studying
the operation of division soon learns.69
Zero as a symbol designates the lack of quantity, which, according to Deacon, puts absence at
the same level as positive quantities– i.e. lack is treated as a positive substantiation. Similarly,
Ferdinand de Saussure posits that the identity of a signifier resides only in a series of
differences.70
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This notion of differentiality, according to de Saussure, is the only feature which
distinguishes one signifier from other signifiers. There is no positivity in a signifier as such, it
‘is’ only a series of what it is not. Following these formulations, Žižek asks, “if all signifiers are
just the combination of differences from other signifiers, why then does not the entire network of
signifiers collapse into itself? How can such a system retain a minimum of stability?”71 Žižek’s
solution is the introduction self-reflexivity itself into the signifying order:
If the identity of a signifier is nothing but the series of its constitutive differences,
then every signifying series has to be supplemented–‘sutured’–by a reflexive
which has no determinate meaning (signified), since it stands only for the
presence of meaning as such (as opposed to its absence).72
This movement follow’s Lacan’s definition of a signifier as what “represents a subject to another
signifier.”73 This is to say, the ontological status of the teacher is that of zero, a void, the signifier
is that which can only be a signifier designating by lack. The importance of this movement
through zero toward the position of lack is to highlight the process of thinking toward spaces that
are otherwise and demonstrate how negativity functions as a positivization of being.

Traversing the Fantasy: The Wound as Methodological Reflexivity
By recognizing (a) the ontological status of the teacher is that of zero and (b) the teacher
does not meet some a priori standard of being, we reach a kind of reflexive inversion that
confronts the teacher with the fact that the true absolute of being is nothing but the logical
disposition of failure (negativity) itself. Reaching this vantage point is synchronous to the
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Lacanian position of subjective destitution whereby the teacher gains an awareness of the
Symbolic conditions of her/his existence. This position of knowing and destitution represents a
critical turning point in the reflexive process because the teacher is logically confronted with two
pathways: (1) s/he can reconstitute the fantasmatic structure and Symbolic coordinates of her/his
existence or (2) traverse the fantasy by acknowledging (and accepting) that there is nothing
behind reality itself and experience the subjective loss of social identity. By refusing the
seduction of wholeness, the teacher uncovers the subversive potential inherent to the subject
itself. Žižek’s wager is that when we encounter “what is in us more than ourselves”74 (i.e. the
subject qua the Real of subjective destitution) we are compelled to act and take responsibility for
the context of our own situation. The task of philosophy then, through the Žižekian lens, lies in
opening the space to make this thinking possible; a space allowing the teacher-subject to view
her/himself as an inherently autonomous being.75
Thus, the final question that remains, if we are to accept the potentiality of the Žižekian
lens, is how might we imagine/formulate a reflexive methodology that opens a more direct
pathway to the trauma of encountering what is in us more than ourselves? The clearest
intellectual trajectory toward such an encounter that subsumes the subject is through Žižek’s
reactualization of dialectical materialism–the “radical attempt to ground subjectivity qua
subjectivity into objectivity–not merely find the hidden ‘objective reality’ of thought.”76 But
what does this mean? In most Marxist (read standard/contemporary) interpretations of Hegelian
dialectics, for example, a contradiction exists between the demands of capital and the abuses of
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labor. According to this analysis, by critically reflecting on this contradiction, it becomes
possible to identify the antagonism at the root of the subject’s over-determination–i.e. the cause
the subject’s alienation. The result is often something akin to Marx’s interpretation of false
consciousness and exploitation: if workers could gain knowledge of their exploitation that would
be enough for the working class to throw off their chains.77
But Žižek turns away from standard teleological interpretations of Hegelian dialectics as
a movement toward synthesis (non-alienation). What this means is that, for Žižek, there is no
positive state of wholeness or understanding to be reached by unifying the subject with a
previously unknown version of reality. Or, in terms of the preceding, contradiction is inherent to
reason itself. Instead, Žižek describes a “downward synthesis,” a subjective movement toward
the negative wherein there is no positive synthesis possible; only a reflexive disjunction “by
which a thing emerges out of its own loss.”78 While, for Žižek, there is no authentic self
accessible to the subject, this negative reflexive movement uncovers the nothingness at the heart
of the subject. The teacher-subject’s potentiality, as such, is ensured by the impossibility of
subjective closure–what Žižek calls “the ontological crack in the universe.”79 This ontological
crack is the same fissure that is sutured by the signifier in the realm of the Symbolic. Ultimately,
the teacher-subject’s intervention into this moment represents the reflexive potentiality to locate
an irreducible trauma within reality that is the primordial subject itself.
As a way formulating a methodology to locate such an irreducible trauma, Žižek
highlights a process of subjective wounding whereby the subject reflexively exposes a signifier
not enchained in a network…by definition ‘psycho-somatic’…a terrifying bodily mark which is
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merely a mute attestation bearing witness to a disgusting enjoyment, without representing
anything…”80 This formulation as a method(ology) act of teacher reflection follows Žižek’s
Hegelo-Lacanian pathology beginning with Hegel’s self-alienation of spirit or the wound of the
subject itself is a wound it tries to heal81– i.e. wounding is self-inflicted. That is to say, the
‘wound’ of the reflective method is the introduction of a gap the opens the immediate substantial
space for the abstraction of the subject.82 In terms of active, reflexive struggle, the wound is that
which causes our alienation and creates the possibility for our resistance–the wound is the
traumatic encounter with the Lacanian Real.
Methodologically, the act of ‘wounding’ represents the possibility that always-already
lurks at the centre of every shifting subjectivity. By following the potentiality of this subjective
wounding, it becomes possible to imagine teacher reflection as an act rooted in Žižek’s negative
ontology (negative in that there is no positive content, the subject can only be located in
alienation and antagonism). By focusing on the various stages of negativity developed
throughout this chapter, the teacher-subject’s mind is conceived of as always-already possessing
the ability to disrupt its own function; to substantiate a break into the immediate understanding
(i.e. given interpretation) of reality. What emerges is a manifestation of that which is in us more
than ourselves, “in so far as [the wound] sticks out from the (symbolic and symbolized reality) of
the body, the wound is ‘a little piece of the real,’ a disgusting protuberance which cannot be
integrated into the totality of ‘our own body.’”83 This piece of the Real is the thing which
destroys us but simultaneously is the only things which gives us life.
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This function of wound can be explained in terms similar to the paradoxical nature of the
(psychoanalytic concept) symptom. The symptom is an element that sticks to the subject like a
kind of parasite that spoils the game, but if we annihilate it, things get even worse. When
confronted with the symptom, we are always confronted with a certain impossible choice. For
example, having only been at my current school for a few months, when my principal asked me
why I had not taken several days off for a recent bout with pneumonia I replied, “I was afraid
that if I were absent for several consecutive days the students’ progress would suffer. But I was
even more afraid that in spite of my absence, their progress would not suffer!” It is through this
internal dialectic process that a shift in the teacher’s perception begins to emerge which makes
the wound and the self-appear as their opposites–beginning the reflective injunction anew from
multivariate vantage points.
The decisive methodological piece of this movement is that once the teacher is truly
within a state of self-alienation s/he can never retreat from it– as this space marks the permanent
loss of innocence. This reflexive movement is Hegel’s negation of negation in which the
presupposed trauma of alienation (negativity) posits itself as a positivity.84 The teacher-subject,
from this methodological state of being, is nothing prior to the loss nor can the teacher return to
the point before the fall. Of course, this is not a literal nothingness but the substantive nothing or
absence of subjective understanding. This ability of the reflexive wound to tear open space(s) of
understanding, critically, posits a new horizon for the emergence of the subject whereby the
potential exists to transcend the circularity of perception. In short, by negating our previously
understood perceptions of what is real we introduce a form of self-alienation.85 The paradox of
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self-alienation is that the teacher comes to realize his or her previously held understandings of
self are false and the process of alienation, in actuality, generates a radically new subjectivity.
Philosophically, this forced shift in the reflexive perspective from the subject of the
addressee to the addresser short-circuits the teacher’s understanding of their present position by
presenting the Real of reality in its alterity of finitude–the otherness of failure.86 As a
radicalization of the reflective method, the wound produces the reflexive point to which it
returns—the self-objectified—thereby creating the temporal space of the subject’s own
autonomy. This temporal space of the teacher’s autonomy is also imagined as a potential
moment of resistance against the discourse of education. Within this reflective position, the
teacher-subject’s reflexive narrative begins to collapse the stability of their own ontological
horizon generating a reflexivity that highlights how the failures of education are always-already
not only epistemological but also ontological. While any attempt to bracket a discourse produces
knowledge it also produces an ontological dimension in that the teacher-subject is included
within this understanding. In this way, the teacher-subject and object are inherently "mediated,"
so that any "epistemological" shift in the subject's point of view always reflects an "ontological"
shift in the object itself. Or, the subject's gaze is always-already inscribed into the perceived
object itself, in the guise of its "blind spot," that which is "in the object more than object itself,"87
the point from which the object itself returns the gaze.
While research on teacher reflection has produced meaningful narratives and
contributions to/within the field, it often remains transfixed within the circularity of its own
liminal horizon of being. The problem, ontologically, is that each methodological iteration
always-already remains within the field defined by the big Other – the Symbolic order as a point
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of discursive solidarity or the Symbolic constitution of all discursive fields.88 For Žižek, this is
the classic postmodern trap– and failure of Foucault – whereby the teacher is perpetually trapped
within the field of power and free only insofar as they are able to maintain an “ironic distance”89
from their attachment to the discourse. As a consequence, the ultimate failure of the teacher is
the inability to see the possibility of dismantling the entirety of the system itself. However, by
locating the truth of subject in alienation itself, the corresponding destitution allows the subject
to recognize the arbitrary nature of the Symbolic–the big Other. This is the ethical position of the
Žižekian lens that allows the persistence of the struggle despite a radical renunciation. Žižek
defines this act as traversing the fantasy, meaning the loss of loss, which is the recognition that
the Thing we seek only exists in fantasy and the big Other is lacking a final answer.

Conclusion
This truth as alienation is particular to our consciousness as a teacher, insofar as it relates
to the failure encountered in the traumatic, repressed Real and my misrecognition of self in
relation to the discourse of education. Education, in such terms, always-already involves what it
is not and this universal is enunciated through a relative locus in the constellation of social
positions. Thus, teacher reflection as an act of resistance begins with uncovering the failure of
our own perception as the result of a misperception at the limits of being in/through the big Other
thereby reifying our own existence. In the proceeding chapter, I consider how as a teacher I
might re-consider myself in relation to a complex system of philosophical inquiry within the
daily reality of my classroom. Each of the passages of my teaching self represents the transition
from an epistemological void (un-knowing) to an ontological one (being)—or, more precisely,
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“the passage from the inaccessible Thing beyond the subject’s reach to the subject itself as the
Thing incapable of being reduced.”90 This empty point of negativity is the negation of all
determinacy and it is within this space devoid of all content that I am is able to reflexively
encounter my true identity as a teacher. Roughly following this framework, the analysis in
chapter three sets out to examine my teacher identity as a subjective misrecognition and teacher
reflexivity within various philosophical domains and trajectories broadly identified as Žižek’s
negative ontology.
Žižek posits that it is possible to overcome our misrecognition of reality by starting with
a clean slate–erasing “the entirety of reality in so far as it is not yet born out of the I by passing
through the night of the world.”91 This position is a philosophical and psychoanalytic inquiry
into madness that reveals how a withdraw into self and the passage through madness is
constitutive of the subject as such. But what does this mean? Again, we arrive at the notion that
any totality (or wholeness) is inconsistent with itself. As Hegel puts it, the God of beyond, died
on the cross, meaning any Symbolic reality is incomplete and internally contradictory. Similarly,
if we as a teacher-subjects no longer presuppose our own symbolic consistency, we also assume
the inconsistency of the big Other. This also involves, however, acknowledging and accepting
the meaninglessness nature of reality and that my Symbolic identity as a teacher is based on a
fantasy. Here we arrive at the other side to face our subjective destitution. The acceptance of this
position acknowledges–rather than effaces–the gap between the Real and its symbolization.
One way of grasping this position is through the reflexive process of endless self-critique
or hysterical questioning that characterizes subjectivity as such. Žižek argues that it is only
through such confrontations with the Real–as Symbolic inconsistency–that we can hope to
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realize our precious fantasy is shit. It is in these moments of destitution that we might be
prompted to act by leaping into the darkness of the unknown and address ourselves at the level of
our gap of being. It is here that we remember the Symbolic authority of education has only ever
been virtual and it is only efficacious insofar as teachers act as though the big Other exists. From
this frame, teachers’ subjectivity is not a positive, substantial entity but an incommensurability, a
dialectical non-identity. The basic insight here is that Hegelian dialectics and the Lacanian logic
of the signifier are two versions of the same matrix.92
Žižek’s subject as Real is an injection of ontological difference that ruptures both the
individual and society, particular and universal without lapsing into fantasies of completeness.
Teacher reflection as a means of traversing such fantasies is the inverse of many common-sense
approaches to reflection that aim to get rid of fantasies, false consciousness, illusionary
prejudices and misperceptions, which distort teachers’ view of reality, and finally learning to
accept reality the way it really is. By envisioning teacher reflection through the Žižekian lens we
do not learn to suspend our phantasmagorical production–on the contrary, teachers must identify
with the excess of her/his imagination ever more radically, in all of its inconsistency and failures.
That is to say, prior to its transformation into the consistent, reflexive (phantasmatic) frame that
guarantees our access to reality. At this zero level, teacher reflection becomes a method of
encountering the void of pure subjectivity, confronted by a multitude of spectral or partial
objects which, precisely, are exemplifications of the Lacanian lamella–the undead object-libido.
It is at the level of the lamella that we reflexively encounter the impossible object correlative to
the pure void of the subject’s absolute spontaneity. In other words, the intersection of Lacan and
Hegel in the form of partial objects (here a bloody head–there another white ghastly apparition)
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that are the impossible forms in the guise of which the subject qua absolute spontaneity
encounters itself amongst objects.
The ultimate wager of this formulation of teacher reflection is that it is not only possible,
but necessary, to conceive of this zero-level of subjectivity, as an unconscious knowledge that
awaits its moment to emerge, take shape and shatter the coordinates within which we make sense
of today’s educational discourse. This dormant teaching self lies in wait, waiting for the surplus
of our unknown and repressed knowledge to be translated into a fearless vision of teaching and
education yet to come. Our thought must throw itself beyond its familiar course if it is to
legitimize its disengagement and unthink the reality from which we were ensnared. As we enter
into the Hegelian night, we must be aware that the subject does not survive. As a consequence,
teacher reflection as an act of subjective destitution involves the experience of losing one’s self.
In this experience, the symbolic texture of reality disintegrates, as does one’s Symbolic identity.
Symbolic subjectivity must then be completely reinvented from nothing–or, as teacher-subjects
we must be born again and rise from the abyss.
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CH 3-Hacking ‘The Matrix’: Teacher Ontology at the Abyss of the Žižekian Real
Splinter(s) in the Mind
I'm trying to free your mind, Neo. But I can only show you the door. You're the
one that has to walk through it. (Morpheus in The Matrix)
The imperative to ‘free the mind’ reverberates throughout the Wachowski siblings film
The Matrix,1 a cinematic exploration of subjective reflexivity at the limits of reality. The film’s
philosophical metanarrative repeats the Platonian dispositif of the cave allegory: ordinary
humans as prisoners, transfixed by the shadowy performances of what they falsely believe to be
real(ity). The foundational difference to be maintained, however, is the distance between the
Real and what is perceived in the introduction of a radicalized ontological plane qua virtual
reality. Within the film, the Matrix is a computer-generated ‘reality’ that generates a simulated
experience that is (nearly) indiscernible from the Real. Metaphorically, what the subject
perceives as reality is the Matrix in that it prevents the individual from seeing reality as it
effectively is. The trap to be avoided, however, is a contrasting of the virtual domain against
material reality;2 or, in other terms, the Real is not the ‘true reality’ behind the virtual simulation.
In this movement, we are able to observe the potentiality of using the Matrix as metaphorical arc
by stepping beyond its boundaries to examine the Real nature of reality itself while,
simultaneously, maintaining its position as a subjective point of reference.
The problem, for Žižek, concerns the fact that the Matrix is exactly the hypostatization
of the big Other, that is, the (virtual) Symbolic network that organizes meaning and thereby
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structures reality.3 The film’s fallacy, therefore, is that the Matrix impedes access to the Real
reality such that beneath the opaque space of the virtual is the ‘desert of the Real’. While The
Matrix is, of course, a fictional narrative, its structure provides a metaphorical scaffolding to
articulate the complexities of the Real qua the Lacanian triad: Imaginary, Symbolic, Real.
Explanations of this triadic function will serve as a thread binding the seemingly disparate
conceptualizations throughout this text. To this end, it is best (for the purposes of this chapter) to
imagine the Real as the void that makes reality incomplete and the function of the Symbolic
matrix as concealing this inconsistency. Given that notion, one way of approaching the Real is
by working through the objet petit a, the object cause of desire, that only exists by way of its
function in relation to the gaps in the Symbolic it seeks to fill.
As a function of reflexive resistance, the objet petit a is a remnant of the symbolization
process that sets the interpretive process of this chapter in motion by representing the lack
created when the subject is severed from the Real.4 In other words, there is always a gap between
the object of desire and its cause, the mediating feature that makes the object desirable.5 If
explicated within a traditional teaching paradigm, for example, the subject (teacher) fetishes the
object (student) as a means of fulfilling the teacher’s desire, the concretization of the teacher’s
own Symbolic function through the conveyance of knowledge. At this juncture, the success of
the act is irrelevant; rather, it is necessary to understand that the subjective fantasy alwaysalready obfuscates the constitutive consistency of experience structuring reality such that the
Real is bearable. Fantasy, in this way, is an Imaginary scenario occupying the place of the Real
wherein the teacher’s being is neither fully internal nor imposed by the environment. Instead,
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fantasy is the unique way that each subject relates to her/himself in relationship to her/his
environment.
In our modern epoch of education, however, the Real is further obfuscated by the representation of education as a virtual knowledge economy in which the aging infrastructures of
public education are rapidly being re-wired to meet the incessant demands of a global economy.
The problem, relative to teacher reflexivity, is such that within the virtual spaces of a classroom,
the subject’s object of desire may become deprived of its cause. For example, within the virtual,
the subject (teacher) and the object of the act (student) remain present. However, when the
student(s) exploit the profound openness of the virtual to transcend the traditional barrier
between teacher and student (i.e., knowledge itself) the specific intermediary feature that makes
the act desirable falls away. In this sense, because so much of education remains predicated on
the reduction of knowledge to Google-able information, a teacher’s fantasy of self-importance
(i.e. the important of the act of teaching) is fissured. While this experience is a traumatic
encounter for the subject, the instantiation simultaneously connects the subject’s ontological
horizon to desire so that it is possible to disentangle the Borromean structure of the Lacanian
triad. In sum, by reading the virtuality of scene, both in the Imaginary suture of fantasy and
constitutive split of the subject, the inaccessible Real (momentarily) emerges.
At its root, each traumatic encounter is a questioning of the fallibility of teacher’s
perceptions that highlights how shifts in teacher ontology can radically alter the reality of what
we call education. The hard lesson of virtuality is not that teachers no longer have real
engagements with their students. Rather, the much more untenable discovery is that there never
have been real teaching engagements; teaching has always-already been a game sustained by a
more fantasmatic scenario:
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Journal Entry: What the virtual reality of education exposes is that “real” teaching has
the structure of “virtual” teaching with an imagined partner in the sense that my students
merely serve as a “prop” for enacting my subjective fantasies as a teacher.
Given the unreliability of the subjective frame, this research seeks to problematize the concept of
teacher ontology as it is understood within the Symbolic matrix and inflected upon by the
transmission of virtual realities. As a way forward into the abyss of the Real, each reflexive
movement seeks to reach the abyss itself; the Schellingian nothingness6 that is the absence of the
big Other. The subject, as such, persists as a self-relating negativity where the groundless space
(ungrund) of the virtual leaves open the possibility of the act that breaks up the casual chain in
knowing, toward a recognition of being, since it is grounded only in itself.7
Methodologically, I situate myself as an autoethnographic referent during my school’s
adoption of a digital one-to-one program whereby teachers and students are continuously
plugged into the educational mainframe. In turning to my own subject(ive) position within a
digitalized classroom, the virtual spaces of my class represent both the potentiality for a more
fully constituted reality and a world that, in its whole, is nothing. The philosophical twist to be
added, from a Žižekian perspective, is that it is not until the subject begins to experience the
reduction of the wealth of her or his subjective experience to a temporality of electrical signals
that it is possible for the mind to begin letting go.8 However, it is precisely the radical ambiguity
of the virtual itself that opens the space for resistance within the educational realm.
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Each movement of this treatise proceeds toward a radical pedagogy (beyond traditional
and critical frames) by pathologically re-structuring the failures of the subjective frame. For
Žižek, no-thing is not nothing but the void(ing) of the internally situated world of appearances
that is subjectivity itself. In this way, the subjective passage represents the transition from an
epistemological void to an ontological one.

Or, more precisely, “the passage from the

inaccessible Thing beyond the subject’s reach to the subject itself as the Thing incapable of
being reduced.”9 The root alienation of this position, in the end, functions as a (Hegelian) selfcontradiction that is the drive of dialectical thinking.10 Here again, the empty point of negativity
is not nothing but the inverse of everything, or the negation of all determinacy. It is within this
space devoid of all content that the subject is able to reflexively locate her or his true identity.
For Žižek, the empty space of primordial loss is a substantiation of Descartes’ withdrawal-intoself as universal doubt or the madness of absolute negativity that preserves the necessity of the
reflexive subject.11 The “madness” of self-reflexivity, in this way, serves as a vanishing mediator
between the thing and its representation such that the withdrawal-into-the-self culminates in a
radical negativity from which I can no longer attempt to “traverse the horizon” of my
subjectivity without accounting for the “terrifying deadlock”12 of the Real.

Subjective Virtuality
To distinguish again between the Real and reality, the two domains are not synonymous
but are mutually exclusive. What the subject experiences as “reality”—the daily-life world in
9
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which we “feel at home” can only stabilize itself through the exclusion of the Real13 because the
Real is a traumatic kernel of subjectivity coded to resist symbolization. The function of the
Lacanian triad, however, opens a conduit to identify the Real; it provides a traumatic glimpse
inward capable of shattering the symbolic coordinates of the subject’s prescribed horizon of
meaning. Given the weight of this formulation, Lacan proposes the triadic structure as the
elementary matrix of human experience enabling both: (a) a thinking of the modern subject, and,
(b) the disentanglement of the failures of subjective perception.14
Within Lacan’s schemata, the subjective position follows the formula of the signifier—a
linguistic circularity that assumes a tautological shape: a name (teacher) refers to an object (the
subject) because this object is called that (teacher). This impersonal form announces the
dimension of the big Other, the intersubjective network of signifiers,15 beyond other subjects.
Because of the oblique differentiality of this formulation, the subject is always displaced by a
minimal difference from the place it occupies. For example, as a teacher, the structure of the
field of my understanding (signifier) is predicated on the redoubling of the object (the selfobjectified) into itself and the place I occupy in the structure, i.e., the phenomenon of symbolic
reduplication.16 Consequently, no subject can ever absolutely ‘fit’ in its place because there
always remains a gap at the level of enunciation. Thus, I am never fully what my Symbolic
mandate tells me that I am because I am always that thing (excess) and my own failure (void).
This formulation is an example of why there is no meaning apart from alienation in the
signifier. For this reason, “philosophers may ask why is there something rather than nothing, but
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for the subject the question is why is there nothing when there should be something?”17 The
nothingness of alienation serves as the first identifying point of unity in the subject by
functioning as “the object which is always designated by the same signifier.”18

As an

illustration, the self-reflexive ‘I’ that I perceive as a teacher–subject is pathologically barred
beneath the mandates of the (Symbolic) big Other. As such, the ontological weight I prescribe to
my perceptions as a positivization of being is, in actuality, an unconscious misrecognition of the
discursive subjugation necessary for the operation of the discourse of education. This illusionary
framework of ontological consistency is the context through which I falsely attain recognition in
the system yet also thereby become complicit in my own alienation. As a teacher then, this
psychic inconsistency plagues my (un)conscious as a reflection always falling short of an
imagined identity. As a response I create a teaching persona, the (Imaginary) fantasy of my
desire to fulfill the unfathomable X of the Other’s desire (or fulfill what makes me worthy of the
Other’s desire). Given my leftist political philosophy, this persona is the ideological and
pedagogical stance of a “radical” educator. However, rather than serving to close a breach in my
identification within the Other, this movement merely veils the irresolvable lack (the kernel of
the Real) that terrorizes my subjective (un)consciousness.

What Education?
In L’envers de la psychanalyse, Lacan describes the Symbolic as an a priori matrix of
passages from one discourse to another.19 Lacan’s interest is specifically focused on the passage
from the discourse of the Master to the University (education) as the hegemonic discourse in
17
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contemporary society.20 The discourse of education functions such that knowledge comes to
legitimize forms of domination by positioning power beneath the “neutrality” of knowledge
itself. Education, therefore, functions as a discursive matrix of representations and significations
that obfuscates its structure through a constitutive formulation of the “factual state of things.”21
What is critical here is that the shift in the discourse does not signal the departure of the Master
but a shift to new forms of domination.
In our present era of late modernity, shifts in education toward digital knowledge
economies are often described in Orwellian terms that inevitably fall out into dystopian futures.
Technological advancements infiltrate classrooms like a disease that intellectually eviscerates
academic discourse beneath the “ceaseless chatter of cyberspace.”22 Inevitably, the incessant
drive of educators toward virtual learning spaces conceal reality by degrading material
connections and modifying the coherence of a subject’s being, ensuring that they are educated
toward accepting certain futures.23 The Lacanian parallel is such that things are ‘not right’
because there is a matrix/big Other that obfuscates the ‘true’ reality behind it all. The big Other,
in this way, (un)consciously governs the performative dimension of reality so that the subject
must appeal to it for knowledge (i.e., the rules of the game) because: (a) the subject is alienated
from direct access to reality, and, (b) the subject believes the big Other has (control of) the
answers.
Yet, if our fate is one of disciplinary bondage to the technocratic big Other, then the
structures of public education are paradoxically being wired to meet the demands of a transmuted
state apparatus. Under the guise of limitless potentiality, schools throughout the United States are
20
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introducing one-to-one digital device programs as a virtual panacea of educational reform. My
own introduction to these programs, as a teacher in a one-to-one institution, was propagandized
beneath the hackneyed edict that we (educators) are preparing students for jobs that do not yet
exist, an edict that was characterized succinctly by the slogan ‘future-ready students’. The
problem for many, however, is that these sentiments do little to quell teachers’ (un)conscious
fears of a growing obsolescence, a fear commodified through the selling of technology as
‘teacher-proof’ curriculum.24
In contrast, however, for those like me, as a self-taught computer-programming teacher,
shifts toward virtuality bring with them the potential to alter and reformulate the iconoclastic
transmissions of the discourse of education. To embrace such a vantage point, though, it is
necessary to force the self beyond present understandings of teacher-subjectivity toward a
radicalized vision of teacher ontology. Questions of ontological understanding are of course a
part of the daily fabric of all teachers’ reality, in both the way teachers see themselves as
educators and in the development of their professional persona,25 however, teacher research
rarely considers how questions of being at the abyss of the unknown stain teachers’ perceptions
of the classroom. Instead, there is an implicit assumption that the subject and reality are a
constant. For example, a standard reading of the nature of teaching science frequently
contextualizes curriculum as a series of precise formulas that ‘prove’ the material status of
real(ity). Through this interplay with students, teachers construct an ontologically consistent
world based on a “logic of truth”26 that accepts as a given the ontological limits of being.
Further, the totality of this understanding (re)presents the modernist logic of American
24
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schooling: there is a reality out there to be found, and ‘we’ (educators) can teach ‘you’
(students) a language to accurately represent it.
Paradoxically, however, the nature of science simultaneously desubstantializes reality
itself at the level of quantum physics such that material reality is unimaginably reduced to
ephemeral pseudo entities that can only be descriptively captured through abstract mathematical
formalizations. Thus, the perceived ontogenetic consistency of reality qua science curriculum is
reduced to the logical structure of the virtual—the simultaneous reduction and limitless
potentiality of perception at the intercept of experience. This structure is a sublimation of the
Real, which masks the trauma of the ontological inconsistency of materialism.27 In other words,
the teacher’s presentation of a universal reality functions to substantiate the teacher’s consistency
of being by masking the trauma of the subject’s alienation.
My point here is not to engage in a debate over the material consistency of reality but to
grapple with the fallibility of teachers’ understanding of the Real. With this in mind, as teachers
stare into the abyss of being, the limits of real(ity) begin to fissure, making the Symbolic frame
increasingly vulnerable to a ‘hack’. Within this space, a hack is imagined as a disjunctive act of
resistance whereby both the discursive network and the ontological horizon are disrupted in an
attempt to unthink education and willfully embrace the alienation of the Real. Metaphorically,
the act is exemplified by the green phosphor text appearing on Trinity's computer screen as she
loads the Nmap program onto a system’s power grid in The Matrix Reloaded.28 The Nmap hack
is a sophisticated port scanner that determines what services are running on a system, which is a
common prelude to a cyber intrusion attempt. By assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a
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particular field, Nmap, like the parallax ontology, finds an open space for exploitation
(resistance) within a vulnerable network.
The intent of hacking one’s own subjective perception is to force a shift in perspective
from the subject of the addressee to the addresser and enter the restricted spaces of the
(Symbolic) big Other. Within the domain of the virtual, the Symbolic functions as a network that
is constantly (re-)establishing connections inside reality’s mainframe for us such that the
computer functionally codes itself onto the Symbolic. In other words, the Matrix is the virtual
big Other that pulls the strings of reality, thereby ensuring that the subject never fully dominates
the effects of its acts. However, to hack the subject position, the user enters into restricted spaces
and is confronted with the constraints of a compiled world in which “all is possible, yet nothing
is contingent.”29 The hack, as such, brings the irreducible negativity or incommensurability of
the subject into focus without lapsing into an imaginary sense of wholeness.
Further, the subjective struggle to free the mind requires the individual to both perceive
the depth of her/his own (mis)perception and to convince her/himself that reality is a construct
that has been deeply internalized. Unfortunately, as Morpheus tells Neo, “Most people are not
ready to be unplugged … many of them are so … hopelessly dependent on the system that they
will fight to protect it.”30 Thus, to problematize issues of perception within the shifting
temporalities of a digital classroom, it is necessary to tarry with the outer limits of the subjective
frame. As an example of this frame, the subsequent narrative is an intentional effort to
destabilize my own common-sense understandings of teaching such that the textual stability of
my perception is forced into a space beyond itself. While I cannot, as Lacan notes, literally step
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outside of myself, the methodological intent of this chapter is to reflexively short-circuit the
subject position by presenting reality in its alterity of finitude.31

The Virtualization of Reality
Journal Entry: A few months into the one-to-one program and my teaching was anything
but radical. In fact, my classroom had deteriorated into an untenable space. The ubiquity
of the virtual unveiled an instantaneous world that blurred the boundaries between my
students, reality, and technology. The most violent intrusion of all was the total collapse
of my curricular content since students always-already had access to vast aggregations of
virtual knowledge systems.
The root disorientation of the shift itself is, of course, not a new experience. Students
have always leveraged available resources to formulate outbursts of classroom resistance,
thereby creating feelings of discomfort for me as a teacher. Over time, however, I have learned
to mask these feelings of inadequacy, forcing them into the background of my consciousness, as
I navigate the daily reality of teaching. Thus, what confounded me most about the one-to-one
program is why this particular technology, compared to other advancements, caused me to
suffocate beneath the enunciation of its primary function?
The shift to a virtualized domain also marks a significant expansion in the reach of my
students whereby the traditional paradigm is permanently effaced by: (a) generating an alterity of
spacing that cannot be translated into an ontologically consistent object by the formulas of
modern education, and, (b) a scripting of textual space that is beyond the resistance of the current
discursive frameworks of education. Dean describes this transformation as the cyber “Real,” in
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which technological advancements change the structure of the Symbolic, exposing the subject to
unbearable intrusions of an over-present Other.32 For example, by directly accessing various
databases of knowledge, students can transcend the traditional barrier between a teacher and a
student—knowledge itself—exposing the fragility of the Symbolic order qua the discourse of
education.
Through Žižek’s description of how computers inscribe themselves onto the Symbolic
realm,33 I began to imagine my experiences as being mediated by my students’ hijacking of my
classroom; each keystroke an enunciation of the pathological absence of the big Other. As such,
rather than providing me a virtual reality to escape the trauma of my experience, the
digitalization of my classroom confronts me with the horror of the Real by reducing the space to
a virtual simulacrum under the prosthetic control of an-Other. In leveraging technology to
traverse the gap of the traditional discourse of education, students are hacking the system and
exposing the impotence of my authority.
Journal Entry: With each movement, students mocked my authority ... (un)consciously
conveying to me, “for all of the control you ‘think’ you possess, reality is far more
contingent.” Regardless of the students’ awareness, the act forced me into a
fundamentally impotent position; no matter how I responded, my lack of power was
confirmed. In every scenario, I was trapped: if I could not, I could not, but even if I
could—any attesting (to my control, knowledge, etc.) was doomed to function as a
denial—a masking of my impotence confirming that I could not do anything.
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Subsequently, by degrading my sense of control, my students forced me into a confrontation with
my perception of being within a progressively deteriorating edifice of the Symbolic consistency.
In this way, my students’ ‘intrusions’ were a violent assertion enunciating the
impossibility of continuing ‘our’ exchange within the confines of its current framework. As a
virtual remediation of the ontological, the digital interface provides students the space to vocalize
what had always been the truth of education: ‘my’ classroom is, in actuality, ‘their’ classroom
and never has been what I believed it to be. Further, my understanding of the very notion of the
term ‘classroom’ has rapidly degenerated and morphed into an unrecognizable virtual space, a
space I am ontologically ill equipped to address, not unlike the computer-generated reality of the
Matrix itself. In returning to Plato’s dispositif, the Matrix metaphorically represents the failure to
re-imagine ‘forms of disillusionment’ in the present, digitalized to create the conditions of our
dystopian future. For Badiou, such avoidance of this future necessitates a hypertranslation of
Plato in which traditional discourses of education are permanently effaced by an operative matrix
of knowledges and transcendental arrangements of ‘truths’ that are always-already visible.34
Thus, the split between perception, epistemology, and ontology is mediated by a technological
event that cannot be represented in Plato.
Journal Entry: All of my students were sitting before me wearing Beats headphones and
watching YouTube videos that explain the meaning of the projected shadows on their
iPads. … If I failed to radically re-conceptualize my role as “their” teacher, I would be
reduced to a “passive state of living batteries,”35 providing the system (education) with
the “energy” (curriculum, pedagogy, disciplinary presence) needed to sustain its function.
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Because of my impotence within this system, I (un)consciously reify hierarchal systems by
condensing all negativity into external figures (i.e., the dislocated referent of the system itself)
that serve as the rationale behind my students’ failure. However, each of my students’ intrusions
into this space confronts me with the unbearable prospect of my own self-objectivization that,
increasingly, generates a cognitivism that deteriorates into anxiety.
The virtual codification of knowledge, in this way, produces ‘simulated’ experiences that
become increasingly indiscernible from ‘real’ social contexts. Each clutching fetishization of
false imagery signifies my growing desperation to feel I have a grasp on reality, “the forced
choice between some-thing and no-thing.”36 Although each formulation is a progressively violent
reduction of my teaching persona, I desperately seek any movement away from nothingness, for
even in being we can, as Sartre reminds us, fear nothingness.37 While the difficulty of navigating
this space is problematic, the mediated exposure forces a confrontational status with the
retroactive awareness of non-being. My existence, in such a context, is not defined by a reality
that is not real but by fissures in the ontological edifice. In this precise formulation, it is not that
there was once a ‘real’ reality and now there is only a ‘virtual’ reality; instead, through the
virtualization of education, I become retroactively aware that there never was a ‘real’ reality, or,
more precisely, my reality always was virtual; I just was not aware of it as a teacher. What the
virtual reality of education exposes, then, is that ‘real’ teaching has the structure of ‘virtual’
teaching with an imagined partner in the sense that my students merely served as a ‘prop; for
enacting my fantasies of self as the teacher.
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The Fallacy of the Real
By returning to the Platonian dispositif a final time, the fantasy I had constructed of
myself as a radical teacher is, in actuality, a perverse enactment of the Rancièrean critique of
Plato. For Rancière, Plato’s failure was situating students as passive (in the cave) and only there
to pursue pleasure (in “images and appearances”),38 in other words, they were individually
unable to pursue the truth. In a similar way, my fantasy of a self (un)consciously attached to a
priori incapacities of my students concretizes the opposition between subject positions,
teacher/student. The act of desiring (even as a critical/radical act), based on a perceived distance
between teacher and student thus (re)creates the opposition itself. My fantasy, as such, fulfills the
object cause of my desire (objet petit a) by supporting the repressed scenario that the system is,
in truth, oppressive, and educators such as myself are needed to shed light on systemic violence.
Thus, the discomfort I experience within the technological realm is a short-circuiting of
my ontological edifice wherein glitches in the screens of my perception expose the fantasy
structure of my self-referential importance. With each deteriorating representation of reality, the
chaos beneath a faltering education system is exposed. In the absence of an anaphoric big Other,
there are only my paranoiac fantasies and the terrifying Real of an unmasked self:
Journal Entry: The primary impetus behind my “radical” teaching practices was never a
means of developing students’ consciousness or a liberatory critique of the system that
subjugates them. Rather, my motivation was the fulfillment of a fundamental narcissism,
a pedagogical stance that realized my political desire to be a “radical,” and my
engagement in a critique of the system created an “Other” to be resisted and defined my
role in its resistance.
38
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In this moment, I realize the entire impetus behind my desire to teach is fraudulent, and not only
had I not been acting on my students’ behalf, I am, in actuality, furthering their subjugation.
Journal Entry: What my students had always-already realized was that any attempt to
overcome an educational impasse paradoxically necessitates them seeking more
knowledge within the system of their subjugation, thereby forcing them to be complicit in
their own alienation39 or resistance against it. However, because of my positionality, I
naively believed that I was in a position of authority beyond the discourse of education.
What I failed to recognize, and what my students asserted, was that I merely served as an
avatar for the Master. For example, despite my resistance to the false neutrality of
knowledge, I was pathologically anxious over meeting the terms of the system’s output
demands (e.g., common core, AP test scores, college admissions, etc.), which ultimately
determined my “success” within the machinery of discourse. Thus, as a teacher–subject, I
was always hysterically addressing the system as a Master.

For Wall and Perrin, this is the fundamental alienation preventing educational progress;
teachers are often well aware of the structural illusions undergirding the system’s failures, but we
still do not renounce them.40 As a basal example of this, teachers endlessly complain about the
intrusions of standardized curriculum, but still we teach it. However, the authors’ precise point,
through a Žižekian lens, is that it does not matter if educators know that a standardized
curriculum is not a representative evaluator of learning or instruction: “all that matters is that in
[their] actual behavior [they] continue to act (through its teaching) as though it is.”41 Thus, in a
39
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strictly codified way, whether I ‘care’ or ‘do not care’ about my students is rendered
inconsequential because I cannot offer them any real assurance (about their achievement)
without the acknowledgment of the Master.

Žižek’s Hegelo-Lacanian Pathology
For Lacan, there is an intimate rapport that conjoins madness and freedom, a rapport of
possibilities due to the virtuality of the gap from which the subject is alienated.

42

From this

position on the precipice of the virtual and the actual, it is possible for the subject to become unglued from a direct referential relationship. “The moment of decision is the moment of madness”
precisely in so far as there is no big Other to provide the ultimate guarantee, the ontological
cover for the subject's decision.43 To fully withdraw the self into the void of the Real, however, I
must make a final speculative turn toward Hegel. Such a short-circuiting of the ontological
function, for Hegel, is an antagonistic wounding that allows for higher planes of consciousness
through violent confrontations of subjective presuppositions and the disavowal of the desire for
wholeness.44 This disavowal necessitates a reflexive break from understandings of teaching
codified by the illusionary fantasy of ontogenic misrecognition described in the preceding
narrative.
Imagined here as an encounter with the dark side of the ontological edifice, this final act
of teacher reflexivity necessitates a confrontation with the terrifying imaginary of the Real
wherein I disengage from my own “radical pathology.”45

Methodologically, this reflexive
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endpoint is, for Žižek, a movement toward ontological failure whereby the abyss beyond
emerges as a groundless nothingness out of which everything springs ex nihilo.46 Nothingness, in
this sense, is a subversive transformation wherein the subject encounters the radical alienation of
an asubjective opacity rather than its own self-image:
Reflection always fails [when] the subject … encounters in a mirror some dark spot, a
point which does not turn into his mirror-picture—in which he cannot “recognize
himself.” It is, however, precisely at this point of absolute strangeness … that the subject
is inscribed into the picture.47
Thus, the subject qua the subject of the look (reflection) is precisely the “inherently incomplete
pathological stain”48 from which the subject is able to perceive itself against the chaos of its own
(mis)recognition. Ontologically, this is the moment the ‘true’ Žižekian subject emerges because
it is within this recognition that the ‘event’ is doubled and the alienation of the Other becomes
present, transforming an act of narcissistic reflexivity into an ethical act of collective
enunciation.
The recognition of myself as a ‘pathological stain’ of ontological finitude within a
virtuality of shifting educative experiences exposes me to ephemeral temporalities, causing me to
seize within the vortices gaps and voids in the fabric of reality. For Hegel, this is the ‘night of the
world’ where “the human being is the night, the empty nothing, that contains everything in its
simplicity—an unending wealth of representations and images, of which none belong to him.”49
What this means is that the fantasmatic phenomenon of “seeing one’s self seeing” as the
46
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disembodied “pure gaze” of ontogenetic experience collapses the fantasy frame50 into the abyss
of radical negativity at the heart of the subject. Radical negativity, as such, cannot be sublated
into a stable social edifice. That is to say, it is a self-relating negativity that puts at risk and
dissolves the social structure that supports both the finite status of the teacher subject and the
ideal of the discourse of education.
From this position of lack, Hegel develops an “energy of thought” that is capable of
dissolving the (apparently) seamless fabric of reality, the “circle that remains self-enclosed,”51
bestowing autonomy on the parts before dismemberment. For Žižek, this depiction constrains the
big Other to a network of signifiers and details the subjective “capacity to reduce the organic
whole of experience to an appendix [of] ‘dead symbolic classifications.’”52 Thus, it is only by
encountering the night of the world, an obscene proto-reality of partial objects floating against
the background of an ontological void,53 that the subject can experience the reflexive negativity
necessary to dissolve our symbolically constituted reality,54 a movement that propels us forward
like Morpheus’s ‘splinter in the mind’.

A Third Pill
In the end, the radical abyss of subjective failure functions as a systemic hard drive crash
“wiping the slate clean,”55 an act that re-codes a teacher’s ontological framework toward an
ethics of resistance. Within the asymmetric imagery of the virtual domain, my own
50
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pathologically barred subjectivity is only present through the realization that my perception is
always-already split, a dialectical antagonism between thought and being. For Lacan, this
position is an inversion of Descartes cogito: “I think where I am not; therefore, I am where I do
not think.”56 The barred subject, in this way, is evacuated as an ethical manifestation, causing a
ruptured perception toward a transitory lack in the Other; i.e., there is no big Other.57 From such
a position, it is possible to enunciate the otherness of the Other through a shared understanding
of alienation with my students—the formulation of the ethics of the Real.
It is thus through my students that the Real of reality emerges within virtual spaces of our
classroom. After repeated failures to free my mind from the disillusionment of the discourse of
education, the ontological abyss of virtuality forces me to grapple with the understanding that the
‘rules’ of reality only govern one particular version of reality. The only Real to experience is in
the experience of alienation itself. This Real, in this sense, is analogous to the fabricated
liberatory potential (pathways) of Neo’s forced choice between red and blue pills:
You take the blue pill, the story ends; you wake up in your bed and believe whatever you
want to believe. You take the red pill, you stay in Wonderland, and I show you how deep
the rabbit hole goes.58
If contextualized within the educational domain, for example, one could easily imagine the blue
pill as traditional pedagogy and the red pill as critical pedagogy. The problem, however, is that
Neo’s enlightenment is contingent on Morpheus’s teaching, a pedagogical incongruence with the
ontological structure of the film. The way forward, for Žižek, is to ontologically conceive of a
third pill: …[a] pill which would enable me to perceive not the reality behind the illusion, but
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reality in the illusion itself (emphasis added).59 A third pill is conceived here as radical pedagogy
beyond traditional and critical pedagogy, a means to search for reality in the illusions itself. The
pedagogical third pill, as such, is a perpetual shift that generates a subjective gaze that is
“always-already inscribed into the reflexive point itself,”60 allowing the subject to relate to the
world, no matter how paradoxically.
Regardless of the depths of our (mis)recognition, the Žižekian lens asserts that there
always exists an indivisible remainder, or “bone in the throat,”61 that resists symbolization.
Radical pedagogy, as such, is centered on the subject’s ability to understand and enunciate the
conditions of her/his circumstances, allowing for far-reaching reconceptualizations of the
problems and possibilities of educating. Therefore, teaching, like philosophy, “begins the
moment we do not accept what exists as given.”62 By metaphorically glimpsing into the spaces
of betweenness that eludes our ontic horizon, the virtuality of education highlights a way of
thinking about education without prescribed answers, where answers can only ever be partial and
may result in a violent passage à l’acte. Experiencing the excessive remainders of
subjectivization allows interlopers to envisage displacements in the Real as a gap or shift
between perspectives that “pulverizes sameness into [a] multitude of appearances.”63 Within this
multiplicity, hacks emerge within the gap separating objects in reality from the virtual simulacra,
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thereby re-coding ergo sum to read “I think where the self is evacuated;”64 in this absence, it is
possible to re-articulate discourse as a radicalized ontology of education.
If educators are to take seriously the possibilities of this frame, we must not be so
arrogant to presume an answer and offer a plan of action for others, but tarry with the negativity
of our own ideological condition. The task, then, for all ‘radical’ educators is to begin hacking
their own Symbolic network by encountering the trauma of the Real again and again. It is only
from this position that teachers can act autonomously, inverting the current system of education
into a state of negative universality, a universality of irreducible Symbolic inconsistency. As
expressed through the linking of violent experiences and common antagonisms, not the neutral
translations of postmodernity, the true radical position is not just the readiness to save ourselves
or our students but also the “ruthless dedication to annihilating those who made the victims,”65
even if this involves the thorough decimation of our own position.
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CH 4- Kubrick avec Žižek: Gaze, Fantasy, and the Violence of Being
Introduction to Chapter Four
In the Ernst Lubitsch film Ninotchka1 the male protagonist, Leon, visits a cafeteria and
orders a coffee without cream; the waiter replies: “I'm sorry, sir, we have no cream. Can it be
without milk?” In both cases, the customer will receive black coffee, so what is the difference?
Readers of Žižek will, of course, recognize this as one of his well-worn jokes explaining the
Hegelian logic of differentiality whereby the lack (or not-All) itself is registered as a positive
feature. In this case, coffee, as the ‘not-All’, is accompanied by a different negation. The reason,
Žižek spends time on such dialectical jokes is because they uncover the function of ideology at
its purest in what many claim are ‘post–ideological times’–or, in terms more familiar within the
educational terrain post-metanarratives. Žižek, however, rejects the claim that we are living in
post-ideological times noting that to detect ideological distortions: “one should note not only
what is said, but the complex interplay between what is said and what is not said, the unsaid
implied in what is said: do we get coffee without cream or coffee without milk”?2
Žižek complicates this issue further by applying the Hegelian concept of the negation of
negation – “a double, self-referential negating that does not involve a return to a positive identity
through synthesis”3–to our subjective understanding of identity. Following this logic: a coffee
with no cream is not just ‘with no milk’ but also ‘not with no-cream,’ and this second negation,
according to Žižek, is more than purely symbolic. Thus, by perceiving the beyond–the point of
differential opposition whereby it is logically necessary to consider that of ‘coffee with X’ versus
‘coffee without X’– the logic arrives at the core of the subjective experience relative to our
1
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understanding of being in the world.4 In sum, Hegel’s negation of negation is the process
whereby the subject’s presupposed trauma of alienation posits itself as a positivity through an
internal dialectical process that shifts the subject’s perceptive. This shift is a new perspective that
makes the original (mis)recognition of self appear as its opposite–beginning the reflexive
injunction again from another vantage point.
But why spend time on such dialectical formulations? In professional development
settings, I often deploy another of Žižek’s dialectical jokes about a Soviet worker suspected of
stealing to contextualize the possibilities of dialectical thinking within the confines of our daily
reality of teaching. Every evening, as the worker suspected of stealing leaves the factory, the
factory guard carefully inspects the wheelbarrow the worker pushes in front of him. But each
night, the guard finds nothing; the wheelbarrow is always empty. Night after night, this same
scene unfolds. The worker passes the guard, but the guard finds nothing. Finally, the truth
emerges, what the worker is stealing is the wheelbarrows themselves.5 What this example
illustrates is that understanding is always-already just out of our reach but the way we perceive a
problem is the problem itself. In this precise way, we could work through all the functional
differentials (coffee not with no cream’ is merely ‘coffee with cream’ and so on) but if we fail to
articulate a vision beyond these differential equations, is it ever truly possible to push the
boundaries of how we understand our self in relation to our understandings of the world around
us?
Why Žižek?
In the first long-form reading of Žižekian theory within the field of education, Tony Wall
and David Perrin implicitly task readers with the refutation of what exists as given through a
4
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hysterical questioning of how the content we encounter is actually possible–a process they
broadly define as ‘‘Žižekian critical pedagogy.’’6 In questioning the epistemological and
ontological horizon of our understanding, Wall and Perrin establish thematic, pedagogical, and
philosophical threads that bind their educational vision to their conceptualization of the Žižekian
gaze—a means of radically conceptualizing the ‘‘problems and possibilities of educating.’’7
There is, however, a certain irony in this frame. For many readers who have spent a great deal of
time engaging in (or grappling with) Žižek’s work, s/he is almost certain to encounter a
maddening failure of comprehension. Thus, if we are similarly tasked here with considering the
‘problems and possibilities of educating,’ the question arises, Why Žižek?
The central issue at the heart of this question is the difficulty readers face when engaging
with Žižek–a point almost universally leveed by his detractors, poignantly summarized by Rex
Butler:
He speaks rapidly through a strong Central European accent and a lisp, constantly
circling back upon himself to try to make himself clearer, threatening never to
stop. We feel he is making the same point over and over, but we cannot quite
grasp it, and in order to do so he must take in the entirety of Western philosophy
and culture, both high and low: from Schoenberg to sci-fi, from quantum
mechanics to the latest Hollywood blockbuster, from now-forgotten figures of
eighteenth and nineteenth-century German philosophy to the notoriously obscure
writings of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan ...8
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In short, using myself as an example, I often walk away from an engagement with Žižek
struggling to comprehend the full depth of what was made available, my mind filled with a
dizzying array of philosophical concepts and references to popular culture. Struggling to retain
the information and comprehend the interconnectedness between theories, concepts, and
examples, the following days are always spent conducting long hours of research. As the picture
slowly gains greater clarity, I realize this is precisely Žižek’s point. While I can personally attest
to how maddening this process can be, the daunting spectre of comprehension exemplifies the
pedagogical implications of Žižek’s work. When one engages with Žižek, the onus is placed on
the reader/student to interpret the material being presented. The unnerving interjection of
philosophical examples and circularity of his presentation teaches by forcefully delaying our
comprehension.
As reader/student, Žižek requires us to struggle with his text which not only produces
understanding but also space for interpretation and resistance. What is unique about this
presentation is how we are (un)consciously forced to locate ourselves within his narratives, we
are forced to consider ourselves in relation to what he has said and how the moment might draw
us nearer or push us further from his philosophical lens. While this might be said of any
theoretical text, Žižek himself warns that beneath the user-friendly surface of his texts, there is a
position deployed with scant regard for the wealth and warmth of any humanistic concerns. In
The Parallax View, Žižek advises of “cruel traps” set for the reader who is trying to decipher its
meaning,9 highlighting the true difficulty we face in unraveling the clues he has placed before us.
In a strange way, I have often wondered if he is using the text itself to exemplify the subject’s
own a priori alienation at the heart of his philosophical edifice.
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When I imagine the Zizekian process within the confines of my own classroom, Žižek
exemplifies an unorthodox use of dialectic engagement between self (author/teacher) and other
(reader/student) whereby gaps in understanding are left open for interpretative threads to split
and spiral in a multitude of direction. But, of course, leaving spaces open for student
interpretation is old hat in education. Whether referring back to Dewey, designing a projectbased lesson, or reimaging transformative learning, good teachers have always left gaps open for
student (re)interpretation. Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher suggest that Žižek’s particular use
of an unsystematic approach to argumentation is an example of the rhetorical method termed
parataxis. Parataxis is a “style that suppresses the logical and casual connections between
clauses in a sentence, paragraph, chapter, or work.”10 Using an example from my own classroom
to highlight the distinction between syntax (which includes logical and causal connections) and
parataxis (which suppresses them), it is the difference between ‘the Syrian boy is shaking
because of the mortar shells’ (syntactical) and ‘the burst of a mortar shell; the boy is shaking’
(parataxis). A paratactic work, such as we often find in Žižek, leaves it to the reader to infer what
the connection is between ideas. In the very Žižekian-ly titled chapter of The Parallax View,
“The Unbearable Heaviness of Being Divine Shit,” he references the possibility of the paratactic:
“a new level of interconnectedness, a “paratactic” field of secret links, of echoes and
reverberations between monadic elements–something, I am tempted to claim, not unlike the
inner links of Plato’s chora which precede the gird of ideas.”11
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While Sharpe and Boucher’s (and others’) analysis is meant to serve as a critique or at
least a questioning of Žižek’s contribution to continental philosophy12–within the traditional
ideal of philosophy providing a sustained system of inquiry– it is fruitful (for the purposes of this
text) to consider parataxis as pedagogical method in itself. As an example, part of what is lacking
(for many) in Žižek are the limited number of direct political positions he provides–despite his
often overtly radical analysis. But following the notion of parataxis, there is often more to his
arguments than is immediately apparent. By failing to define a direct position, he is leaving open
gaps in the analysis for the reader to draw their own independent conclusions. In so doing, Žižek
subverts the position of the Master by highlighting the pointless nature of desire for activity
without an understanding of the limitations imposed on us by the big Other–or our a priori state
of alienation. Another risk, however, as was pointed out to me by colleague, is that Žižek’s
writing is so obtuse that people will choose to not read his work at all. This point might have
even greater implications in education, where individuals already feel time is a constantly
dwindling commodity.
Pedagogically, the aim of a paratactic lens is to leave the interlocutor to infer what is
missing within the logical breaks and interruptions of thinking. Within Žižek’s own
argumentation there always remains an implicit space (or gap) that leaves the reader unfulfilled,
left to infer what might be. This approach suggests that one of the primary critiques levied
against Žižek – a lack of a directly articulated positionality or system of thought– is precisely the
point of the analysis itself. According to Sarah Kay, the discomfort we might experience when
trying to understand the full interconnection between the example and the argument being
posited by Žižek can be attributed to the difficulty of writing on (or around) the Lacanian Real:
12
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the object of inquiry that cannot be encountered directly but must instead be discussed through it
effects.13 Similarly, Žižek himself notes, the only way to comprehend Lacan is to approach his
work as a work in progress, as a succession of attempts to seize the same traumatic kernel.14
Comprehension, as such, is always in negotiation, or perhaps, always faltering as each kernel of
understanding only uncovers a deeper level of our own misrecognition. From this position, we
might say that Žižek’s pedagogical style is not the result of a poorly developed argument or a
lack of a philosophical system but is the result of his writing drawing us nearer to the fringes of
our understanding of being in the world.
By disrupting and disassembling the spatial and temporal continuities of the spectator’s
understanding, many of Stanley Kubrick’s films can be described as mysterious or enigmatic in a
manner akin to Žižek’s paratactic method. The crucial element binding Kubrick enigmatic work,
according Phillip Kuberski, is a “devotion” to the ellipsis: “leaving things out of the film means
leaving them “in”–for the audience’s own consideration.” Kuberski goes on to note, “Kubrick’s
use of ellipsis includes a tendency to leave out explanatory scenes that would close other
narrative gaps.”15 In more generalized terms, the filmic ellipsis is often used for narrative
compression, analysis, or interpretation by linking separate moments in such a way that a
discursive relationship emerges.16 But for Kubrick, the ellipsis is used in a disjunctive manner,
dividing and disjoining the discourse of the film from our everyday life-world without
completely fissuring this connection.
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In Mario Falsetto’s narrative and stylistic analysis of Kubrick, he further highlights the
gap between the surface meaning which appears on a screen and its deeper, subtextual meaning,
as central quality of his films. Falsetto’s analysis draws our attention to the intricacies, complex
organization, and layers of meaning that may not be present to spectators of Kubrick’s films.17
When surveying each film, Kubrick forces us to search for the relations among its various
components–from scene to scene, shot to shot–trying to construct a (somewhat) cohesive
narrative. But the obliqueness of Kubrick’s presentation is such that meaning also resides
between shots and even between frames. Thus, as spectators of Kubrick’s films, we must
embrace varying states of discomfort, a discomfort derived from the implicit trust he has placed
in us to experience and accept the ambiguity of his films. As Kubrick himself noted: “I’m sure
that there’s something in the human personality which resents things that are clear, and,
conversely, something which is attracted to puzzles, enigmas, and allegories.”18
Together, what Kubrick and Žižek highlight is that the way we view a problem is (often)
the problem itself. Within the prism of education, we see the avoidance of this discomfort in
students’ expectation of an answer when they ask a question–and teachers mirror this expectation
of their students. As teachers how often do we turn to reflection only when searching for an
answer to a particular issue we are facing in the classroom? When we begin reading a text (book,
journal article, etc.) on education is there not at least a small part of us that expects the authors to
formulate a conclusion to their analysis–the proverbial ‘thing’ we can take back to our
classrooms? I am always taken aback by how quickly professional development is labeled a
‘waste of time’ when this proverbial thing is lacking. My colleagues often charge theorists and
philosophers with expounding on ideas to no particular end, for solving no practical problem.
17
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But what might happen if instead of asking Žižek or Kubrick a question and expecting an
answer, we considered Žižek or Kubrick’s work as the question itself? That is to say, how does
what is presented before us function not as an answer but as a question that starts us on our path
of discovery?
To function as the question and not the answer is the task of the analyst in Lacanian
psychoanalysis. In a similar way, Žižek claims that “the duty of philosophy is not to solve
problems, but to redefine problems, to show how what we experience as a problem is a false
problem.” He uses the hypothetical example of a deadly comet colliding with earth as a clear and
present danger that does not require philosophy, just good science. For Žižek, “if what we
experience as a problem is true, then we don’t need philosophy.” Instead, what is great about
philosophy is precisely philosophers lack of answers.19 Reading Kubrick with Žižek allows us to
approach this question from the other side of the same coin. As spectators of a film, like the
readers of a book, we expect answers. Answers that make sense and provide a somewhat orderly
conclusion to the narrative. When we don’t get answers, we (often) feel cheated. But why do we
feel cheated? As we have seen through Žižek, the point is to provide questions not answers and
Žižek and Kubrick’s work provides us a platform for questioning how this simple lack can cause
such frustration.
When comparing the questions that are present in Žižek’s work to that of Kubrick, we
might say that Kubrick’s formulations of unknowing are a bit more Kafkaesque. Anyone who
has read Franz Kafka’s work–such as The Trial or Metamorphosis–undoubtedly arrives at the
conclusion that certain elements of the narrative are not meant to be solved–only questioned–
because the reader will not find satisfactory answers within the text. But this is precisely Kafka’s
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point. In life, there are no clear answers. The only answer is what you are able to formulate in
your own mind. In the text I return to most often, Kafka’s The Trial, Joseph K. is accused of a
crime he doesn’t understand by a court he cannot communicate with. There are no clues because
there are only generalities–not particularities.20 There are no answers, only questions, but no
amount of personal investigation can offer greater clarity either. In a sense, Kafka represents the
danger of Žižek’s paratactic method, if we fail to provide our readers/students signposts within
the abyss, they will simply wither within the nothingness. But there is also something present in
Kafka–and Kubrick–that allows us to understand something about ourselves in relation to the
Zizekian method.
In a recent TED-Ed animated talk by Noah Tavlin he asks, “what makes something
Kafkaesque?” Explaining how many cavalierly misuse the adjective and what it truly means,
Tavlin notes, “The term Kafkaesque has entered the vernacular to describe unnecessarily
complicated and frustrating experiences, especially with bureaucracy.”21 But is standing in a long
line to fill out confusing paperwork at the DMV truly Kafkaesque? Does a student rotely
completing worksheets at a teacher’s command really capture the richness of Kafka’s vision?
Probably not. In Talvin’s own exploration he notes, “It’s not the absurdity of bureaucracy alone,
but the irony of the characters’ circular reasoning in reaction to it, that is emblematic of Kafka’s
writing,” Ben Marcus adds even greater context, although he never directly uses the term
Kafkaesque, by making an argument about what Kafka’s “quintessential qualities” were,
including “affecting use of language, a setting that straddles fantasy and reality, and a sense of
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striving even in the face of bleakness–hopelessly and full of hope.”22 As a reader, for example,
we begin to experience the outer boundaries of what Marcus describes when we are provided
with a riddle with no possibility of a solution; yet, we cling to the notion that there must be a
solution.
Kubrick’s narrative structure is often threaded with similar experiences: The Shining ends
with an image that is impossible to contextualize within the film’s narrative arc and A Clockwork
Orange concludes with a somewhat ambiguous statement from the film’s protagonist–both
instances threatening to undermine the entire film. With each example, we are left to interpret
how it all fits together, every answer is a subjective fabrication of reality–as ‘correct’ as any
other formulation. On a basic level, we encounter both the pain and possibility of paratactic
method, the ‘meaning’ of the text exists only in the gaps of understanding and our struggle to
piece together a coherent thread that connects the disparate pieces. But the real disruptive
potentiality of the paratactic method gains greater clarity when we understand, for example, how
each of the examples above (the DMV and the student) fail to truly meet the criteria of being
Kafkaesque. Despite the inane and soul-crushing actuality of each, it is not until we find a
perverse pleasure in the deadlock or find ourselves hopelessly full of hope that we will uncover
some unknowable interpretation that the example becomes truly Kafkaesque. What Kafka
teaches us about Kubrick and Žižek, in Lacanian terms, is that by locating the pleasure we find in
the deadlock itself, we open reflexive spaces for a for a traumatic encounter with the Real of our
subjective being.
Like picking at the scab of an unhealed wound, this is the function of Alex’s character
throughout this chapter; he is a question without an answer and the deadlock through which I
22
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hope to encounter some unknowable interpretation of my own self-identity. Importantly, my use
of Alex as a Kafkaesque example highlights (a) the primacy of the example in Žižek’s writing
and (b) Žižek’s philosophical delineation between the idealist and materialist positions. Film
theorist Matt Flisfeder outlines the two positions in relation to Žižek’s use of the example in
film: for the idealist, “examples are always imperfect, they never perfectly render what they are
supposed to exemplify, so that we should take care not to take them too literally.” For a
materialist, however, “there is always more in the example than in what it exemplifies, i.e., an
example always threatens to undermine what it is supposed to exemplify since it gives body to
what the exemplified notion itself represses, it is unable to cope with.” To put this simply, the
materialist position corresponds with locating pleasure in our deadlock and then circulating
around the object with the hope that enough encounters will uncover something that was
previously inaccessible to us. In such terms, by reflexively binding my own understandings and
interpretations, fantasies and desires, between, against, and through Žižek and Kubrick, my
analysis of A Clockwork Orange becomes truly Kafkaesque.
But how might we imagine these moments in relation to our own use of reflection as
teachers? The circularity and unknown of the paratactic method, in its simplest form, represents
the moments we have to look twice in order see the things that appear right before our eyes. Each
time we double back and encounter ourselves against the object, it simultaneously signals our
end and our beginning. This dialectic represents more than Žižek’s compulsive return to the
example, it is the rhythm that sustains the methodic madness of the Žižekian lens providing a
unique pedagogical horizon to teacher education and lens of analysis in the philosophy of
education. As a return to the negativity at the heart of everything we have explored, the
paratactic method opens the reflexive space to engage with the alienation at the core of our being
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(negative ontology) and overcome our false understandings of self–whether these are internal
(e.g. the fantasy structure) or external (e.g. the Symbolic/big Other).
This final chapter is written in the spirit of Žižek and Kubrick’s work as a challenge to
the standard way we view the function and logical pathways of an academic text. It is intended to
be read as a conversation between you (the reader) and me, but as I progressively detail my own
reflexive journey, I challenge you to imagine your-self within the deteriorating frameworks of
the narrative. At its core this text is about the reflexive spaces we exist in during the
methodological act of reflection itself, but these spaces are largely void of meaning if you fail to
imagine the cost of being in such spaces. The importance of each pathway detailed in this chapter
is thus not some form of subjective destination but the reflexive process of stumbling upon the
belief in such a destination to begin with. If we are consider Žižek or Kubrick’s work as the
question itself, how might you consider this text as a question that forces you to interrogate your
own self-identity in relation to my descriptions of reflexive possibility and failure? That is to say,
how do consider what is presented in this chapter not as an answer but as a question that starts
you on your path of discovery?

A Clockwork Orange as Reflexive Space
Stanley Kubrick’s adaptation of Anthony Burgess’ novella A Clockwork Orange23 is a
cinematic cacophony of “ultraviolence” that critically examines the perverse hypocrisy of
modern society. Using the film as a narrative and conceptual framework, this methodological
oeuvre formulates a series of unlikely and disquieting parallels between Alex–the story’s primary
antagonist–and my own enunciations of being as a subject and teacher within the apparatuses of
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school(ing) and the larger structures of our modern socio-Symbolic culture. The importance of
Kubrick’s reading of Burgess’ novella24 is uncovered both in his transmogrify of the narrative
itself and the disorientating re-presentations that only come into existence through his cinematic
lens. To place this narrative frame under further distress, Kubrick’s reading of violence is read
again through Žižek’s interpretive lens–constructing the title’s formulaic structure Kubrick avec
Žižek. What emerges is a disquieting and unrelenting narrative that unveils an inherently
antagonistic and violent subjective and structural edifice. By situating myself–as a veteran
teacher and administrator in a large midwestern city–aside Alex, I develop an increasingly
disruptive reflexive frame aimed at permanently effacing my assumptive and fantasmatic
positionality in ways similar to Kubrick and Žižek.
The importance of this framework is highlighting and uncovering our subjective inability
to understand reality; that is to say, our own misrecognition of self-identity as teacher in relation
to reality itself–the Lacanian registers of the Symbolic, Imaginary, and the Real. However, our a
priori misrecognition of reality cannot be easily undone. By blurring my own understanding of
self (as teacher-subject) against my understanding of self qua Alex–as the film’s antihero and
authoritative assailant within Kubrick’s exegetical minefield–I am able to create a violent thread
to help me find my way through the thicket of unknowing. As each cherished notion of my selfidentity falls away, a space opens to reimagine the reflective method and redefine how we
understand our teaching in relation to the discourse of education. Without fully disentangling the
depth of our lack of understanding, we risk continually misunderstanding the problems we seek
to resist and reinforcing the structures that define our alienation.

24
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Set in a dystopian landscape, in a London of the near future, A Clockwork Orange is the
story of Alex DeLarge whose principle interests are “rape, ultra-violence, and Beethoven”–or
“Ludwig van” as Alex likes to refer to him in the film. Alex and his Droogs25 (gang of friends)
spend their nights at the Korova Milk Bar getting high on moloko plus (milk laced with drugs)
before embarking on “a little bit of the old ultraviolence.” While the analysis within these pages
focuses on Alex as the narrator, protagonist, and anti-hero, this text is simultaneously about
Kubrick, his presentation and our interpretation of this Thing–the Lacanian object which both
attracts and repels us–that is Alex DeLarge. It is critical to note that the importance of my
connection to Alex throughout this analysis is predicated on more than his dominant positionality
in the film. As it will become increasingly clear, it is only through Alex that it becomes possible
for me reflexively encounter the trauma of Lacanian Real. To reiterate, Alex is the thread that
keeps me on my path and makes it possible for me to navigate through Lacan’s triadic structure.
While his character may not be immediately present, his spectre looms over every section of this
analysis–just as it haunted my reflections.
Because this journey is based on an encounter with my own misrecognition of selfidentity, it is necessarily circuitous and multifarious, starting and stalling, before doubling back
on itself and splintering in unforeseen directions. Much like the paratactic method itself, my
reflexive journey toward the Real lacked clarity and obvious direction. But regardless of how
many times this research stalled and/or splintered in unimaginable directions, Alex lingered in
my psyche as a haunting spectre (or Lacanian Thing) disrupting my understanding of self in
relation to the film and my sense of being in the world. In Kubrick’s own view of Alex, he notes

25
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“there is a basic psychopathological, unconscious identification” with him. He is a creature we
unconsciously connect with the uncontrollable portion of our psyche. In most cases, according to
Kubrick, “this recognition seems to bring a kind of empathy from the audience, but it makes
some people very angry and uncomfortable.”26
Given the nature of Kubrick’s presentation of Alex, it is likely that we know nothing of
the experiences he portrays off the screen. Alex’s actions throughout the first Act of the film
represent, in Žižekian terms, subjective violence. Paul Taylor describes subjective or
interpersonal violence as “what we common-sensically”27 understand as the very notion of
violence. It is easily recognizable, witnessable, and carried out by a “clearly identifiable agent.”28
This description can, of course, easily be applied to what we witness in Alex, thereby accounting
for why we as people, a society of human beings, might recoil in the face of the violence
portrayed in A Clockwork Orange. We recoil at the way Alex’s action take form and how they
assault our senses with their graphicness and obscenity. But what about the other side of this
perverse coin? When we examine ourselves and the quiet moments when we believe we are
beyond the judgmental gaze of society, how often are we (un)consciously fascinated by lure of
subjective violence? Are we not held captive by the ten o’clock news when they tease us with a
story about the murder of a teenage girl or the abduction of a child? Do these same stories not
function as ‘click bait” on the internet?
As a social studies teacher, I am well aware that the most violent and grotesque lessons
garner the highest levels engagement from my students. Using the syllabi as their guide, my
students’ anticipation for our discussion on the world wars (history) or serial killers (psychology)
26
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far outweighs any other topics. Nonetheless, there is something about Alex which functions as a
constant barrier for many spectators. According to Michael Herr, one of Kubrick’s collaborating
writers post-A Clockwork Orange, Kubrick was very intentional in exploring human pathology
in his films, including Carl Jung’s concept of the shadow–that which represents the dark side of
human nature.29 For Kubrick, A Clockwork Orange represented this shadow, “man isn’t a noble
savage. He is irrational, brutal, weak, unable to be objective about anything where his interests
are involved.”30 While it is easy to draw a line from Kubrick’s presentation of Alex to societal
issues of subjective violence, perhaps the disgust we express in relation to Alex is a mask we use
to prevent our own encounter with some-thing that lurks within us. From this position, when
Kubrick describes his own intentions as allowing the spectator to “see violence from Alex’s
point of view, to show it was great fun for him, the happiest part of his life, and that it was like
some great action ballet,”31 I began to ask, how does my response to this presentation of Alex
uncover my own understanding of self–my own irrationality, brutality, and weakness? The
pathway forward as such was not to recoil in the face of violence, but to embrace it at the core of
my being. But how do we isolate our-self in relation to the violence presented on a screen? How
do we come to understand these temporal moments of interconnectedness as glimpses into our
own shadow nature?
Interestingly, despite the seemingly overt storyline of the film, both Burgess and Kubrick
have stated that A Clockwork Orange is not about violence. “The book isn’t really about
violence,” according to Burgess, “it’s about the curing of violence. That’s what the mechanical
title suggests: a mechanical inflexible system imposed on a juicy, organic whole.” Burgess
29
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viewed the lesson of book as a warning about state sanctioned violence being used as a
regressive technique to snuff out violence itself. Kubrick extends Burgess’ sentiment remarking,
“the central idea of the film has to do with the question of free-will. Do we lose our humanity if
we are deprived of the choice between good and evil?”32 In the comments, both Kubrick and
Burgess are largely referencing the second act of the film which documents Alex’s imprisonment
and rehabilitation via the Ludovico Technique–an experimental form of aversion therapy the
state offered Alex in return for a commuted prison sentence. But this of course does not mean
that the film (or novella) is not about violence but that Kubrick and Burgess did not interpret
their message as such.
For me, the film is about nothing but violence. This interpretive disjunction highlights the
pedagogical possibility of the paratactic method. While Kubrick may have intended for one line
of reasoning to emerge from the film, my own interpretation has spiraled in another direction.
But if I were to frame this under the guise of a lesson plan–given all of the assumptions,
expectations, etc. that we (as teachers) (un)consciously write into our lessons–would ‘Mr.
Kubrick’ hope for a similar outcome? As a student of Mr. Kubrick, I was presented with a ‘unit’
of information (the film); this information is our content and how to expect students to arrive at a
positioning of knowing or understanding. As a student, I studied and analyzed that information to
produce a new real-world application, but my conclusion was different than what my teacher
intended? At risk of overly simplifying matters, whether or not we are comfortable with this
process as a teacher is often largely dependent on how I view my-self in relation to knowledge.
This, of course, is a well-worn research topic in education. However, it also highlights the risk of
the paratactic method. In order for you to traverse the gap between A and C and define B in
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itself, I (the teacher) must provide you (student) with the theoretical groundwork to make these
movements possible. If am unclear, even for the sake of the method itself, then the entirety of
this project (lesson) is failure.
The resulting deadlock in this scenario is different than the Kafkaesque frustration,
described in the preceding, in a critical way. As a reader of Kafka, the frustration I experience
occurs after he has established the theoretical constellation of his world–i.e. after learning has
occurred or I arrive at point C. While the deadlock I experience remains frustrating, I am capable
of thinking what might exist beyond C but can never arrive at a destination. If, however, the
deadlock occurred at point A, then the book or the lesson is a failure in the sense that it is failed
to convey the basic coordinates necessary for us to understand its structure. This is the danger
and possibility of the paratactic method. As teachers we cannot tell our students what reality
exists beyond C because any such formulation is entirely subjective/paratactic, but we can help
to ensure they have a basic framework to gaze out into the abyss.
Returning to my own interpretation of the film as being about nothing but violence, by
embracing the seemingly unrestrained violence of the film, it became possible for me to imagine
violence as a multifaceted concept I could leverage to uncover otherwise inaccessible pieces of
my own ontological being. In Žižek’s analysis of violence, he cautions that it is necessary to step
back and view violence from a critical distance to avoid the horrifying lure of its imagery.
Within this space, he notes, it becomes possible to gain a proper sense of what is actually
occurring around us.33 What Žižek is referencing here is how our–both on a personal and societal
level–horror and fascination with highly visible incidents of subjective violence prevent us from
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noticing objective violence; the violence which is built into the systems that function as a selffulfilling metaphysical dance that runs the show.34
Broadly, I would argue that Žižek’s analysis of violence encapsulates the overall
approach to the methodology of this paper in two distinct ways. First, engaging in countless
conversations with academics, cinephiles, and coffeehouse combatants, I have found most
spectators of the film become lost in the aesthetics of Alex’s actions and fail to (or are unwilling
to) see any other context with which to view each increasingly egregious act. Secondly, in a
more foundational sense, by focusing on violence itself, this text strives to draw attention to the
complex interplay between subjective and systemic violence. The interconnectedness of these
elements, according to Žižek, have a profound effect on us but are largely invisible to the
ideologically acclimatized eye:
Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard
against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is
thus something like the notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to the
all-too-visible subjective. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if
one is to make sense of what otherwise seems to be irrational explosions of
subjective violence.35
The uncovering of this systemic violence is indicative of the main thread linking Burgess and
Kubrick, systemic violence must be considered if we are to make sense of the otherwise
inexplicable eruptions of subjective violence we experience through Alex. However, in my own
methodological analysis of self-identity against and through the film, I re-frame this reading of
violence in few small but critical ways.
34
35
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Scaffolding
The cumulative impact of these elements would seem to suggest that developing a
reflexive framework would necessitate, following Žižek, distancing ourselves from subjective
violence in order to gain a proper perspective. To begin, however, I counter that we must
immerse ourselves completely in it in order to fully understand the pervasiveness objective
violence has on the zero-level standard against which we must perceive all things. I use the term
subjective violence here both as a reference to the intersubjective acts of violence we witness
through Alex and as an enunciation of a self-inflicted form of violence I imagine as the necessary
drive of this reflexive process. That is to say, the ‘method’ of teacher reflection I seek to describe
is violent in that it is act intended to create distress by destabilizing the way we exist in the
world. It is violent in its irrational function as an act against our stable understandings of reality,
its violence is a function of creating progressively uncomfortable and disruptive moments of
reflexive articulation from which we cannot retreat. With each violent iteration, we move closer
toward disrupting systemic violence by gaining a greater understanding of our misrecognition
self being in reality.
At a recent administrative workshop, I was surprised when a local superintendent of
schools spoke about the emphasis she placed on reflection with her teachers and administrators. I
was surprised in the sense that reflection seems to have fallen out of favor in many (or most)
schools. While it still remains a box to be completed at the bottom of our lesson plans or an
exercise to be finished before our post-observation meetings, many schools treat reflection as a
‘task’ we have already accomplished. In her presentation, however, she noted how important it
was to ensure the reflective process is perceived as “non-threatening” to the staff and that no one
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is made to feel “uncomfortable.” It is precisely in response to this type of sentiment in education
that I imagine the violence of this reflexive method. In our conversation following the workshop,
I asked her if she believed we can ever truly understand who we are or change the fundamental
nature of our actions without threatening our comfort? If we allow ourselves to always remain
comfortable, will we ever truly change? Within our classrooms, do we allow for any such
comfort or do we believe it is necessary to push our students beyond what they perceive as their
limits?
In the analysis that follows, I outline the necessity of violence in my own reflexive
journey toward some-thing akin to temporal transformation. The movements necessitate violence
because we are acting irrationally, are striking out against our commonly held understandings,
we are disrupting the patterns of knowing and being that allow us to experience reality with
minimal discomfort. Each reflexive movement is an irrational act of violence because it requires
me to act against what I (un)consciously perceive as my own best interests and, as I will
demonstrate, the structures that regulate and delineate the coordinates of my daily reality.

Reflection and Lacan’s Triad of the Unconscious

Figure 4.1: Jacques Lacan, Borromean knot, Seminar XXII, 1974.
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As a way of navigating the complexity of this analysis, each reflective movement is
roughly separated into one of Lacan’s triadic registers of the unconscious psyche–the Symbolic,
the Imaginary, and the Real. While this framing separates the registers from one another,
allowing each to be outlined and interpreted as an isolated form, Lacan viewed them as
permanently entangled–as illustrated in the diagram above (Figure 4). Lacan’s topology of the
subject based on the Borromean knot allows us to outline and articulate our existence through
multiple pathways and modes of analysis. As a base formulation of the triadic structure, the Real
corresponds to the unknown abyss of our existence or that which exists outside of the Symbolic.
The lack at the core of the subject’s being is the Symbolic (big Other), and the Imaginary
corresponds to the way we mask this lack as a way of maintaining our ontological consistency.
What Lacan’s Borromean structure allows us think, beyond basic theoretical definitions of
temporal space is, (a) how the intersectional moments of our existence correspond to different
orders and (b) how the intersections of each order corresponds to unconscious moments of our
existence.
It is within these intersections that it becomes possible to uncover and analyze different
aspects of our subjectivity. For example, when the Real is in proximity of the Imaginary we
experience anxiety. This feeling of anxiety is created because the trauma we experience when we
encounter the Real threatens to disrupt our Imaginary view of a stable reality. Thus, anxiety
(beyond basic stress) can be understood as the beginning stages of experiencing the trauma of the
Real. It is for similar reasons that Žižek warns, the Real is repressed for a reason. Or, from an
inverse perspective, the Real does not exist, it insists–a traumatic kernel of our subjective
identity that is thoroughly immanent to our Imaginary-Symbolic reality in that it cannot be
imagined or symbolized. Using this basic topological structure, each of the proceeding reflexive
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acts attempts to articulate a basic diagnosis of the space from which it emanates while
progressively moving toward a traumatic encounter with the Real.

Framing- ACT I: The Symbolic
Most often introduced within the realm of language, the Symbolic order or big Other
structures our everyday understanding of reality by providing the words we use to describe our
subjective experience(s), ourselves, and our world. The Symbolic is what is grasped through
language operating completely through differential relations–for example, a ‘desk’ is a ‘desk’
because it is not everything else. This same function plays out in the way the Symbolic structures
the identities we take up as our own within society. For example, the Symbolic identity of who I
am–American, teacher, parent, etc.–provides (a) a way for me to locate my-self as existing in the
world and (b) a sense of my self-identity without having to create it from nothing. Throughout
the process of becoming a subject, these identities are prepackaged for me and I am able to
(un)consciously see myself realized in their Symbolic molds. Although no Symbolic identity fits
me exactly–I never feel, for example, like I completely embody what it means to be a teacher–I
never experience the pure alienation of identity either. My imaginary sense of self (i.e. fantasies
belonging to the realm of the Imaginary) covers up this gap.
In this section, I articulate various theoretical examples of the Symbolic and reflexively
articulate a vision/version of my self-identity in and through these formulations. As a way of
disrupting their function and moving beyond our commonly held understandings of Symbolic
structures, I introduce the Lacanian concept of the gaze through Kubrick’s presentation of the
character Alex. The importance of the gaze as a point of analysis is how Kubrick problematizes
the particularities of our perspective and intentions, forcing us to pay attention to their impact on
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our identities and our anonymous sense of being. In a broader sense, the gaze complicates the
notion of how we see and understand ourselves in relation to the world. From this perspective we
again encounter the central theme of this thesis: the way we perceive some-thing (ourselves, a
lesson, a problem) is the problem itself.
While the full necessity of Alex’s character may not be immediately apparent in this first
Act of reflexive analysis, the importance his character gains increasing clarity as I navigate
through the registers of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. What this again highlights is the basic
idea that we are not intended to (intentionally) encounter the Real. Because of this, we need help
to reflexive reach into the darkest, depths of our understanding

Framing- ACT II: The Imaginary
If we broadly understand the Symbolic as that which supports and regulates the visible
world, the Imaginary order obscures the power of Symbolic order in shaping our identity and
masking the lack (i.e. my alienation) created by its inability to do so completely. The Imaginary,
as such, consists of the fantasies which support our existence, covering up the gaps in our
understanding of the world. In so doing, the imaginary provides an illusion of completeness
(subjective wholeness) in both ourselves and what we perceive as reality. Lacan’s use of the term
thus plays on both meanings we commonly associated with the term: the Imaginary it is at once
visual and illusory. The way we experience the Imaginary register is most often its work to
conceal the function of the other registers that our constitutive of experience–i.e. the Symbolic
and the Real.
In this section, I further explore the notion of the gaze to disrupt our foundational
understanding of self-identity and being in reality. By repeatedly shifting our understanding of
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self in relation to Alex it becomes possible to bring our fantasies out of the shadows and attain
previously unknown insights into our perceptions of reality. When we uncover pieces of
ourselves that were always-already present but obscured from our direct understanding, we begin
to see fragments of our self-identify emerge and fail in unexpected ways. Within the Imaginary,
we begin to see the possibility of disrupting the stability of our ontic horizon and dislodging our
subjective frame from both the Symbolic and the Imaginary.

Framing- ACT III: The Real
Lacan’s third register of experience, the Real, is the hardest to explain. The Real marks
the point of failure for the subject’s look (understanding of self in the world) and the Symbolic’s
explanatory power to order the world.36 According to Sheehan, Žižek encourages a thinking of
the Real as, “the primordial level of naked, amorphous materiality, that which is ‘really’ there,
unprocessed, underneath or behind the symbolic patterning which accounts for the matrix of
representations that we call reality.”37 In such terms, consciousness itself must be understood as a
barrier to accessing or understanding the Real.38 But, at the same time, the Real paradoxically
represents the full potentiality of our consciousness. The Real is a change in perspective that
produces a different way of looking at, experiencing, and understanding reality.39
By stressing the importance of the Real, Lacan did not proclaim to offer a pathway to
escape the alienation of language or the possibility of identifying what is really actual; instead,
he affirmed that the Real marks the inherent limitations of language itself. That is to say, the
36
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inability of language to say it all or speak any whole truth. Thus, to tarry with the Real is to
understand that no matter how violent the assertion of the Symbolic ideology, for example, our
indoctrination can never be completed without a hitch. What we see then is the importance of
reflexively grasping at the Real as it is an indication of the incompleteness of the Symbolic.
Every ideology, discourse, etc., for example, includes a point within its existing structure that it
cannot account for or represent. This is the point of the Real at which our understanding of the
Symbolic opens up from the outside by marking the vulnerability of Symbolic orders (again
ideology, etc.).
Throughout the entirety of this analysis, I methodically work through each of Lacan’s
registers in attempt to reach the traumatic Real capable of disrupting the fantasies that obscure
the authority of the big Other (Symbolic). This is a methodologically violent assertion toward
self-knowing dependent on my own ability to recognize and embrace the points at which my
identity breaks down. These points of failure are located through and against Alex. By focusing
on various aspects of his character, the juxtaposition of self against his frame creates a space
where we lose the ability to distance ourselves from the trauma of our ontological being. While
films can lull the spectator into a dreamlike, fantasmatic netherworld, causing the subject to
become lost deeper within the realm of Symbolic ideology,40 they also open up the possibility for
an encounter with the trauma of the Real that disrupts the power of present understandings.
Films, as such, can relocate the spectators sense of being in relation to their Symbolic identity,
reconfiguring what it means to look at ourselves and the prevailing systems that structure our
reality. In this sense, the violence of each traumatic encounter with Alex represents the Real and
our unrestrained reflexive potentiality. This trauma is the possibility of freedom, a freedom that
40
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is at once a horrifying and a liberating release from the Symbolic constraints and fantasmatic
illusions that support our daily existence.
Across each of the three acts I focus on ontological being in relation to the reflexive
space I seek to navigate in understanding my own self-identity. This follows Žižek’s claim that
“those who think ontologically have to err ontologically;”41 meaning, what appears as the gap
between theory and practice, for example, is also the gap we must navigate between the
Symbolic and the Real. This gap, he argues, can be defined with the word trauma because
understanding our being in relation to each register is perceived as a traumatic encounter and
navigating the gap–between the Symbolic and the Real–entails a loss of reality. For this reason,
the reflexive movements outlined in this analysis can be understood as a traumatic or violent loss
of our ontological horizon. But within the violence of the reflexive act itself, we are momentarily
exposed to the raw ontic thing that is not yet screened by our fantasies, misrecognitions, etc, that
is the Real of our being.42 This is the trauma of the Real or the moment we encounter the kernel
of our self-identity stripped of all its extemporaneous bullshit and false understandings. By
highlighting the possibilities of ontological knowing and the ontological autonomy that is
always-already present in the spaces of our reflection but often missed (or ignored), this text
seeks to problematize our common-sense understanding(s) of education, teacher education, and
the philosophy of education as primarily an epistemological concern.
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ACT 1: There was me, that is Alex
As the opening credits of A Clockwork Orange abruptly end and the stark monochromatic
red background vanishes (see Figure 4.1), Kubrick confronts us with an image of Alex
straightaway.

Figure 4.2: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.

Figure 4.3: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
Alex, our “humble narrator” as he references himself, is our portal into the film.
There was me, that is Alex, and my three Droogs, that is Pete, Georgie, and Dim,
and we sat in the Korova Milk Bar trying to make up our rassoodocks (mind)
what to do with the evening. The Korova milkbar sold milk-plus, milk plus
vellocet (amphetamine) or synthemesc (synthetic mescaline) or drencrom
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(unknown drug), which is what we were drinking. This would sharpen you up and
make you ready for a bit of the old ultra-violence.
These words are paired with Alex’s adversarial and sardonic gaze that directly meets the camera,
establishing an intimate relationship between Alex and the spectator. We will experience
everything with Alex, he shapes our perceptions, controls what is seen, and how it is understood
in this world. Robert Kolker notes, when a filmic character stares at the spectator it has the effect
of attaching the spectator more firmly to the character. The illusion of the camera’s gaze is that it
stands for the eye of the character thereby becoming the ‘I’ of the two subjects (character and
spectator). This becoming creates a privileged space of seeing and knowing. When the character
and spectator merge, the fictional world is constituted for both as a whole.43 How this world is
constituted is not unlike how we understand ourselves in relation to the Symbolic register. Our
understanding of the Symbolic is comprised of (un)conscious, intersubjective networks that are
constitutive of all meaning. Although we may not be aware of its presence, the big Other is
always working to define the coordinates of our existence.
In its most basic form the Symbolic register accounts for how I understand myself in
relation to the world. This is not how I perceive reality (which is the function of the Imaginary)
but how I understand–or more accurately know–and organize myself in relation to other objects,
people, structures, etc. The primary way we navigate this space is through language but because
language cannot be private, meaning is always intersubjective. More specifically, it exists in the
Symbolic order–i.e. the Lacanian big Other. The Symbolic, in its most basic form, gives us a
sense of how, not only proper names, but the name of every object (signifier) in any common
language implies a circular, self-referential tautology. Whether I consider my name Brian or my
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title as a Teacher, each name refers to an object because this object is called that. There is no
special Brian-ness that exists at the core of my being; rather, I am the object called Brian only
because I am not everything else that is not Brian. This impersonal form (‘it is called’)
announces the dimension of the ‘big Other’ beyond our understanding of self and other
subjects.44
In a much more direct form, we (un)consciously posit the Symbolic as a kind of existing
entity or big Other aware of what we are doing, capable of addressing my every action. Because
Kubrick’s presentation of Alex is manifested as a similar function, we can begin to see how our
own misrecognitions of self are impacted by the Symbolic register through Alex. In similar
terms, I began to ask myself, how does my understanding of self in relation to Alex raise
questions about the connection between my subjective understanding of self-identity and my-self
in relation to other objects? How does this questioning then inflect upon my understanding of
reality as a whole? According to Žižek, the actuality of life is “structured by reference to
symbolic fictions,” such that any examination of the Real involves a reflexive intervention he
calls “tarrying with the negative.” 45 Tarrying with the negative represents a shift in our reflexive
perspective. It is a willingness to (a) consider that our understandings of reality might be
structured by some-thing beyond our recognition, (b) accept that we are objects in the world that
lack the specialness we believe defines us, and (c) forgo the comfort and stability we experience
as our daily reality. Tarrying with the negative, as such, is a reflexive wallowing in the manifest
alienation of the Real that allows us to unthink the false stability we experience in the Symbolic.
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Framing Frames
By tarrying with negative, we can begin to see the importance of constantly shifting our
reflexive perspective. We might ask ourselves, how does Alex inflect upon our understanding of
self in relation to both the film and our self-identity? How is this complicated by the difficulty
we experience fully interpreting objects in the world? With an emphasis on perspective,
Kubrick’s use of Alex and his gaze can be contextualized as ‘framing’ what is being seen and
understood in relation to the film. The use of the term framing, in academic discourse, is both
accepted with little question and serves a flash point for endless debates about our biases as
researchers, what is, and is not, included in our field of inquiry. In such terms, how I framed this
dissertation, for example, refers to my research design, my integrations of various theoretical
traditions and methodological frameworks, and my guiding motivations and purposes. At its
most basic, we might interpret this use of the term frame as how and why some-thing is
presented. If my bias is not (un)consciously recognized by readers, it may be because the
research frame is deeply ingrained in structural, academic, and popular discourses–thereby
reifying systems of objective violence. As a teacher, these structural discourses are translated and
internalized to create a set of idealized images and definitions that create a particular view of self
and reality. Deborah Britzman argues that these images are myths that “valorise the individual
and make inconsequential the institutional constraints which frame the teacher’s work.”46
Britzman further notes that these discourses serve as the “frame of reference”47 for a teacher’s
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self-image creating a critical link between knowing and being within the lived realities of the
everyday classroom.
Similarly, as a teacher, how I frame the content I teach has dramatic implications on how
it will be interpreted by my students. Student involvement and understanding, conformity and
deviation, all depends on how I set guidelines and expectations, or the frame that relates lessons
and content to the reality my students (and my own) experience in my classroom. What I often
miss, however, is how my writing is an act of teaching. In this sense, this dissertation represents
an-other classroom for me. From the outset, I entered into this space wanting to convey to others
the possibilities of the Zizekian lens in education and, in a very pragmatic sense, this dissertation
is a terse teaching of that framework. Having spent the past thirteen years in K-12 education,
either as a teacher or administrator, I often view the time when I am ‘in school’ as my teaching
and my writing as ‘academic’ work. What is most interesting about this (un)conscious
understanding of my-self is how often I write against this narrative in my academic work and
how vehemently I protest this idea at academic conferences. Yet, I seem to subscribe to this
belief in my lived reality as a teacher/academic/scholar.
Each of these frames simultaneously represents the function of the Symbolic and how our
own misrecognitions prevent us from observing how it structures our lives. Each failure brings
into question how we understand ourselves in relation to all things around us; my-self in relation
to you, education, Alex, or the big Other that pulls the strings in our daily reality? But
understanding how we frame some-thing or why we respond in certain ways to particular frames
is a perilous, complex, and intensely subjective negotiation. As a way problematizing our notion
of framing as ‘how’ something is presented, Žižek’s analysis of art and the act of framing raises
the question of ‘where’ an object of analysis is presented.

157

Following Kojin Karatani’s use of the term bracketing,48 Žižek notes, an object is
elevated to the status of art as a response to the question “where” is it is presented–49 not how or
why something is art. Using Malevich’s Black Square (see Figure 4.4) and Duchamp’s Fountain
(see Figure 4.5) as examples, each is an answer to why something is called art that exemplifies
how the substance of art is not an inherent property of the object itself.

Figure 4.4: Kazimir Malevich, Black Square, 1915. Moscow, Tretyakow Gallery.

Figure 4.5: Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1917. London, Tate Modern.
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According to Žižek, “It is the artist himself who, by preempting the (or, rather, any) object and
locating it at a certain place makes it a work of art.”50 What Malevich’s minimalist disposition of
a black square on a white canvas does, in its simplicity, for example, renders the place as such. In
Žižekian terms, the work of Malevich and Duchamp represent the emergence of excremental
objects that are out of place or are outside the coordinates of the Symbolic register. Inversely, the
presence of each is correlative to the emergence of a reflexive space without an object. The art of
Malevich and Duchamp, as such, can be read as disrupting how society defined high art by
opening a space for otherness within a previously foreclosed system of thinking.
How can we begin to think of ourselves as excremental objects within the field of
education? If we abandon our belief in some intrinsic specialness (inherent property) that exists
within us, that is an answer to why we are called teachers, can we begin force ourselves into the
narrative in previously unimaginable places? If we begin to imagine our reflective spaces as
deprived of any fantasy objects that fill out the incompleteness in our sense of being, is it
possible–if even for a moment–to can create something from nothing, a reflexively space outside
the coordinates of the Symbolic? How can we begin to imagine teacher reflection as an empty
frame or a black square, void of fantasmatic possibilities, capable of transforming any objectwhich includes ourselves–into an excremental work of art. Similarly, Žižek’s ultimate point is
not about art at all but is another elaborate shell game to get us reconsider the fallibility of our
own perceptions. The failure to immediately understand the transcendent importance of a urinal
turned art highlights the possibility of the paratactic method or how our framings and
interpretations of frames uncover secret links between seemingly monadic elements.
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Kubrick’s use of the frame powerfully intersects with these spaces to extend and
complicate our understandings of “how” something is presented. Returning again to the opening
sequence of the film, Kubrick’s use of Alex’s face to frame the scene functions to (dis)orientate,
confront, and control what is being seen, felt, and understood by the spectator. The opening shot,
with Alex gazing intently at me, juxtaposed with his narration of the scene using an almost
impenetrable slang, establishes a confrontational atmosphere. At the same time, his use of slang
and the repeated use of “my brother” when addressing me as the spectator helps to establish an
intimate–almost deviant–relationship between Alex and me. Thus, when Alex discusses “making
up our rassoodocks [minds] what to do with the evening,” a piece of me feels like I am one of
the Droogs. From the very beginning, Kubrick’s use of Alex challenges my understanding of self
in space. While Alex’s gaze in-itself unsettling, the full weight of its instinctual and reflexive
force is created by Kubrick’s of the gaze to create simultaneously moments of identification and
recoil (or even revulsion).

Gaze as Symbolic
As a teacher, I have often imagined reflection as a momentary respite in time where it is
possible to withdraw from the strain the job often entails. It is space where I can take a step back
and untangle the anxieties I am experiencing about a given lesson or pedagogical technique
while trying to understand why I am experiencing each moment as such and articulate a solution
to each quandary. Following a similar pathology, I have often imagined the experience of
viewing a film as an escape from reality, where I am able to gaze upon the images flickering on
the screen and passively observe what is presented before me. In Nathan Andersen’s text Shadow
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Philosophy–a philosophical analysis of A Clockwork Orange–he provides an exquisite narrative
of the seemingly ubiquitous way we (often) believe we interact with films:
Films present us with image and sound. We see things–objects, places, people–
moving about, doing things, and interacting. We understand what we see. For the
most part, it makes sense to us. We know what the things we see on screen are, or
at least what kind of things they are, and the kinds of things they do. We notice, or
at least feel, the differences between different styles of camera movement. When
moving images from different perspectives are joined together, one after another,
we can usually tell when they’re meant to suggest a sequence of events, when
they’re meant to suggest simultaneity, when they belong to different locations, or
when they belong together as different perspectives on the same situation.51
But for me the spectacular beauty and terror of A Clockwork Orange is that the film does not
allow for any such distance or comfort. The importance of problematizing such spaces is
beginning the process of realizing the way we view a problem is the problem itself. As we
continue to question how and where something is presented, it is important to maintain our
connection to the Symbolic. How do I understand my-self in relation to these questions and what
is helping to shape these understandings? At this first level of reflexive analysis, it necessary to
begin questioning whether we truly understand the fundamental nature of any problem or
narrative?
As teachers who often feel that a lack of time is an insurmountable burden, it is easy
understand why we might feel compelled to address what we perceive as our most immediate
need. But if we lack a fundamental understanding of our own self-identity, will we ever truly
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recognize the root causation of any problem in the classroom? Or, will we continually address
what appears right before our eyes even though we might unconsciously be responding to the
demands of the big Other? In continually trying to see what I have been unable to see throughout
my career, I remained focused on my discomforts with A Clockwork Orange, using the film as
constant reflexive space to disrupt and rupture my self-identity. To reiterate the proceeding, the
importance of this constant thread is to provide a point of analysis beyond my-self and a lifeline
for when my analysis inevitably spirals out of control.
The central fiber of this thread is the distress I have always experienced through
Kubrick’s use of Alex’s gaze. Since the first time I saw the film, over twenty years ago, Alex’s
gaze has always been the first image I see when I reflect on the film. According to Andersen, “to
see a face is not to see an object…but to witness the gaze of another. The face shows its self
deliberately, sets the terms by which it will be seen and encountered.”52 In Alex, we encounter a
gaze that invites our own but also clearly establishes the confines of our existence together.
While I have evoked the term gaze at multiple junctures to this point, I have not defined its
usage. This is because of the complexity of its interpretation within Lacanian theory and its
extraordinary importance as a part of understanding the subject’s constitution–and the frailty and
pitfalls of associating with the individual’s pursuit of stability. Until now, my usage was largely
colloquial, referring to an especially steady and intent look. For Lacan, however, the look and the
gaze are separate. In Seminar XI, Lacan defines the gaze as the object of the act of looking,
meaning the gaze is no longer on the side of the subject. To formulate this structure, Lacan
conceives of an antinomic relation between the gaze and the eye (or scopic drive): the eye which
looks is on the side of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object. There is no
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coincidence between the look and gaze, according to Lacan, because “You never look at me
from the place at which I see you.”53 Throughout the remainder of this analysis I will develop a
progressively more nuanced reading of the Lacanian gaze. At this juncture, however, it is
sufficient to note that when the subject looks at an object, the object is always-already gazing
back at the subject, but from the point at which the subject cannot see it.
The importance of introducing the gaze into this analysis is providing a point from which
to unhinge our very perception of the world. It is through our eyes that we believe we understand
the world around us. We look out into the world to receive and interpret information and know
how we exist in the world. When I ask my psychology students to discuss their greatest fears, the
loss of sight is inevitably near the top of the list–after, of course, public speaking and death. This
is because we unconsciously connect seeing the world to knowing that we exist within it. But
what might happen if our understanding of how we perceive the world were disrupted? We have
already begun to see how the structures we believe frame our world–i.e. the Symbolic–are not
what we perceive them to be. What if perception itself is equally fallible? As teachers when we
uphold the modernist logic of school(ing) whereby we im/explicitly tell our students: there is a
reality out there to be found and “we” (teachers) can teach “you” (students) a language to
accurately represent it, where precisely are we gaining this knowledge?
As a way forward, I examine the historical arc of theories and (mis)interpretation of the
Lacanian gaze in psychoanalytic film theory as a way threading together my own analysis of self
in relation to A Clockwork Orange. This thread provides a fertile groundwork for rupturing my
understanding of the Symbolic register and development of progressively violent (selfdestructive) positions of reflexive mediation. The importance of such intervention is not only to
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provide a platform for you to begin questioning your own self-identity, but, in a much broader
context, it is a question about what happens when we begin to accept that there is no big Other to
sustain our identity? What happens to notions of self, teaching, and education, if we are forced to
confront both a self and reality that is radically incomplete? The loss of the big Other would
function as a kind of ontological catastrophe. But would this catastrophe mark the end or the
beginning? If we lost it all, would it become possible to begin the construction of a radically new
identity–even if we cannot grasp this identity at the moment?

Disrupting the Symbolic
The first time I saw A Clockwork Orange and encountered Alex’s gaze, I experienced it
as threatening and over-bearing. On a cursory level, this feeling is akin to Jean-Paul Sartre’s
phenomenological analysis of ‘the look.’ For Sartre, the gaze is what permits the subject to
realize the other is also a subject.54 Early in Lacan’s career, he was in general agreement with
Sartre but added that a state of anxiety comes with the awareness that one can be viewed.55 The
psychological effect, upon realizing that s/he is a visible object, is that the subject, loses a degree
of autonomy–a formulation largely contained within Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage. In his
reading of Lacan, Todd McGowan concisely summarizes the mirror stage in the following terms:
Infants acquire their first sense of self-identity (the formation of the ego) through
the experience of looking in a mirror and relating to their bodies. For Lacan, this
experience metaphorically captures a stage in the child’s development when the
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child anticipates a mastery of the body she/he lacks in reality. The child’s
fragmented body becomes, thanks to the way the mirror is read, a whole.56
Thus, when a child encounters a mirror s/he encounters the existence of their own external
appearance–i.e. their self-identity in reality. Importantly, this appearance is based on a mastery
that does not exist in reality and a wholeness of self-identity that is created by the illusory effect
of a mirror.
According to early Lacanian film theorists, the spectator derives a similar sense of
mastery based on the position that the spectator occupies relative to the images/events projected
on the screen. This formulation is based almost entirely on Lacan’s mirror stage essay, ignoring,
as contemporary theorists have demonstrated, Lacan’s progressively nuanced and multifaceted
reading of the gaze. In his text The Imaginary Signifier, Christian Metz likened the experience to
the subject’s belief in the attainment of mastery of the self and the visual field it does not
possess: “The spectator is absent from the screen as perceived but also present there and even
‘all-present’ as perceiver.”57 According to Metz, being absent as perceived and present as
perceiver allows the spectator to escape the sense of real absence that characterizes life outside
of the cinema. Following Metz, the way I experience a film thus produces an imaginary
pleasure–repeating that of the mirror stage–because the film has the effect of blinding me from
understanding my own alienation in the Symbolic order. This view of film leads spectators into
self-deception by providing an experience that allows the subject to overcome our temporal
sense of lack. For Jean-Louis Baudry, cinematic images act as devices of deception, luring the
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spectator deeper into the clutches of the Symbolic apparatus.58 From such a perspective, we
remain unaware of the acts of production that are created by the images presented before us, we
buy into their illusion, and believe we have some sense of control over what is being seen on the
screen.59
At this point we have arrived back at our basic understanding of the function of the
Symbolic register but can observe how it plays out on a purely visual level. While we believe we
have a basic grasp of the world around us and a sense of control over how we engage with that
world, this stability is an illusion. Instead, we are responding to misrecognitions of our world–
while unconsciously believing that one day we will gain control over the shape of our existence
in the world. Extending from this position, film theorists viewed the task of analysis as
combating the illusory mastery of the gaze by elucidating the underlying Symbolic network that
the gaze omits. Metz articulates this vision in the following: “any psychoanalytic reflection on
the cinema that might be defined in Lacanian terms as an attempt to disengage the cinema-object
from the imaginary and to win it for the symbolic, in the hope of extending the latter by a new
province.”60 In short, what was missing in the spectator’s understanding of films was the
Symbolic (e.g. ideological) function that is performed; a position which associates the gaze with
vision and mastery. The problem, however, is that this reading of the gaze continues to locate
vision and mastery on the side of the subject, where no such mastery exists. Thus, before we can
reflexively dislocate our own understanding from the Symbolic, it is necessary to grasp the
failures of this belief.
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Returning again to the vulnerability I experienced in Alex’s gaze, my understanding of
self in relation to Alex intimates I somehow experience myself as a passive representation of the
object of the gaze. In her essay, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative,” Laura Mulvey pushed early
Lacanian readings of the gaze, pointing out that the gaze is not general; it is a male gaze
personified on the screen. This concept of the male gaze highlighted the asymmetrical nature of
power in film. Mulvey writes about the power of the male gaze: “In a world ordered by sexual
imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female. The
determining male gaze projects its phantasy on to the female figure which is stylized
accordingly.”61 This notion of the male gaze, according to Simone de Beauvoir, impacts a
woman’s self-consciousness as the gaze forces her to define herself according to constructs of
male desire.62 From this perspective the gaze becomes a site of power where the gazed upon is
transformed into an object (i.e. objectified).
While contemporary film theorists have criticized Mulvey for failing to account for
differences among spectators, her analysis powerfully articulates an interconnection between the
spectator and the power of the Other as experienced in an imaginary master. In reflecting on
myself and my understanding of experiencing Alex’s gaze, I became increasingly aware of how
often I (un)consciously deployed my own gaze as a teacher in a similar manner. Much like Alex,
I invite students into a shared space but always maintain an understanding of the power
dynamics that define our space vis-à-vis the gaze. As a veteran teacher, the use of the gaze is
often step one in the unspoken manual of classroom management, a process of regulating
student’s bodies and behavior while minimizing the disruption of a lesson by eliminating the
necessity of a verbal exchange. The key to this example is understanding the invasiveness of the
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gaze on its object and its function such that even when students resist my controlling gaze as
their teacher–with rolled or averted eyes, for example–the assumptive power remains within my
gaze. Importantly, this brief narrative only represents my interpretation of the gaze. As I have
reflected back on the scene, it offers no analysis of my students use of the gaze or my position as
a teacher with the larger structures of education. In this way, it precisely exemplifies how I (as a
teacher) believe I have mastery over this space (my classroom), but this belief is always just
imaginary.
While this formulation harkens to Michel Foucault’s theory of power as organizing
individuals (subjects) and the spaces we occupy for the (re)production of docile bodies, I will
bypass this reading here as it is a theoretical narrative well-traveled in education.63 Žižek,
following Lacan, differs from Foucault with respect to how the gaze accounts for the unity of the
subject. Instead of explicitly linking the gaze to power, as Foucault does to explain how we
become objects of a penetrative gaze (which has the effect of classifying, normalizing, and
correcting us), Žižek theorizes that there is a peculiar interconnectedness between the gaze and
the subject such that the gaze is the o/Other for whom I imagine myself performing. While both
accounts would seem to be identifying a big Other, “who registers my acts in the symbolic
network,”64 Žižek’s reading of the gaze produces more than the systems that normalize judgment
and discipline the behavior of the observed.
The gaze, from Žižek’s perspective, provides the supposition for the subject’s very
capacity to act and see her/his action’s as worthwhile and making sense. Absent this point of
identification, the subject is unable to coordinate an understanding of their self-identity in
relation to reality, rendering us unsure of the point of our own actions. In other words, the sense
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of mastery that was lacking in the mirror phase is found in the big Other. The Symbolic register
provides us with a name, the structure of our existence, and now the only sense of mastery I
experience in reality. The difficulty of this position is both understanding how we arrived here
and imaging how it might be possible to exist in a space that is not here. In an overly simplified
way, I am reminded of how often I talk to my students about the meaningless nature of social
media. While they experience each ‘like’ as a validation of their identity, ultimately, they are
performing a role for Others which they allow to directly impact their understanding of self. As a
teacher, largely removed the crushing nature of teenage peer-pressure, it is easy for me to tell my
students to ‘stop caring,’ but is this not precisely how Žižek is describing the function of the big
Other?
The paradoxical point to consider, which pushes the full boundaries of our understanding
of the Symbolic, is Lacan’s emphatic assertion that “there is no big Other [il n'y a pas de grand
Autre].”65 The Symbolic order, according to Lacan, is a contingent, fragile, an inconsistent
configuration without any a priori formal structure to support it. What this means is that
presupposing a transcendent “big Other” who supports us, terrorizes us, and simultaneously
prohibits us access to it, is a social fiction. Such knowledge forces us to consider what might
happen if the big Other were nothing but a perceptual fantasy? What if the big Other is nothing
but a temporal construct we created to cover up the gaps in our understanding of self in this
world? If there is no big Other, how is it that we remain transfixed within the spectre of the
Symbolic?
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A Hailing Gaze
Through the process of reflection, I was able to approach this difficult understanding by
conceptualizing Alex’s gaze as hailing me, his gaze as calling for my attention in response to his
whims. Returning to the introduction of this section, we first encounter our own existence as an
external object in the Lacanian mirror phase. Even though we perceive our image as complete,
this appearance is based on a mastery that does not exist in reality. While it is easy to imagine
our adult selves as has having a mastery that we lacked as a child, we always lack the ability to
master our own image. This is why, when we are confronted with ourselves as the objects of the
gaze, it creates psychological anxiety, we are confronted with our lack of control over our own
visual representation. Alex’s hailing gaze allows us to experience this anxiety by disrupting our
false sense of mastery. I use the term ‘hail’ in reference to Althusser’s famous example of
interpellation where a police officer calls out “Hey You!” For Althusser, interpellation connects
individuals (subjects with a lowercase s) to the state (Subject with a capital S) through the act of
“hailing.” Hailing, in Althusserian terms, is similar to how we have defined the Symbolic, it is
the use of language to name customs, the law, and performative gestures encoded in public
space.66
Following Althusser’s example, I became eerily cognizant of this hail at the 2017
Lollapalooza music festival when a group of police offers yelled into a group of concert
spectators. Even though I was consciously aware that I had not committed a crime, when I turned
in the direction of the police I was racked with fear–as if I was guilty of some crime. When my
eyes met the gaze of the police, I felt myself (un)consciously diverting my attention. Similar to
how my students divert their eyes when I ask the class a question, it is as if we believe we can
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remain invisible–avoiding the hail–if our eyes fail to meet the eyes of the Other. In the days that
followed, I returned to the incident often, reminded of teenage years when I likely would have
been guilty of some transgression–and would have run from the police instead of simply
diverting my eyes. But through the process of repetitious reflection, I was reminded of how
frequently my high school teachers addressed us as students in a similar manner or, within a
more recent frame, my administration’s use of email to create anxiety in teachers by
reprimanding the entire staff for the transgressions of a small minority of teachers.
By transposing Marxist and Althusserian readings onto cinematic spectatorship, film
theorists–such as Metz and Baudry, linked the illusory qualities of film to the process through
which subjects enter into ideology and become subjected to the constraints of the social order.
McGowan highlights how this formulation of the filmic experience functions at the level of the
Imaginary reinforcing an illusory subjectivity that fulfills the role of Symbolic register. This
illusory sense of being is, at its most fundamental, the production of a particular sense of
subjectivity.67 Žižek, however, extends Althusser’s structure arguing that interpellation consists
of two moments that occur simultaneously: 1) a moment of indeterminate guilt and 2) a moment
of identification with the structure that supports the hail from public space.68 To investigate this
position, Žižek might ask us, how do we come to recognize ourselves as being hailed? Or, in
slightly shifted terms, how does our belief in any cause or particularity of understanding arise?
As a teacher, I might practice specific actives (pedagogical techniques, etc.) related to an
ideological cause, but how do I come to recognize this cause as my own? Žižek’s answer is not
that I have some preexisting good reason or that the cause in some logical ways corresponds to
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my deep seeded true interests–although this is excluded in its entirety; rather, my response is to
an irrational injunction.69
The irrational injunction, in its simplest form, is the groundless authority we follow when
obeying a certain custom, habit, or social obligation. Although we are often unsure why we act,
we act nonetheless. As teachers, we often announce the dimension of irrational injunction in our
last-ditch efforts to maintain classroom discipline through the phrase “because I said so.” No
matter how this scenario proceeds from this moment, our lack of power/authority is confirmed: if
we could not, we could not, but even if we could—any attesting (to our control) is doomed to
function as a denial—a masking of our impotence confirming that we could not do anything. Of
course, before we invoke this phrase, we are already (un)consciously aware of the act that it will
fail, but we say it anyway. Why? This moment brings us into a confrontation with the full
tautology of the Symbolic register.
First, it brings us back to our first enunciation of the Symbolic. Any authority we hope to
invoke is based strictly on our position as a teacher and this authority–‘because I said so’–is
rendered groundless. There is no authority from this position because the signifier teacher has no
meaning as such and there is no big Other to support the authority of this groundless position.
We might draw a parallel here between the Symbolic register, my classroom management, and
the very notion of law in western society as a way of exemplifying this function. The authority of
the law is binding because it is the law, or the fundamental authority of the law is solely
grounded in the fact that it is the law–i.e. it is the law because ‘they’ said so. The law only
functions because we inter-subjectively agree on its terms. Like the police, a teacher can only
enforce the rules (laws) of their classroom insofar as they agreed up inter-subjectively (between
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students and teacher). When a student no longer submits to this agreement, they expose the
absence of the big Other. As teachers, we can levee punishment in a desperate attempt to bring
the student ‘back in line,’ but if the student continues to resist we are forced to acknowledge the
truth: our rules only ever exist because we said so. In a like manner, if we attempt to reference
something beyond the law as the ground for our authority, we must posit something higher,
something by which law could be judged. If we use philosophical notions such as reason or
morality, we become ensconced within the same tautological form as the notion of the law. That
is to say, the ultimate authority of each is grounded in itself: reason authorizes because it is
reasonable; morality because it is moral.
This brings us to the other side of the irrational injunction and how understanding its
function can uncover how the gaze structures our relations to the act itself–the peculiar
interconnectedness between the gaze and the subject such that the gaze is the o/Other for whom I
imagine myself performing.70 While we can see how there is no big Other to support our
authority, it is far different to imagine our existence without any structure to support it. Yet, if we
force ourselves to reflexively look at this idea from a slightly shifted perspective, we see how
readily it becomes apparent. Instead of experiencing the system(s) of education I seek to resist as
an abstract bureaucratic apparatus–a myriad of organizations, edicts, presences, and regulations,
in my daily reality, I posit the system as a kind of real, existing, entity. In this form, the system is
transformed into a ‘big Other’ aware of what I am doing–an enemy capable of assessing my
every action. The point here is double. First, it is through my identification in the Symbolic that I
posit the entity I understand myself as resisting. This form of the big Other represents the
primary point of my misrecognition and integration into the socio-ideological field. Next, we can
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observe how there is no big Other with which I am fighting. The big Other is a perceptual
fantasy of social authority for me to resist. The big Other exists as a temporal projection to cover
up the gaps in my identity and provide the references points to define who I am.71
The big Other is thus nothing other than an intersubjective illusion–that we agree upon
and resist in different ways. It is a story that we accept because we want to, or have to, in order to
gain a basic understanding of self-identity within the seemingly unknowable abyss of reality. The
truth we are forced to encounter in this moment is that all ideas follow the same tautological
function as the signifier: the law is only the because it is that, just as I am Brian or a teacher
because I am that object and not everything else. When we tear apart the basic fabric of our
understanding, there is no greater significance to how we frame and interpret the world. All of
our understandings of self, knowledge, ideas, and even our visual understanding of self in the
world follow this illusionary framework. All understanding is a social fiction that we
subjectively interpret, it can be written, re-written, and un-written. This, of course, is an idea that
has been presented to us at least since high school and our first reading of George Orwell, when
he writes, for example, “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present
controls the past.”72
But if this is the case, why has it taken me so long to arrive at this position? Why do we
not simply break free of the illusion? Perhaps it is fear? Or the pain of liberation?
Methodologically, I have started to believe, as a friend recently shared with me, that it is not until
“we feel it [the un-method] in our bones” that we are able to understand the depth of possibilities
that exists when we think otherwise. What we have watched unfold in the first Act of this
research is the emerge of our self-identity as an irrational understanding in itself. I began this
71
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process my attempting to understand how I saw my-self being seen by Alex which uncovered the
painful realization that I have no control over of my own self-image nor do I fully understand the
space created by the interconnectedness of the gaze. This opened a reflexive pathway to consider
what I am within the structures that surround me and possibility that if I am not what I perceive
myself to be then perhaps the big Other is not what I perceive it to be either. This, however,
returns us again to the question, what keeps us within the bounds of the Symbolic register? Why
would we not simply step outside of these coordinates and redefine the fabric of our selfidentity? The answer is fantasy.
Our navigation and analysis of the Symbolic realm took a considerable amount of space
because it required that we (a) examine large swaths information that exist inside and outside of
the subject and (b) it allowed us to establish a rhythm of how the Zizekian lens might look when
applied directly to a method of reflexively analysis. As we attempt to disrupt the role of fantasy
and locate a piece of the Real, the analysis will begin to proceed more quickly because the bulk
of the processing is internal, largely lacking references to external structures.

Gaze as Imaginary
Unlike a wish or want, fantasy accounts for our foundational understanding of how we
perceive the reality of our daily existence (in the world, in our classrooms, etc.) and why we fail
to recognize our alienation in the Symbolic. The fantasies we construct cover up the irreducible
trauma of social antagonism and make possible our everyday understanding(s) of reality. Our
fantasies are the way things really seem to us but, in actuality, are a mediation between the
formal structures of the Symbolic register and the raw material positivity of the objects we
encounter in reality. While our fantasies camouflage the Real antagonism and lack that are
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always-already present within any system, they simultaneously help us maintain a minimal level
of ontological consistency–without which we would experience reality as nothing but pure
alienation. What this mean is that it is not reality that we misrecognize, but rather the fantasies
that structure our reality. In our analysis of the Symbolic, we saw how Lacan’s theory of the
mirror phase marked the moment we first experience (or understand) ourselves as existing in
reality. Because the imagined image of the infant is not identical to the infant (as an entity in
itself) nor is it identical to our external image or reversed image in the mirror, this moment marks
subject’s foundational misrecognition of reality. The self-identify we construct in response to
this misrecognition is a fantasy marking our slippage into the Imaginary.
Significantly, the process of the mirror phase also accounts for our formation of what
Lacan termed the objet petit a. The objet petit a is an imaginary object which we unconsciously
believe, if located, will account for the mastery we lack in reality. For this reason, the objet petit
a maintains our fantasy because it allows us to maintain the belief that subjective wholeness (or
mastery) is possible. Our fantasies, in this way, must be understood as unconsciously including
this desire to find a lost object which we never truly lost because any notions of wholeness we
maintain are based on a false sense of mastery. At this juncture then it is helpful to frame our
misrecognition of self-identity in the following terms: the way I “see myself” is a function of the
Imaginary and my “self-image” is comprised of features structured by the Symbolic.
To reiterate the preceding formulation of the gaze, early Lacanian film theorists located
the gaze in the spectator based on an illusory framework established in the mirror-stage essay–
i.e. I see myself in the Other. But in focusing on Lacan’s mirror stage to interpret the relationship
between the spectator and subject, Joan Copjec points out that early film theorists neglected
Lacan’s actual theorization of the gaze. If the subject, for example, is left indefinitely bound up
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within the Other’s field of view, the end result is the creation of a temporal relationship between
the cinematic audience and the cinematic apparatus: “the images presented on the screen are
accepted by the subject as its own ...the image seems...to perfectly represent the subject.”73 One
of the problems that emerges as a result of such analysis, according to Copjec, is that the analysis
focuses on the subject’s desire for mastery, where no such mastery exists.74
What Copjec is highlighting here is how we remain duped by our belief in visual
representations; if we look hard enough at some-thing we will find our way out of the darkness.
Without spiraling into the rabbit hole of Marxist critique, this follows standard readings of false
consciousness in education, whereby ideology is an epistemological problem (a problem of
knowledge). But our encounter with fantasies highlights the failure of the epistemological claim
and the ultimate illusion of our resistance: the Symbolic (e.g. ideology) is not simply imposed on
the subject, we enjoy our misrecognition (e.g. false consciousness, ideology, etc.)! To put the
nature of our fantasies in Marxist terms, there is no liberation from ideology because reality itself
is already ideological. When we remain fixated on our belief in visual representations and
processes of overcoming our un-knowing, desire–as the desire for mastery–is viewed as an active
rather than a passive process: the desiring spectator (subject) actively takes possession of the
passive object.
But in his mirror stage essay, Lacan never used the term le ŕegard in association with the
gaze. As was noted previously, in Seminar XI, Lacan stresses that the gaze is of the object, not
the subject. Lacan thereby reverses our usual way of thinking about gaze as an active process75
by structuring the gaze as something the subject (spectator) encounters in the object (film). This
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reversal is more than an explanation of structural topology; instead, according Copjec, it forces
us to consider the truly untenable position of Lacan:
Lacan does not ask you to think of a gaze as belonging to an Other who cares
about who or where you are, who pries, keeps tabs on your whereabouts, and
takes note of all your steps and missteps, as the panoptic gaze is said to do....The
horrible truth, revealed to Lacan...is that the gaze does not see you. So if you are
looking for confirmation of the truth of your being or the clarity of your vision,
you are on your own.76
Copjec thus brings us to the position we encountered as the failure of the Symbolic through the
lens of the gaze. There is no big Other, you are on your own.
But abandoning all notions of being seen by an Other is not quite right either. Žižek
contextualizes this formulation within the realm of film noting that the “gaze should not be seen
as the action of a subjective being;” rather, gaze refers to the way that the “film’s objects regard
the filmgoer.”77 By reversing the subject and object, Žižek highlights how films may not be
subjective but they reveal subjectivity to us by unveiling subjective-life in a filmic mirror. By
emphasizing that the subject is the ultimate object of the gaze, we are able to use the filmic
mirror to reinforce the disconnection between the gaze and the seeing eye. What this reflexive
movement forces us to confront is that the gaze is the ultimate object of fantasy. Apropos a scene
of fantasmatic ultraviolence from A Clockwork Orange, Žižek challenges us to ask ourselves, for
which gaze is this scene staged?
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relation to Alex, does the scene allow us to maintain or destruct the fantasies that bind us our
Symbolic lack.

The Function of Fantasy
The power of Kubrick’s use of the gaze in A Clockwork Orange is found in the
(un)conscious opportunities the film presents to encounter the breeding ground of our fantasy.
Despite the number of times I have viewed the film, it retains the ability to overwhelm my
perceptual ‘safe space’ through its unsettling displays of ultraviolence–juxtaposed with my
interconnectedness to Alex. Rather than allowing me the space to keep my fantasy active,
Kubrick makes visible the reversal of the gaze–rendering me the vulnerable object of Alex’s eye.
From this opening shot, I am forced to realize Alex’s words are meant for me. His insidious gaze
pathologically draws me into his dystopian world, then, as the camera slowly withdraws, he
raises his glass to the toast the camera, “letting [me] know we are in for one for one hell of a ride
[together].”79
Copjec’s analysis similarly pushes psychoanalytic film theory toward a multifaceted and
malleable conceptualization of the function of the gaze. In Lacan’s discussion of the mirror
phase, he describes a moment where we experience the a priori lack that defines our subjectivity,
this is the point at which the child realizes “I am not in the picture.”80 Lacan called this
addendum, the theory of separation in which the child realizes in their own reflection there is
something in the picture that is not really me because it is “in no way mastered by me.”81 Instead
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of terrifying me, this object–or piece of my/the self–“grasps me, solicits me at every moment.”82
This moment marks our compulsion toward finding some missing object (the objet petit a) and
the simultaneous beginning of our psychological anxiety caused by the belief that we are never
quite complete–i.e. there is always a gap between how we see ourselves and our understanding
of the roles defined for us by the Symbolic.
Copjec opens up this space further in her explanation of how Lacan saw a potential
screen in every mirror. If the mirror is a screen, then every screen also has the potential to disrupt
the subject’s sense of mastery over the visual field and/or belief in a potential toward
wholeness.83 The possibilities of this space highlight another moment the paratactic method
presents itself to us. How you and I experience this disruption will, of course, not present itself in
the same way. But regardless of our subjective interpretation, this moment marks a shift in our
perception where we will both begin to lose mastery over the visual field by encountering
ourselves as the stain in the picture looking back at us. How we interpret ourselves as this stain
cannot follow the same pathway, but we remain a stain nonetheless. We are not the image in the
mirror looking back, but the object of the image in the spectral gaze. Because we cannot step
outside of ourselves, we can never truly grasp how we exist beyond spectral images (mirrors,
pictures, videos, etc.). Copjec goes on to highlight how, as the subject experiences this sense of
loss within the spectre of the screen, s/he will increasingly encounter the gaze: “at the moment
the gaze is discerned, the image, the entire visual field, takes on a terrifying alterity. It loses its
‘belong-to-me aspect’ and suddenly assumes the function of a screen.”84 As we are confronted
with the loss of self in the screen (qua the ‘belong-to-me aspect’) we are simultaneously
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confronted with the idea that the film’s objects regard us as the spectator. It is here, in the screen,
that we encounter the true nature of the Lacanian gaze.
When we meet the gaze in this way, it has the effect of triggering us visually forcing us to
consider how we are always exposed to some unknown object. Fantasy is our response to this
over proximity. It answers the question of who and what we are to the Other by providing a veil
to cover our lack of consistency. Here we can see more explicitly how fantasy, for example,
functions as a frame to identify with the irrational injunction of the Symbolic as the gaze before
which we imagine ourselves acting. In this context, fantasy tells me how to desire by providing
me a framework to imagine (a) the existence of a knowing, big Other which confirms my
existence and (b) posits an excess object as somehow eluding my gaze which, if located, holds
the key to my existence beyond the big Other. Our (un)conscious desire thus depends on this
missing piece of our-self and fantasy is the framework through which I believe some object
(person, experience, or practice) will finally function as “it,” as what we desire.
From this position Alex’s role begins to take on a shifting complexity. While Alex’s gaze
does not become any less unsettling, when we shift the focus of subjective desire toward
disrupting fantasy–rather than searching for wholeness–the interconnectedness we experience
with Alex opens the space to remove the fantasmatic veil. At a basic temporal level, Kubrick’s
presentation of Alex forces me to acknowledge that Alex is always-already regarding me as the
spectator. What is so unnerving about this position is how seemingly impossible it is to
reflexively find myself out of the thicket. The problem we experience can be articulated in the
follow terms, if I remain trapped in the illusion of mastery, I will continue to reflexively search
for a missing piece of my-self but feel as if I am always being forced to respond to the demands
of an-other (e.g. the Symbolic, Alex, etc.). In this scenario, can we ever truly define a space
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beyond the Other to focus our reflection on ourselves? In a simplified way, this is an expression
of a common anxiety we experience when trying to reflect as teachers. During every moment of
quiet contemplation are minds are responding to the demands of some other thing which requires
our attention? Beyond the pragmatics of time, would we not find that fears about our self-identity
are at the root of our anxiety as teachers? What is this anxiety other than the feeling that we have
no control, no control to define our identity within the gaze of the Other?
In a like manner, I feel a similar anxiety within Alex’s gaze. Each frame forces me to
emerge from the relative anonymity of a darkened theatre and become present for all to see. In
Lacanian terms, to imagine the self as the constant object of the gaze is to occupy the position of
the hysteric and (un)consciously experience a sense of constant questioning of the big Other:
what do you want from me? The movement toward hysterically questioning actually starts the
moment we begin to formulate a sense of self-identity in the mirror phase. Following Lacan’s
schema, our a priori alienation can be exemplified through the following scenario: my mother
(caregiver) holding me in front of a mirror and pointing to my reflection, exclaiming something
to the effect of, “Look, it’s you…” Whatever thing (name, gender, etc.) follows this exclamation
represents the most basic form of the signifier. Because this (and all other) conferrals of language
are arbitrary, meaning we do not know why we have been defined as any-thing within the
Symbolic, we are forced to constantly address the (big) Other with the question, ‘Che vuoi?’85–
meaning, what do you want from me? Or, in slightly different terms, why am I what you said
that I am?
Plagued by self-doubt, we begin to internalize the demands of the Other. But because we
do not fully understand our own identity in comparison to the Other, we will ultimately begin to
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desire what we perceive as the desires of the Other. 86 This is why Žižek describes desire as an
imaginative projection constituted by fantasies about the Other’s desires and the vain hope that
an impossible oneness is waiting for us just around the corner.87 While this appears to be a
complex philosophical movement, it is easily imagined my returning again to the mirror phase.
My m(o)ther’s gaze in the mirror signifies this function; it is the gaze through which I first
encounter the desire of the Other. Our a priori fantasy is that of our mother’s (caregivers) desire;
if we were able to understand what our mother desired in us, it would be possible to overcome
the deadlock of our identity. In this way, we can observe how the other’s desire is transformed
into the object of my desire.88 This corresponds to the hysterical desire to know: what do others
want from me? What do others see in me? What am I to others?
But If we accept that there is no big Other, where do we find our sense of self-worth?
This mirrors the psychoanalytic question Žižek asks of the hysteric–from where does s/he desire?
Because, as Žižek maintains, “the problem for the hysterical subject is that he always needs to
have recourse to another subject to organize his desire,”89 We remain trapped in the dilemma in
which we, as subjects, never know what we are or really want, since the Other’s desire forever
remains an enigma to us. Do we really want to believe that there is no big Other? Even as we
seemingly let go of the Symbolic, we find ourselves trapped within its discourse because we
cannot navigate our ontological inconsistency. As we accept the meaningless nature of the
Symbolic, we find new layers of our self-identity that we are unable to navigate without
refencing it. At this juncture, do we truly believe that is possible to let go of any notion of
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subjective wholeness? Or, at this point in our analysis, do you continue to believe in the ultimate
fantasy, that somehow–even if it is paradoxically by working through the Symbolic and the
Imaginary–that you can find some semblance of mastery?

The Neighbor & Other Monsters
Much like the function of our a priori fantasy of the m(o)ther’s gaze, I encounter Alex as
an Other who might be able to unlock the mystery of my own desire. But, as I will soon
encounter, the basic paradox of desire is that its only function is desire for desire itself. Because
of Alex’s unrestrained expressions of ultraviolence, as spectators of A Clockwork Orange, we
will (likely) know nothing of the graphic pleasures Kubrick documents in the first Act of the
film. In this sense, it is extraordinarily difficult to see ourselves, or any approximation of
ourselves, in a narrative analogous to Kubrick’s presentation. But when I continually isolated my
reflections on Alex’s most egregious act of sexual and physical violence, it became possible to
construct a view of Alex within Lacan’s formulaic logic of enjoyment: since it cannot possibly be
“I” who enjoys these acts, then it must be “You” because clearly “someone” is out there
enjoying. Whether this “You” is represented by the real acts of subject violence that we bear
witness to on the evening new or the countless individuals who post pictures of themselves
dressed as Alex on the internet, the people that ‘enjoy’ A Clockwork Orange always seem to be
one’s neighbor, never oneself. In much more practical terms, because my use of the film has
been received with skepticism or disgust by many educators, I often found myself playing out
this logic by offering elaborate justifications for why I used the film as the medium for my
analysis– always explaining, “yes, I appreciate the film but…” it is someone else who truly
enjoys it.
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This importance of uncovering the logic of enjoyment is providing a shifted perspective
on the subject’s relationship to the objet petit a. What emerges is a conflicted orientation that is
externalized in the form of fantasy about the Other. At the surface, what is experienced is an
outward frustration toward the Other whereby I encounter the enjoyment of the Other’s desire,
but my own secrets still have not been revealed. Why are others allowed to freely enjoy A
Clockwork Orange, but I encounter negative judgement from my peers? How does Alex enjoy so
freely, but I remained trapped in a constant search for an unknown piece of my identity? In more
basic terms, this logic manifests itself in the belief that my next-door neighbor (an ‘other’) is
likely harboring a dirty little secret–i.e. a perverse fetish, an obscene form of enjoyment–that
behind the closed doors and drawn curtains of her/his normal looking house–allows her/him to
access an enjoyment that is inaccessible to me. As a teacher I often imagine scenarios following
a very similar formulation, behind closed classroom doors my colleagues (i.e. neighbors/Others)
have access to an enjoyment that is inaccessible to me. Fantasies of my colleagues obscene
enjoyment functions as a basic instance of disavowal–“I myself know nothing of this obscene
enjoyment because I work hard, follow the prescribed curriculum, and so on–and displacement–
“It is not I who enjoys, it is You!”
This formulation uncovers how fantasy prevents us from moving beyond our subjective
deadlock. At the level of our surface temporality, we might imagine this scenario as playing out
in displaced forms of anger. Because other teachers violate the rules and cause distrust between
the faculty and administration, I am forced to endure increased scrutiny, greater bureaucratic
regulation, and so on. While these feelings might be real, at the basic level of our understanding,
we simultaneously experience an (un)conscious enjoyment through their transgressions because
they hold open the possibility of our own satisfaction. Even if I am not enjoying, I know
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enjoyment is possible because I am witnessing an Other who enjoys. Thus, despite our deadlock,
we experience enjoyment in the form of a fantasy ideal. If this Other is enjoying so can I. On the
condition that we unconsciously cling to this fantasy ideal, we can reflexively observe our
continued path toward repression and our ultimate alienation.
Žižek argues that the fantasy ideal, places us in a position of understanding toward the
Other, rather than resentment–because the Other is enjoying at my expense. While on the surface
I may reflexively experience frustration–because the teacher across the hall has found a way out
of my own hellish existence–allows me to maintain the hope (an-other form of temporal fantasy)
that I might experience one day thereby maintain my own fragile existence. My fantasy, given
these points, is maintained by my unconscious ability to misattribute my own impossibility to anOther that seems to enjoy in a way I cannot experience but am only able to imagine. In spite of
this, this distinction between our own lack of impossible enjoyment and the non-lacking status of
the Other concurrently opens the possibility for imagining ourselves in positions that would
otherwise be unimaginable. Rather than viewing this interconnectedness as another position of
deadlock, how can we imagine this as opening a reflexive space that would otherwise be
foreclosed to our line of reasoning? How can we view this position as the externalization of our
fantasy and as exposing our fetishization of the enjoyment of the Other? If we were to invert this
perspective, would I not be the one who enjoys, the other who is harboring a dirty secret that
prevents my colleagues from fully enjoying? If there is no big Other, then the Other who in
enjoys must be you or me.
In A Clockwork Orange, Alex is not just the neighbor, but through Kubrick’s use of
Alex’s gaze, he represents the point at which the entire visual field organizes itself. While the
unknowableness of my own lack and the coordinates of the Other’s desire always seem just out
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of my reach, what is most alluring about Alex is that he appears to have found enjoyment despite
his own impossibility. While at this point we have identified a pathway for understanding the
Symbolic register from multiple trajectories and uncovered the complex role that fantasy plays in
structuring our (mis)recognition of reality, we still seem to remain somewhat trapped on the edge
of our ontological horizon. We are unable to break, if only for a moment, from our
misrecognitions, a fall headlong into the abyss of the Real. Žižek would caution us that this is
because an encounter with the Real is still a difficult and perilous task. In Lacanian parlance, to
grasp at the Real is to confront the idea that we “never had a real existence.”90 This is not a
denial of our material existence (although it is not a conferral of it either), but the
acknowledgement that everything we have understood about our self-identity and the nature of
reality is potentially false. If everything we know and believe is false, then so too is what we
believed about our existence.
But this position, however paradoxical in nature, should be viewed as anything but
anguishing or hopeless. Rather it announces the moment we first encounter a piece of the Real, it
is a reflexive encounter that announces a kind of “’Thou art that’ which articulates the very
kernel of the subject’s being”91 and indicates the presence of the Real itself. As a way forward,
we can only encounter our fundamental fantasies insofar as we are willing to undergo what
Lacan call subjective destitution–the position through which the subject discovers nothing other
than a spiral of continuous alienation.92 Methodologically, we might imagine subjective
destitution as a continuous process of reflection aimed at repeatedly articulating ‘Thou art that,’ a
process where we seek to understanding that we nothing other than that.
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Spiraling Toward the Real
Returning again to Andersen’s analysis of the film, he notes that films are able to portray
the unimaginable because the viewer ultimately knows the images on the screen are not real.93
As an example, he highlights a moment early in the film when a young woman–an unnamed
operatic singer at the Korova Milk Bar–is confronted with Alex’s gaze (see Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
The woman, sitting at the bar with friends, sings a few bars from an opera familiar to Alex.
Hearing this, Dim makes an obscene gesture toward the woman. Alex becomes enraged at the
gesture and quickly strikes Dim with a cane. When the woman looks in the group’s direction,
Alex again raises his glass, this time acknowledging his appreciation for the woman (See Figure
4.7).
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Figure 4.7: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
While the scene’s explicit function is to establish Alex’s alpha position among the Droogs and
his deep reverence for “Ludwig van,” it simultaneously creates a moment where I encounter
Alex’s gaze from a slightly shifted perspective. As a spectator, I am (un)consciously aware of
Alex’s danger, but, according to Andersen, because we are not a part of the situation being
depicted, “we don’t have to react. We can’t. We can close our eyes, walk away, but we are
otherwise unable to affect what we see. We don’t face that face, only its moving image,
framed.”94 Of course, on this literal point Andersen is right, I am not physically present in the
Korova Milk Bar.
But instead of offering this space, how does our understanding of scene transform when
we view Alex as the Other who enjoys? Alex confronts us with the image of someone who
enjoys without regard for his own impossibility–an other who locates a target to act out the
aggression that arises as a response to the impossibility of his own wholeness. Alex’s enjoys
without consideration for the Other’s desires. In short, Alex represents the possibility of having
one’s cake and eating it too. Perhaps this is why, as noted previously, in Kubrick’s estimation,
“there is a basic psychopathological, unconscious identification with Alex.” In such term, in the

94

Nathan Andersen, Shadow Philosophy: Plato's Cave and Cinema (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group, 2015) 15.

189

opening scene when Alex states, “There was me,” it is as if this “me,” this “I,” in some way
contains a disturbing potentiality, a disturbing superposition of a me that enjoys itself (Lacan’s
jouit de lui-même).95 That is to say, Alex represents a certain production of himself that
punctuates the true sadistic pleasure of being, a subject unbound from the compulsion to locate
her/his desires in that of the Other. This is the subject that finds a perverse mastery (or perhaps
dominance) over their own lack. My (un)conscious identification with Alex, as such, represents
the possibility of what could be if I were not restrained–by the Symbolic, Imaginary (fantasy),
and so on.
I increasingly came to view Alex as confronting me with my own fantasmatic belief that
if I were only able to uncover the secrets of the Other’s desires, my own secrets might be
revealed. This path is the basic formulation for the psychoanalytic concept of drive, the process
through which the subject encircles the objet petit a as a privileged object. The gaze becomes
interlaced in this function by compelling me to look again and again for what appears to offer
access to the unseen. When Alex raises his glass, for example, it appears to mark the point at
which the visual field takes my desire into account. But does the gaze provide us with this direct
of a path? If the screen functions as a mirror, we are forced to consider how Alex’s gaze is
constituted of an unrepresentable alterity, forcing us to dwell in the once concealed spaces of
unknowing? Through the process of repetitious reflection, I begin to derive satisfaction from
repeatedly following this same path, propelled by the belief that an unknown piece of my selfidentity would become visible to me. Of course, this position reiterates how we become trapped
within the realm of fantasies, transfixed by the fantasmatic belief that if we only search deep
enough within ourselves we will find an illusory piece of wholeness.
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The last few months of this analysis were spent obsessively pouring over every detail of
Kubrick’s presentation of Alex. While the reflexive cycle remained largely the same, I began to
lose sight of precisely what I was searching for. According to Žižek, when we deprive desire of
the privileged object–through which we might attain wholeness–it becomes an endless, repetitive
circle, which is to say, desire ceases to be desire and drive becomes death drive. It is through the
notion of death drive that we encounter the full weight of Žižek’s self-reflexive negativity and
the possibility of traversing the fantasies that prevent our encounter with the Real. Death drive is
not biological–as in common references to sex drive, for example, but a drive that is opposed to
instinct. Death drive, according to Žižek, functions as a brake on biological instincts: “We
become ‘humans’ when we get caught in a closed, self-propelling loop of repeating the same
gesture and finding satisfaction in it.”96 Death drive, as such, represents the reflexive possibility
of breaking free from our fantasies. It is the moment of negativity implicit to the dialectical
development of subjectivity, the moment we spiral into the abyss of the Real and encounter the
nothingness that is our self-identity.
Žižek argues, “the Freudian death drive has nothing whatsoever to do with the craving for
self-annihilation, for the return to the inorganic absence of life-tension.”97 Instead, the repetitious
movement of death drive is a process of marking the enchaining events of our primordial
subjectivity, and through this process, death drive opens up a reflexive space deep within our
subjective self–beyond notions of truth and pleasure (the Imaginary) or economics and politics
(the Symbolic). This being we encounter in death drive is a self-annihilating, self-sabotaging
subject created from the potentiality of the autonomous subject itself. By repeatedly grasping at
an object which eludes me, the reflexive shift to death drive is a pivotal concept in
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psychoanalytic theory for encountering the Real and understanding our own self-relating
negativity.
In various iterations, Žižek often notes, it is not until we realize our precious fantasy is
shit that we are able think beyond the coordinates of our current subjective frame. The point to
be gleaned here returns us to the necessity of our own subjective destitution. In Žižek’s
description of Althusser’s autobiography L'avenir Dure Longtemps, he notes that Althusser’s
greatest fear was that others would become aware of his own non-existence. This fear, rather
than being a point of avoidance for Žižek, is the critical movement of psychoanalysis
demarcating the subject’s loss of anxiety about her/his own non-existence. That is to say,
material reality outside myself definitely exists; the problem has always been that I myself do not
exist. By accepting our own non-existence and embracing the destitution of the death drive, we
are able to relinquish the fetish of the hidden treasure responsible for our unique worth. Žižek
calls this moment “the unbearable lightness of being nothing.” In terms of our own reflection,
this is the intimate moment that conjoins madness and freedom when it becomes possible for us
to become un-glued from direct referential relationships. “The moment of decision is the moment
of madness”98 precisely in so far as that there is no big Other to provide the ultimate guarantee,
there is no fantasy to veil our discomfort, and all notions of stability that guarantee an
ontological cover for our subjective decisions our lost.

Gaze as the Real
As a final movement toward the trauma of the Real, I attempt to encounter this moment
of madness through A Clockwork Orange’s HOME-sequence. As I will demonstrate, Kubrick’s
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presentation of events in this sequence provided me the context to uncover several shifting pieces
of my own understanding through the reflexive shift to death drive. At its core, this final
movement remained rooted in axiom, the way we perceive a problem is the problem itself.
However, as I encountered the reflexive trauma of the Real, it became necessary to confront
understandings about my-self that were previously unimaginable. For many (or most) spectators,
the HOME-sequence is the most disturbing and controversial segment of the film. The sequence
(analyzed in detail below) depicts Alex’s and his Droogs brutally beating an aging writer (F.
Alexander) and raping his wife while he looks on helplessly. Critics of the film, often highlight
the HOME-sequence as an illustration of Kubrick’s detached glorification of a certain kind of
amoral behavior, presenting spectators with a colorful, operatic, vision of violence and sexual
deviance. Kubrick’s response to this claim is that what is presented is a deadly serious satire
about the violent tendencies of contemporary society. Regardless of our larger interpretation of
meaning versus intent, in its visual presentation, there is no segment of the film that more readily
exemplifies what Alex term’s ultraviolence–an exaggerated and unprovoked form of violence
highlighted by the rape, murder, and senseless brutality inflicted on helpless victims for the
pleasure of violence itself.
Given the very real violence of contemporary society that we have watched unfold live
on television and the internet and the unprecedented displays of violence portrayed in films in
the years since the release of A Clockwork Orange, I have always been fascinated by the film’s
hold on society’s collective psyche. Perhaps it is, as Andersen notes, that while “many films
since have portrayed violence more realistically and explicitly, A Clockwork Orange captures
powerfully the tension between the horror of the experience and the casual ease with which it can
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be inflicted.”99 In using this sequence as the final (dis)orientating scene in the film, I attempt to
make explicit the full disruptive possibilities of the Žižekian lens whereby the Real of the gaze
violently confronts me with the contradictions that hold my conceptual understandings of self
(and other) together.
As has become the modus operandi at this juncture, Kubrick introduces and frames the
scene through Alex, confronting the spectator with both his gaze and voice as our humble
narrator (see Figure 4.8 and 4.9).

Figure 4.8: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.

Figure 4.9: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
In his narration, Alex interjects the threat of violence and trauma prior to the sequence itself:
The Durango-95 purred away real horrorshow (good, well) - a nice, warm, vibraty
feeling all through your guttiwuts (guts). Soon, it was trees and dark, my brothers,
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with real country dark. We fillied (played) around for a while with other travelers
of the night, playing hogs of the road. Then we headed West. What we were after
now was the old surprise visit. That was a real kick, and good for laughs and
lashings of the old ultra-violence.
Although I am intensely aware of the sequence of events that are about to unfold, I return briefly
to my first reflection on the film to uncover the full complexity of how Kubrick portrays Alex in
the film leading up to the HOME-sequence.
Prior to the HOME-sequence, we are shown a scene in a derelict casino where a rival
gang is tearing the clothes off a woman (see Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
As the gang is about to rape the woman, Alex and his Droogs crash the gangs party like a
marauding band of vigilantes, preventing the sexual assault by violently subduing the members
of the rival gang. Earlier in the evening, after the Droogs leave the Korova Milk Bar, they attack
a homeless man who was drunk on the street (see Figure 4.11).
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Figure 4.11: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
While the violence is unprovoked, their attack is spurred by the groups disgust with his lack of
motivation and how both his drunkenness and indolence harms society. Despite the discomfort
we experience in his (and the Droogs) actions, we are left to question whether it is possible that
Alex represents some form of perverse hero in this nightmarish dystopian landscape?
Throughout the duration of this analysis, this is a question I returned to again and again never
fully grasping how this frame fully impacted me.
This early framing of Alex follows the general trope of the anti-hero or the hero that lacks
traditional ‘heroic’ characteristics like idealism, courage, and morality. But even following this
frame, I often wondered if Alex lacks these characteristics or does he represent such an extreme
manifestation of them that it is difficult for us to locate our own understandings within their
narrative? Returning again to our previous reading of the law, we uncovered how the ultimate
authority of the law and morality was grounded only in itself–we can only define the authority of
morality because it is moral. But perhaps Alex’s frame extends beyond the bounds of this
understanding? I viewed this question as not unlike the recent shift in many super hero films–see,
for example, Christopher Nolan’s Batman Trilogy: The Dark Knight and James Mangold’s
Logan–where we encounter a hero that exhibits many undesirable traits, plagued by internal
strife, and intense psychological issues. But ultimately do we not find that society is willing to
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look past the hero’s violent transgressions if the hero is able to stop a more violent threat (or
transgression) from occurring? In the Dark Knight, for example, we see Batman ‘save’ society
from various external terrorist threats–although Žižek makes a compelling argument that Bane
represents the true revolutionary hero in the final film. Despite the unimaginable violence
portrayed in Logan, in the end, he saves a group of kids from their imprisonment and
exploitation. Thus, is the fatal flaw of A Clockwork Orange the lack of a clearly identifiable
positive outcome as a result of Alex’s actions?
When we pick back up with Alex and his Droogs, their joy ride comes to an end when the
Droogs come upon a house literally identified by a glowing sign reading “HOME” (see Figure
4.12)

Figure 4.12: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
The ultra-modernist design and clean, white ex/interior functions as an immediate counterpoint
to brutalist architecture and dystopian graininess of the rest of Alex’s world (see Figure 4.13).
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Figure 4.13: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
Kubrick gives us a glimpse inside the HOME where a man–F. Alexander–quietly sits at a
typewriter (we later find out the man is authoring the novel, A Clockwork Orange) and his wife,
in a nearby room, is shown reading a book. The solitude of the couple’s evening is broken when
Alex rings the home’s doorbell asking to use the phone because his friend has been in a terrible
accident. After pausing for a moment, the couple coincides to their own empathy and hesitantly
agrees to let Alex use the telephone. Upon entering the home, Alex and his Droogs raucously
weave their way inward taking both the wife and husband captive. As both are held prisoner,
Alex begins singing an acapella rendition of Gene Kelly’s Singin’ in the Rain while violently
assaulting the husband and methodically prepping the wife for her rape.

On one level, this moment is the most disorientating scene of the HOME-sequence as it
enunciates the full sadistic horror of Alex’s act–the obscene pleasure and ease with which he
engages in ultraviolence. But as I continually viewed and reflected on the scene, it
simultaneously marked a turning point–or more precisely, a total disruption in my (un)conscious
understanding of self in relation to Alex. After his rendition of Singin’ in the Rain, the HOMEsequence crescendos with a three-shot progression depicting Alex looking directly looking into
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the camera (see Figure 4.14) stating, “Viddy well little brother, Viddy well! (see well little
brother, see well);” immediately followed by a point-of-view (POV) shot of the husband lying
gaged on the floor (see Figure 4.14) and the wife standing naked and gagged opposite him.

Figure 4.14: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.

Figure 4.15: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
In this movement, the relationship between the spectator and Alex can be seen as permanently
altered/ruptured.
Even though we have encountered Alex’s gaze on a number of occasions, this encounter
proves to be more disorientating than previous moments. On the surface level, it is this first
instance where the gaze is immediately transformed into Alex’s direct point-of-view forcing the
spectator to witness and experience the crime on a deeper temporal level. Further, while Alex has
engaged us through his narration previously, in this moment, he is explicitly compelling us to see
well or not avert our attention. In view of this orientation, we are confronted directly with the
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gaze, forced to consider how the film’s object’s regard us as a spectator. For the duration of the
sequence, we cannot look away because we are temporally intertwined with Alex. When we
consider how the Other’s desire might unlock our own unknown desires, this repeated calling on
the audience appears as a response to our own alienation through the demand to enjoy and a
conformity to its operation.
Because of the spectator’s position vis-à-vis Alex, Kubrick is able to simultaneously
exploit (through appeals to sex) and repel (through his depiction of violence), making the film
uncomfortable to watch because the spectator is both aroused and sickened. This impossible
position forced to me to begin asking myself how do I understand myself in relation to what we
see, hear, and experience in the film? Given what is depicted in the HOME-sequence, my initial
analysis on the Real did not focus on violence as such but my temporal responses to Kubrick’s
anesthetization of sadistic violence. At the purest level of human emotion, it is, of course,
difficult to continually reflect on a scene depicting the rape of woman while her husband is
forced to watch. Kubrick furthers this untenable position by presenting the film through the
vantage point of Alex’s point-of-view (the POV technique). In sharing Alex’s perspective, each
time I have watched the film I have experienced a complex array of (un)conscious feelings and
responses ranging from fascination, to empathy, and abject disgust. What Kubrick is able to
accomplish in this framing should not be diminished. The spectator is both allowed and forced to
experience Alex’s acts not only as they occur, but through the lens of Alex’s fantasies. As a
consequence, Kubrick is able to represent fantasy, as external to our reality thereby forcing the
viewer to confront the role that fantasy plays in our subjective experience. By viewing fantasy
from the outside, this position makes it possible to begin thinking through and potentially
overcome the illusions on which our desires are based thereby confronting the void beneath our
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subjective understanding of reality. When we traverse the fantasy in an attempt to encounter the
Real, we must begin my acknowledging (and accepting) that there is nothing behind reality itself
and experience the subjective loss of social identity.

Sign’ in the Rain
In the two years that I have been researching Kubrick and writing this text, I have
engaged in countless conversations with academics, cinephiles, and coffeehouse combatants
trying to peel-back what it is about the film that seems to gnaw away at my interlocutor. What
has been most interesting–and illuminating–throughout the course of these conversations is the
detail with which my interlocutors can describe Alex’s crimes. On the surface, this is, of course,
not surprising given that Alex’s crimes create the primary thread that binds the film’s narrative
structure. What is missed, however, is that Kubrick does not actually display the imagery of
forced intercourse or the bloody moment of death during any of Alex’s acts. In fact, the only
point in the film when violence is actually depicted is when Alex himself is forced to bear
witness to it during his re-education as a part of his aversion therapy. Yet, (many) detractors
continue to cite the obscene depiction of violence, rape, and murder as the reason why the film is
so morally reprehensible. Admittedly, even after watching the film countless times, I often
believe I am able to envision details in the film that are not actually present. Further, in my
writing of this analysis, I have had to repeatedly return to scenes to spot check where the film
ends and where my imagination begins. But what allows for such psychological function?
Returning again to the HOME-sequence, in the moments prior to Mrs. Alexander’s rape,
Alex exults the song ‘Singin’ in the Rain’ (see Figure 4.16).
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Figure 4.16: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
In many of my conversations noted above, this is the moment where my interlocutor’s analysis
of Alex would often begin. According to Anderson, we understand–for the most part–what we
see in films; they make sense to us. The sounds we hear cue a certain psychological or
psychological response thereby permeating a particular mood to a scene.100 Stitched together, the
repeating aesthetic and euphonic forms of a scene are significant to us because they formulate
connections to the world around us, allowing us to become familiar with alien terrains, and the
many versions of reality that we struggle to understand each day. With its allusion to Gene Kelly
performing “Singin’ in the Rain” Kubrick places Alex within the cinematic context of Kelly who
was ready for love. Despite my own general aversion to ‘classic’ cinema, it is difficult to hear the
song without immediately imagining Kelly strolling down the street in the pouring rain (see
Figure 4.17).
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Figure 4.17: Scene from Signin' in the Rain, Directed by Gene Kelly and Stanley Donen.
Hollywood, Metro-Goldwin Mayer, 1952.
In fact, I am no longer sure if I have seen the Kelly film or if the image of Kelly hanging off a
lamp post while singing the song has simply become part of our cultural lexicon.
Notwithstanding my own reminiscing, there are few songs that seem to better personify the
convergence of love and happiness than ‘Singin in the Rain.’
The original song is dripping saccharine sentiment, a singer so deeply in love that not
even the rain can ruin their day. But Alex’s vocalizations contain a jarring irony. His actions are
both the antithesis of the original song and depict someone enthralled by the pleasure of their
violent acts. What is love for Alex? Throughout the film, Alex is depicted as repeatedly
destroying objects that other people love. Perhaps this scene functions as one of the best
examples of Alex’s force because of the dual nature of his destruction: as he attempts to destroy
the object of F. Alexander’s love he concurrently destroys the song itself which symbolizes love
for the spectator. Within this context, we encounter a moment when our connection to Alex
reaches beyond the film, beyond our normal understanding of how we interact with films. During
the later stages of this analysis, I repeatedly watched (and re-watched) Gene Kelly’s performance
and found it impossible to not think about rape and violence. The song as Symbolic
representation of love had been destroyed. It was no longer possible for me to contextualize the
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film through Gene Kelly, as someone ready for love. Instead, we encounter Alex, where love is
the barren and anonymized destitution of the “old ultraviolence” and flesh is reduced to the “old
in-out, in-out.” He is “Singin’ in the rain” (bash), “just singin’ in the rain” (kick). Alex’s
performance, as such, disrupts our standard notions of the cinematic agreement–and it is through
this inversion that it becomes possible to identify a horror and disruptive beauty within his
performance.
Viewing this notion from a parallax perspective, in Žižek’s analysis of Caravaggio’s
opera Testa di Medusa he describes how the imagery of unseen horror functions as placeholders
for “a sound that doesn’t yet resonate but remains stuck in the throat… the obverse of the voice
that gives body to what we can never see, to what eludes our gaze.”101 Is Alex’s performance not
a disjunctive and horrific sound that serves as a placeholder for the imagery that eludes our gaze?
Or, in other terms, Alex’s song allows the spectator to see the unseen horror of the act–the act of
Mrs. Alexander’s rape–with her/his ears. From here we must ask ourselves, what role does
Alex’s use of the song play in the spectator’s unconscious memories of scenes that are not in the
film? Through Alex’s performance, we are forced to encounter how the voice functions as an
“organ without a body,” Žižek’s reversal of the Deleuzian concept, meaning the voice is an
undead vocal drive–or a piece of the Lacanian Real–that insists in the absence of a physical
presence. From this perspective, the listener gives shape to a spectral body based on our
perception of the sounds. Existing as a phantomlike protuberance lurking behind a mirror, when
there is no positive knowledge of the Thing-in-itself; one designates a place for the images
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unseen in the HOME-sequence by making a temporal space for them. In Lacanian terms, “If
beyond appearance, there is no thing itself, there is the gaze.”102
Here again we encounter ourselves as an object of the gaze but from a shifted from
perspective. We begin to see how even at our most basic understandings of self-in-reality, as
derived in the senses, things are not what we perceive them to be. As teachers, we are, of course,
aware of the importance of knowledge that is not immediately observable by our senses, but how
much of our daily reality is comprised of the spatial bearings that come from coordinates that are
outside the body? As we walk through our classrooms are eyes are always directed against this
outside, but I can only see from one point. Of course, in our existence, we are looked at from all
sides–just as we encounter the gaze in the abyss of the Real. In his article "'I Hear You with My
Eyes," Žižek explains how the gaze and the voice are both objects that give the subject an
uncanny impression of the Real. He warns, however, "hearing with one’s eyes' is not the same as
"seeing with one’s ears." According to Žižek, the gaze is far more mortifying than the voice;
while voice and gaze relate to each other as life and death: voice vivifies, whereas gaze mortifies.
As an illustration of this function, Žižek references the “silent scream” of Edvard Munch’s
painting “The Scream” to exemplify how, even when the voice fails, we remain aware that the
violence of death is always nearby. As Žižek puts it:
Far more horrifying than to see with our ears—to hear vibrating life substance
beyond visual representations, this blind spot in the field of the visible—is to hear
with our eyes, that is, to see the absolute silence that marks the suspension of life,
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as in Caravaggio’s Testa di Medusa. Is not the scream of Medusa by definition
'stuck in the throat?103
Within this context, we see can see the full disruptive function of the HOME-sequence. In Alex’s
rendition of Singin’ in the Rain we see with our ears and encounter the spectacle of Alex’s
assault–even though the details we see are not actually depicted by Kubrick in the film. And in
viewing the spectacle from behind Alex’s mask–i.e. Kubrick POV technique–I encounter my
own silent scream, like the silenced voice of F. Alexander lying gagged on the floor. In my own
silent mortification–or as Kubrick might identify it later, the experience of being eyes wide shut–
I encounter the trauma of the Real.
In Lacanian terms, this connection between the trauma of my self-awareness and Alex
can be seen as a kind of ‘surplus-enjoyment’ in the sense that it exceeds the contours of our
standard understandings of filmic characters and narrative fictions, forcing me to encounter
problematic, repressed, and even traumatic dimensions of my subjectivity.104 In this way, it is
possible to unveil the basic interconnectedness between myself and Žižek’s reading of the Other
as a source of fascination and intense attraction. As noted previously, Žižek frequently employs
the term ‘subject supposed to enjoy’ to describe how the subject’s enjoying of the Other can
function as a fetish-object–allowing me to gaze upon the Other as a fantasy ideal or screen while
preserving my own (mis)recognition of an unproblematic identity. While the final act of the
HOME-sequence leads to an unequivocal feeling of horror, the introduction of a ‘joyous song’
covers the precarious structure of the self in relation to the Other.
The voice, in this way, provides a fetish-object around which I can organize my own
enjoyment through Alex. Or, to put this in other terms, the performance allows us to see the
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enjoyment of the sexual act with our ears. Unconsciously, our desire manifests itself by using
Alex as an open portal to understanding the enjoyment of the neighbor thereby allowing me
access to an enjoyment that has always been forbidden to me. The relationship between the
spectator and Alex, as such, functions as a site to locate fantasies and profound libidinal
investment–i.e. we ‘get off’ on fantasizing about Others who enjoy in ways we are afraid to
enjoy. What we see here is two sides of the same traumatic encounter with the Real. This
encounter creates a disjunctive space that opens the possibility for a reflexive encounter with self
against the grain of our standard coordinates of understanding, a space that is always-already
present but is radically otherwise.

Viddy Well… Again
Just after Alex finishes singing, Kubrick confronts us with Alex’s most chilling gaze
because of its connection to the statement, “Viddy well little brother, Viddy well!” One way of
unpacking its function as a basic enunciation of the gaze is by connecting it back to Althusser’s
theory of interpellation. From this perspective, Alex can be frames as ‘hailing’ the spectator and
the spectator–as the one who responds to the policeman’s call “Hey, you there”–immediately
identifies her/himself as a subject of ideological (Symbolic) power.105 Žižek, however, pushes
Althusser’s theory noting that the subject is not produced at the moment of being hailed; rather,
there is already an uncanny subject that proceeds the gesture of subjectivization.106 While the
policeman’s cry may provoke a direct response from one respondent, it also necessitates the
(un)conscious formulation of a reaction by all who hear it. Even for those who protest their
innocence, Žižek argues, they experience a feeling of “Kafkaesque” abstract guilt:
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A feeling that, in the eyes of power, I am a priori terribly guilty of something,
although it is not possible for me to know what precisely I am guilty of, and for
that reason–since I don’t know what I am guilty of–I am even more guilty; or
more pointedly, it is in this very ignorance that my true guilt consists.107
As a spectator, Kubrick’s use of relentless performative juxtapositions situates me such that
Alex’s acts of transgression highlight the frustrating inescapability of Symbolically determinate
guilt.
In Alex’s hail he is calling upon me to acknowledge the repressed unconscious that
already exists on the underside of the Symbolic–the piece of me that is the traumatic Real. In the
moment that Alex compels me to see well, a feeling of anxiety is aroused in me as the spectator,
by forcing me to identify with the visceral spectacle of the scene. What we see unfold is that the
seemingly neutral gaze of the film is instead subjectivized into the partial gaze of the spectator’s
own desire: “the viewer is compelled to assume that the scene he witnesses is staged for his eyes,
that his gaze was included in it from the very beginning.”108 To add to my dislocation, Alex’s
address the camera in Nadsat–the slang of the Droogs–implicating me in the violence by
identifying me as one of them (i.e. speaking to as a member of his gang). Kubrick then traps me
in this position by framing the remainder of scene from inside Alex’s mask thereby separating
me from the external Symbolic community and reinforcing my position as his accomplice.
At the most basic level of structural enunciation this position forces us back into a
confrontation with paradoxical edifice of Symbolic law and the notion that law can only exist
when it becomes possible to imagine something beyond that law. But instead, on an abstract
signifier or articulation, Alex represents the space beyond the law created by individual beings
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that elude the law. In other words, the image of the Other as beyond the law paradoxically
sustains the law. In this way, we return to a similar tautological frame but observe how the
transgression of the law is always-already included within the law itself.109 We can easily
imagine this function playing itself out within the disciplinary apparatus of our schools or the
daily confines of our classrooms. But how might we imagine this as uncovering unannounced
structural dimensions of the discourse of education? Or, how does our own classroom instruction
always-already include an unannounced dimension of what we fail to perceive but undermines
every notion we try to convey?
Philosophically, it can therefore be helpful to imagine the law, Symbolic structures, or
discourses–for example–as having two sides: the Public, Symbolic surface consisting of written
and unspoken prohibitions (norms, rules, social conventions, etc.) and the underside or the
domain of transgression where the Symbolic communicates the imperative enjoy! As subjects we
are compelled to obey our true master, the master that always presses upon our unconscious, yet
we fail to perceive its presence. As a pedagogical point of emphasis, by holding the Symbolic
(law, discipline, education, etc.) and transgression in opposition to one another it is revealed that
there is no point of synthesis between the two, thus forcing us to return to the reflexive
imperative of embracing our destitution and encountering the register of the Real. Just as a
dialectic interpretation of law must account for crime as the necessary founding gesture of law,
we cannot recognize that we exist in reality until we fully experience our own nothingness.
What is most significant to understand about enjoyment, transgression and any attempt to
overcome the failure of our understanding is that far from releasing us from our Symbolic
mandate–and opening the possibility of adopting a radical position outside of the Symbolic/law–

109

Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999).

209

our transgression embroils us further within the normalizing structure. According to Žižek, this is
because enjoyment itself, which we experience as transgression: “is in its innermost status
something imposed, ordered–when we enjoy, we never do it ‘spontaneously’, we always follow a
certain injunction.”110 The psychoanalytic name for this obscene injunction, for the obscene call
to ‘Enjoy,’ is the superego. The Symbolic can be conceived here as being internally monitored
by the superego and, as such, is underpinned by the obscene possibility of its own violation.
Thus, even as we move toward a reflexive encounter with the Real, the Symbolic has already
anticipated our movement. In the specific case of A Clockwork Orange, we can see how this call
plays itself out through the construction of various fantasy scenarios. What this reflexive position
highlights is that as we encounter the trauma of the Real, our psyche will unconsciously continue
to create fantasy scenarios to prevent this encounter–thereby keeping us pinned beneath the
Symbolic and Imaginary registers.
From one transgressive position, for example, we might attempt to neutralize the gaze.
Instead of being held by Alex’s desire, desire is transferred to a passive Other–an Other who can
rescue Mrs. Alexander from her torturer. In many films this is the role of the ‘hero,’ a police
office or some Other who would risk it all to stop Alex. The difficulty we experience with A
Clockwork Orange is that this position is absent from the narrative and the Other can only be
modeled as a fantasmatic presence–lacking the full gravity of Alex’s being in our ontological
horizon. The role of such a hero or savior is, of course, a well-documented narrative within
education. Whether developed within the overworked imagery of Stand and Deliver and Dead
Poet’s Society or the much more complex idea(l) of educating other people’s children, how many
teachers would identify with the pathology that education is a vehicle to save children, society,
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and so on. But the absence of this heroic role in the film makes this point of identification
convoluted and difficult to sustain.
When A Clockwork Orange premiered, it was met with public backlash and claims that
its narrative promoted violence and sexual deviance. This was particularly true in the U.K. where
several copycat crimes were committed by teenage boys dressed as Droogs singing Singin’ in the
Rain. In the wake of the crimes, Kubrick steadfastly refuted the idea that films alone can trigger
violent behavior but withdrew the film from public release in the U.K., a ban that was not lifted
until after his death in 1999. In response to the public backlash, several of the film’s actors and
actresses spoke out in support of Kubrick and the film, including Adrienne Corri (Mrs.
Alexander) who noted the enjoyment she experienced during the filming of the HOME-sequence
(see Figure 4.18).

Figure 4.18: Adrienne Corri, Photograph from the filming of A Clockwork Orange, Directed by
Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner Bros., 1972. Accessed August 01, 2018.
http://www.allocine.fr/film/fichefilm-260/photos/detail/?cmediafile=18878883.
While seemingly disconnected from how we might directly experience the narrative of the film,
the interjection of this understanding directly impacts our subjective experience of the film–and
our experience of self through the film. In a broader context, we can begin to fully see the
complexity of Lacan’s triadic structure and the difficulties we face when reflexively navigating
each register.
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In view of Corri’s comment, our capacity to neutralize the gaze is diminished because our
(subjective) ability to maintain the construction of a passive other is disrupted–even if this only
occurs on an unconscious level. The enunciation of her experience in ‘reality’ has the effect of
dividing the spectator’s temporal experience of the film between an enjoyment (pull) created by
a yearning to rescue the woman and a repulsion (push) of the victim enjoying her suffering.111
This reflexive trauma is an inversion of what we experienced through Alex’s performance of
Singin’ in the Rain.’ Rather than experiencing trauma as emanating from the film and disrupting
the way we understand fantasy in reality, we can see how our experiences in reality disrupts the
fantasies we experience through the film. This traumatic element functions to dislocate the
subject from the passive Other and announces the dimension of the Real through the position
‘Thou art that.’ In my own reflexive experience, I was forced to accept my fundamental
impotence. By suspending my ability to act–to rescue the victim, whether it is Mrs. Alexander
from Alex or from herself–my impotence bears witness to the fact that I again became the dupe
of my own fantasy. The importance of this realization is not that I was duped, but in the failure
of the fantasy itself. What we see, at this juncture of the reflexive process, is a total
transformation of the reflexive space. We are forced to accept that it is only possible to encounter
our fantasies insofar as we are willing to face our own impotence–the moment of subjective
destitution. No matter how I construct and image of my-self in relation to Alex qua Mrs.
Alexander, I am confronted by the traumatic Real of my self-identity. Every encounter, every
formulation, results in nothing other than a downward spiral. This spiraling movement–the
reflexive death drive–lays bare the full horror of the interconnectedness between the spectator
and Alex on multiple temporal level.
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Accomplice or Witness: What’s it going to be then, eh?
Although we might imagine how Alex continues to arouse the possibility of a primordial
subjectivity that exists beyond the law, the trauma of Real enfolds the spectator into the scene,
presenting us before the big Other either as an accomplice or witness (occupying the place of the
big Other itself gazing upon Alex). Alex’s open implication of “viddy well” functions to create
reflexive space void of safety, a destitute space where we must confront our self as the blind spot
in our own visual field. To reiterate how we arrived at this destination, in Žižek’s reading of
Lacan he notes, that the gaze provides a pathway to examine the elementary skeleton of the
fantasy structure–a process that will ultimately help to disentangle multiple facets of our own
subjectivity and open unbearable reflexive pathways.
If I now look back to beginning of the film and consider Alex’s recurring question,
what’s it going to be then, eh? I begin to understand I have always-already been Alex’s
accomplice. In the two years that I have been writing this text, however, I have found the
majority of people with whom I have discussed this research are fundamentally unwilling to
accept/acknowledge any part of themselves as having identified with Alex. I suppose this is not
surprising given the nature of his crimes. But, returning to Žižek’s analysis of the neighbor, I
wonder what this unwillingness says about you and me? How have you and I experienced each
other in relation to Alex? How has our understanding changed as we have navigated the path
together? Have you imagined me as someone “like you”–the Imaginary other–with whom you
engage in mirror-like relationships of competition, mutual recognition, and so on? Or, did this
narrative read only as a theoretical analysis, an analysis of the rules that coordinate our co-
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existence but lacking any spaces of mutual recognition? Was there a moment where you found
yourself facing the Other qua the Real?
When we encounter the Other qua the Real, we experience the Other as some-thing with
whom no symmetrical dialogue can be mediated by the symbolic Order.112 This experience is a
confrontation with the Other as an impossible object or “inhuman partner.” As intersubjective
beings, this experience is further compounded by our phenomenological reading of the face.
When we look at the face of another person itself, according to Žižek, we experience both a
domestication and a gentrification. The other is inhuman, as monstrous, unfathomable abyss as
well as the gentrified neighbor experienced in our face-to-face encounters. When we look as the
face of an-other, we encounter both dimensions at once as a coincidence of opposites, where
innocent vulnerability overlaps with pure evil. This overlap forces us to consider that these two
dimensions are the same thing viewed from difference perspectives–a manifestation of the
parallax view.113 What this means is that beneath my neighbor as my semblant–my mirror image,
there always lurks the unfathomable abyss of radical Otherness, a monstrous Thing that cannot
be gentrified. And if this is true of my neighbor, it must also be true of me!
In Matt Flisfeder’s analysis of Žižek and Hitchcock, he discusses the function of
perversion in film that complicates the way in which people might disavow the violence in A
Clockwork Orange. Flisfeder’s analysis forces us to consider our self in relation to this violence
and the monstrous Otherness that always lurks within the Real. According to Flisfeder, within
the Hitchcockian film structure there exists a ‘will-to-enjoy’ that “forces the viewer to concede
that he or she is possessed by the will to experience his or her own perverse violence on the
screen–and then, by giving him or her exactly that which he or she desired, shows to the viewer
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he or she has in fact been manipulated… as the true sadist.”114 While A Clockwork Orange does
not directly parallel the strategy of the Hitchcockian allegory, its complex presentation of
violence within the narrative structure manipulates the spectator in a manner similar to what
Flisfeder references in Hitchcock.
On the evening after the HOME-sequence, the Droogs embark on an expedition to a
health farm where Alex murders a wealthy “Cat Lady” with her prized porcelain phallus (see
Figure 4.19).

Figure 4.19: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
The moment of her attack is mediated by erotic paintings that the woman had displayed
throughout her home. The post-murder sequence marks one of the few moments in the film that
does not present violence from Alex’s point of view. As Alex attempts to flee from the Cat
Lady’s farm, Kubrick cuts to a close up of a milk bottle, then reveals Dim holding it behind his
back. Importantly, Dim had challenged Alex’s authority earlier that day, but Alex dispatched
Dim with the same aggression he displays throughout the rest of the film. This time, however,
Dim breaks the glass milk bottle across Alex’s face. The impact of the breaking bottle is shown
in slow motion. As Alex collapses to the ground clutching at his face and crying, his Droogs
laugh at him and run away–leaving Alex to be captured by police.
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Each time I have viewed this scene, I experienced his arrest as a subversion of my
expectations. Admittedly, I initially omitted this final piece of analysis from this chapter because
of my (un)conscious turmoil over this experience–and my expectations of how you would
perceive me in the wake of my confession–“it is not I who enjoys…” While, on the surface, we
might be able to identify with the disappointment of being betrayed by a friend, but
(un)consciously I know Alex’s continued freedom would bring with it the continued enactment
of his ultraviolent tendencies. This expression is the experience of the sadistic will-to-enjoy. In
the moment things begin to go awry for Alex, it uncovers my (un)conscious disappointment, I
will no longer get to experience his violence. The discomfort of knowing this desire is
experienced as something transgressive because I am forced to acknowledge my desires as
something that violates the norms of socially permissible behavior. In Alex we have observed the
monstrous Thing that lurks in the unfathomable abyss of radical Otherness, but in this moment,
we are forced to acknowledge: if this is true of Alex, it must also be true of me.
Critically, the inverse of this perspective is played out through Alex’s arrest as well. Even
in police custody, we see that Alex remains cocksure and defiant. But Alex can no longer
impress his will on the situation through acts of intimidation and violence, he has been rendered
(relatively) passive like so many of his victims in the film. While in police custody, Alex is
subjected to multiple outbursts of physical violence at the hands of the police (see Figure 4.19).
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Figure 4.20: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
For many spectators, this is the start of Alex “getting what he deserves” for the acts he
committed. I use this phrasing in quotes because in my discussions on this topic––both in
non/academic and in/formal settings–this is the exact terminology used when my interlocutors
are explicating their response. At a primordial level, what we are witnessing is the other side of
the same perverse and violent coin. Unlike my own identification with Alex, viewers that
identify with the desires of the police believe their desires are–for the most part–on the side of
social norms. To repeat the preceding, what is transgressive about identifying with Alex is that it
is experienced as something that violates the norms of socially permissible behavior. In this
instance, while we might quibble over the specifics of the police’s tactics, Alex is ultimately
viewed (by many) as getting his comeuppance. Therefore, many spectators feel free to invoke the
“getting what he deserves” clause because it fulfills a kind of cosmic karma that will restore
order to the Symbolic community. In the end, however, both sides uncover the inhuman monster
that lurks within us. We learn the violence of A Clockwork Orange has always-already been
inside of us.

217

Note: Rather than concluding this chapter here, chapter five functions as both a conclusion to this
analysis and a conclusion to this research project as a whole. Because of its length and selfcontained movement of reflexive analysis, I decided to create a subsequent chapter.
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CH 5- Tonight We are All Monster: Final Conclusion
I use the trauma of this final reflexive realization–of self as inhuman monster–as pathway
toward concluding the entirety of this dissertation. In each of the preceding chapters I have
examined various reflexive spaces and modes of analysis through the lens of Žižek’s negative
ontology. Taken together, the cumulative impact of this analysis has uncovered a few key
questions to consider as a terse framework for unthinking the reflective method:

1. How is the way we perceive a problem always-already the problem itself?
2. How does our understanding of self in relation to the world shift when we force ourselves
to dwell in the spaces of our own misrecognition?
3. How do we see our own self-identity in relation to the o/Other?

Throughout this analysis, these questions allowed me to crack open–even if only for a moment–
various reflexive spaces previously inaccessible to me by disrupting my previously held
understandings of self as being in the world. When I arrived at the final moment of this reflexive
analysis in chapter four, the realization that I had always been the inhuman monster, the Real of
my self-identity seemed to represent (a) the ultimate violence of the human condition and (b) a
certain hopelessness of the cause.
As a result of this, when I began the final framing of this chapter, I imagined my personal
deadlock as providing the symmetrical context to refer back to the introductory chapter and
Žižek’s invocation of the courage of hopelessness:
The true courage is not to imagine an alternative, but to accept the consequences
of the fact that there is no clearly discernible alternative: the dream of an
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alternative is a sign of theoretical cowardice; it functions as a fetish that prevents
us thinking through to the end the deadlock of our predicament. In short, the true
courage is to admit that the light at the end of the tunnel is most likely the
headlights of another train approaching us from the opposite direction.
The train approaching me, in this context, is my mirror image, the temporal confrontation that
there is no big Other, there is no pathway out of my misrecognition. If the monster has always
been lurking inside of me, but my understandings of reality have always been mediated and
veiled by fantasy, then any articulation of a grand resistance against a non-existent big Other is
the equivalent of hoping the train is “the light” even though I know it is a train. The horror of this
space represents the realization that no matter how ardently I believe I am resisting the
discourses of education as a teacher, what I have always missed is that I am the one maintaining
those structures.
But as I dwelled on the failures of this research, I continually asked myself, if everything
you have encountered to this moment has been a misrecognition, then why do you believe this
moment of understanding contains any certainty? In response to this question, I began to reconsider this final scenario as both a conclusion to this research and a consideration of its
application in the wake of what I have done. The questions I considered as a move forward
centered on the notion of unthinking and whether an encounter with the Real truly opens the
reflexive spaces to reconfigure our previously held notions of reality? It is from here that I began
to consider whether the entirety of this project had been a failure? Had I still not pushed my
understandings of self far enough to substantiate a disruptive change in my thinking? Or, when
viewed from a shifted perspective, the method failed to enunciate a violence beyond the current
coordinates of my subjective understanding.
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In an attempt to articulate a horizon beyond this failure, this chapter contains an analysis
of the actions of F. Alexander–the writer forced to watch the rape of his wife by Alex in the
HOME-sequence–and consideration of whether his actions at the conclusion of the film exhibit
the possibility of suspending the hold of the self and the Other in an act of authentic resistance.
This final movement problematizes our understanding of self in relation to the o/Other, as
Alexander represents both Alex’s foil and the only possibility of redemption in the film.
Concurrently, Alexander allows us to complicate the paradoxical simultaneity of relationships
that exist between teachers and students, rupturing our own memories of teaching and the silver
screen depictions of teacher resistance that linger in our consciousness (i.e. Stand and Deliver,
Good Will Hunting, or even Dangerous Minds). In the end, however, it appears we are forced
into another position of virtual deadlock. If our revolutionary violence is shown to be something
other than what we had believed in, how do we proceed? If we arrive at a reflexive space where
there is no ‘feel good’ moment, how do we process the failures of our subjective position? By
reflecting on Alexander’s narrative as a final questioning, I reflexively contemplate whether (a)
the decimation of the subject position is an uncovering of our ultimate hopelessness or (b)
despite our apparent hopelessness, does a space remain open to articulate something beyond our
current deadlock?

F. Alexander: A Teacher’s Plea for Ethical Violence
Let us recall the first time we encountered F. Alexander: he was bound and gagged on the
floor, being assaulted by Alex and his Droogs, forced to watch the rape of his wife. It is
Alexander’s horror, viewed through Alex’s eyes, that captures the terror of the HOME–
sequence. We experience the horror and domination of Alex vis-a-via Alexander. While the
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horror of sequence is transferred to us through Kubrick’s use of the POV technique, the scene is
largely felt through F. Alexander not his wife. This, of course, does mean that we do not identify
with Mrs. Alexander or connect in a multitude of ways with her trauma, it is merely a
commentary on Kubrick’s use of filmic techniques to (re)present the scene. In this sequence, as
we explored through the performance of Singin’ in the Rain, Alex both attempts to destroy the
object of Alexander’s love and destroy the Symbolic representation of love for us as spectators.
Thus, this analysis and our understanding of self has been intimately tied to Alexander–even if
we were not consciously aware of it throughout the film.

After the visceral trauma of the HOME-sequence, we learn that Mrs. Alexander has died as
a result of the incident which shifts Alexander’s grief into a poignant rage against the
government. It is within this shift that I will outline two final ways of thinking about ourselves
(and self-identity) in relation to the Other that serves as a conclusion to the entirety of the
research. First, by analyzing Alexander’s actions from this moment forward, it is possible to
reimagine the possibility and inherent failures of our interventions in teaching and education
through a new prism. Next, when we arrive at Alexander’s final act, we are able to re-consider
our own final destination, a wondering (or unthinking) if what might me if we fully embrace the
depth of the violence present on multiple temporal levels throughout the film.
Drawing on Slavoj Žižek’s analysis of violence itself, the interconnectedness between F.
Alexander and Alex at the end of the film problematizes the paradoxical simultaneity of
relationships (domineering/nurturing) that exists between teachers and students. Broadly, Others
are perceived, following Žižek, as an indifferent multitude whereby understanding acts as a
violent gesture that cuts into this multitude and privileges the One–introducing a radical

222

imbalance into the whole.1 Despite (or perhaps because of) the violence of the educational
system, students are (often) privileged as the One by their teacher(s) and the intended violence of
the reflexive method, for example, lacks the disruptive potentiality needed to transcend the
subjective level of a teacher’s understanding. For this reason, even if teachers methodologically
articulate a radical vision of the reflexive method, when they return to the classroom, it is
difficult for her/him to look beyond the face of the student before them (the One) and the
relationship that exists as teacher and student (the Two). A plea for ethical violence is an
invocation of resistance against the Two in the name of the Third, the faceless Others who are
not present in our classrooms but are being subjected to the structural violence we seek to resist.
Ethical violence is resistance in the name of the Third that “grounds justice in the dimension of
universality proper.”2 Such a plea is not a call for literal violence in schools, at this moment in
time, but an act that seeks difference in spite of the Other. In contrast to notions of understanding
between the One (students) and the Two (teachers), our true resistance to the discourse of
education qua ethical violence begins when we remember the faceless many left in the shadows.
From here we can imagine Alexander’s political resistance as representing this faceless
Third. While we do not learn about Alexander’s political activity until late in the film, he blames
the government and its tactics in response to the violence of society for his wife’s death.
Ultimately, Alexander becomes the leader of a political party that actively works to undermine
the credibility of the ruling party in the government. The groups dissent against the government
crescendos in the film over the prison system and the government’s usage of the aversion therapy
(the Ludovico technique) to stop violent criminals from committing future crimes. It is within
this context that Alexander and Alex are brought back together–although their meeting appears
1
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to be karmic happenstance, the narrative uncovers a complex array of spaces for us to re-locate
ourselves.

The Second HOME-sequence
One evening, a few years after the murder of his wife, F. Alexander opens the door of his
HOME to an unrecognizable Alex–a scene that both functions to parallel and invert the first
HOME-sequence. Alex, who has been beaten up by the police and left to die in the countryside,
is again in need of assistance. Coinciding to his own empathy once more, Alexander lets Alex
into his home. While tending to Alex, with the help of his own caregiver, Alexander recognizes
Alex’s picture from the morning paper and offers his sympathies for the violence Alex has
experienced at the hands of the government and the police. This moment marks a critical point of
reflection for us to consider how we think about our own interventions within the classroom.
Recalling the notion of ethical violence as being identified as resistance beyond the Two in the
name of Third, how many of us could imagine ourselves offering Alex similar refuge? Despite
the violence of Alex’s transgression (as the One) and the longitudinal harm it created (the Two),
Alexander’s concern remains rooted in his resistance of the government (the Third).
In this way, we can see begin to see how ethical violence is represented by a commitment
to resistance as something beyond ourselves for a faceless other. This frame grounds resistance
in the Third in the dimension of universality proper.3 Resistance and our commonly held
understandings of self qua students are thus structurally incompatible: resistance must disregard
the privileged Other whom I “really understand.” This means that the Third beyond the Two is
not secondary but always-already at the forefront, and the primary ethical obligation is toward
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this Third not the Other whom I face. The difficulty we experience as teachers, of course, is
coming to terms with looking beyond the students’ faces that look back at us (the Two)–as
Alexander looks beyond Alex–or (un)consciously considering the consequences of any act on
our position as a teacher (the One). Ultimately, what Alexander’s final interaction unnervingly
exemplifies is that what unites the subject and the Other in the Third is the violence of resistance
itself-even if this involves the decimation of the subject’s own personal desires or previously
held understandings of self-identify.
Upon hearing Alex’s story, particularly how he underwent the government’s aversion
therapy program (the Ludovico Technique), Alexander urges Alex to share his story publicly. He
wants Alex to join him in his resistance against the government believing Alex will serve as a
fulcrum to sway public opinion and dislodge the current majority political party. Alexander’s
position here reminded me of the complex array of experiences I encountered in my analysis of
self in chapter three. Ultimately, my reflexive analysis exposed that my students merely served
as a “prop” for enacting my subjective fantasies as the teacher. The primary impetus behind my
“radical” teaching practices was never true critical resistance (developing students’
consciousness or a liberatory critique of the system that subjugates them) but the fulfillment of a
fundamental narcissism, a pedagogical stance that realized my political desire to be a “radical,”
and the creation of a big Other to be resisted by radical teachers like me. As Alexander begins to
see the potentiality of Alex as a symbolic object, do his actions remain ethically rooted in the
Third or does Alex function as a similar prop? In both instances–my own teaching and
Alexander’s use of Alex–if the larger outcome is achieved, does are fallibility as subjective
beings matter? If, for example, my students have become more critically conscious and better
prepared to resist the systems that subjugate them, does my uncovering of unconscious
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motivations matter? Or, does the act remain an act of ethical violence, regardless of intent?
Similarly, if Alexander’s motives remain rooted in resistance of the government for the people,
do his considerations of Alex change the ethical propositions of the violence of the act? If the
entirety of this reflexive analysis is foundationally rooted in the One, can it simultaneously
function as an act of ethical violence if both you and I discover a traumatic kernel of our being
that allows us to act in ways previously unimaginable that are rooted in a faceless other?
After asking Alex to join their cause, Alexander shares with Alex that since his wife died,
he has had difficulty doing chores around the house himself (explaining the necessity of the
caregiver). When Alex enquires about Alexander’s wife, he goes into great detail about her rape
and murder. Because of Alex’s aversion therapy, he becomes sickened by the details and
Alexander orders Alex to rest for the evening. In this moment, we realize as spectators of the
scene, that Alex has now become aware that he is the perpetrator of the crime, but Alexander is
unaware that Alex is the young man who raped and murdered his wife. Shit! In a similar form to
what we observed in chapter one, it is precisely when we think we are gaining a proper grasp on
our condition (or reality) that we are most blinded by our position. Certainly, Alexander’s failure
to identify Alex could represent the psychological repression of an unimaginable trauma, but is it
not reminiscent of our unwillingness to see what is often right before our eyes? Like Frank’s
unwillingness put on the sunglasses offered to him by Nada, we do not want to encounter the
trauma and alienation of what appears right before us. The answers are always there, just out of
our reach, we merely lack the perspective to locate them.
Later in the evening, as Alex sits in a warm bath, we observe Alexander making calls to
his comrades informing them that he has a potent weapon to use against the government.
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Figure 5.1: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
As Alex becomes increasingly more relaxed, a washcloth draped over his face and arms dangling
over the side of the tube, he begins singing Sing’ in the Rain. Beginning as a soft murmur and
then growing in joyous intensity, the song slowly becomes audible to Alexander. It takes him a
moment to register the melody before the expression on his face enunciates the unequivocal
understanding of the interconnectedness between he and Alex. But despite this realization,
Alexander does not let on to Alex that he knows. From this point, Alex now represents both a
weapon to leverage against the government and the One against which Alexander is compelled to
exact his revenge. Not dissimilarly, as I continually reevaluate my failures as a critical educator,
I began to consider how all Three levels of relationships might exist at once and whether the act
can remain a violent intervention against the discursive/Symbolic structure.
The One
Me: My students serve as a prop to enact my fantasies of teaching AND I do care
whether they are actively learning.
Alexander: Alex serves as a prop to enact his fantasies about political resistance
AND an object to act out against to avenge his wife’s death.
The Two
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Me: Through the process of teaching, my students and I share an intimate
interconnectedness.
Alexander: Because of Alex’s past transgressions, he and Alexander are
intimately linked.
The Third
Me: The resistance of oppressive ideas and ideologies that are enacted through
thinking itself.
Alexander: The resistance of the government as a controlling apparatus.
Ultimately, if we arrive at our final destination, does it matter how we arrived? If we are unable
to disconnect from the One and the Two, does the act remain violent but lack the true ethics of a
movement rooted in the Third?
After Realizing Alex’s true identity, Alexander and his political conspirators drug Alex
and lock him in an upstairs bedroom. Using the trigger from his aversion therapy–Beethoven’s
9th Symphony–the group tortures Alex through the use of sound.

Figure 5.2: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
The political aim of the group remains intact as they hope to show the danger of state’s aversion
therapy technique by driving Alex into madness. But, as Alex writhes in pain on the floor, we
simultaneously see a look of joy wash over Alexander’s face.
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Figure 5.3: Scene from A Clockwork Orange, Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Los Angeles, Warner
Bros., 1972.
Alexander is experiencing the joy in violence we once saw only through the eyes of Alex. On
one level, we now encounter the inversion of our reflection at the conclusion of chapter four. Do
we experience sympathy for Alex in this moment despite what we know of his past or does this
moment represent another instance of his getting what he deserves because Alexander’s revenge
is restoring a kind of karmic balance to the world? Would many of us even go as far as to
identify his actions as “technically” wrong but a socially permissible behavior because we
understand how he arrived at this point or could even imagine ourselves acting out a similar
fantasy? At the temporal level, does Alexander’s joyous face simply represent the monster that
lurks within all of us?
As we have encountered through this research, the difficulty we encounter when tarrying
with the negative is not that we should avoid such feeling but fully embrace the monsters that
lurk within us. The subject the emerges through these processes of reflection and wounding is the
subject of the night of the world, or the subject as lack itself that emerges when we embrace that
piece of ourselves that we might prefer not to exist. In a like manner, when I recognize myself as
a pathological stain or as not existing in my reflection in the mirror, the confrontation with
ontological finitude forces me consider how, for example, all educative experiences might seize
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within the vortices, gaps, and voids in the fabric of reality. This is the realization of the Hegelian
‘night of the world:’
The human being is the night, the empty nothing, that contains everything in its
simplicity—an unending wealth of representations and images, of which none
belong to him. It is this Night, Nature's interior, that exists here—pure self—in
phantasmagorical imagery, where it is night everywhere . . . where, here, shoots
a bloody head and, there, suddenly, another white shape—only to disappear all
the same. We see this Night whenever we look into another's eye—into a night
that becomes utterly terrifying—wherein, truly, we find the Night of the World
suspended.4
Following this formulation, what we experience in Alexander’s joy is the fantasmatic
phenomenon of “seeing one’s self seeing”–whether through the horror of Alex or the joy of
Alexander–it is an ontogenetic experience that collapses the fantasy frame into the abyss of
radical negativity at the heart of the subject. This is a return to the zero-level of our subjective
understanding, the moment we see the weight of the violence and joy present of A Clockwork
Orange.
In the final scene of the second HOME-sequence, Alex can no longer withstand the pain
of his torture and attempts suicide by jumping out of a second-floor window. Even as Alexander
exacts his revenge and forfeits his own morality, is it possible to interpret his actions as
suspending the face for the Third? Can we view the violence of Alex’s attempted suicide as
remaining grounded in resistance and the dimension of universality proper through a continued
desire to overturn the state’s sanctioned use of the Ludovico technique–the program Alexander
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had fought against since his wife’s death? If what unities the subject and Other in ethical
violence is ultimately resistance itself, then even if the act involves the decimation of the
subject’s own position, does it remain ethical–or at least transgressive? Although Alexander’s
final act appears to signal the ultimately deadlock of the subject position, have we arrived at
another position of failure within the reflexive method?
For much of this analysis, I have imagined this moment as again returning me to the
introduction and the ultimate hopelessness of the cause. But the lesson that Žižek never stops
repeating is that there is no big Other nor is there an Other of the Other which could provide a
guarantee of any our existence. In the absence of an Other, the gaze does not provide us with any
real meaning. Instead, our encounters with the gaze threaten to break the hold of the Symbolic
and return us to an impossible truth of the Real–which is a rupture, cut, or wound in our
understanding of reality. This rupture, however, is not between something and something
different–or a self-identity that was at the beginning and what comes after–but rather the
introduction of pure difference itself. This is the reflexive realization that at the beginning, there
was nothing. This moment of nothingness is everything. It is the active nothingness described by
Hegel in the night of the world. What we see in the gaze of F. Alexander is our own descent into
the dark of the night, a night that becomes utterly terrifying.
When we continually tarry with the focus of our ontological understanding, it becomes
possible to imagine how even the most immense structures can be rendered incomprehensible.
We begin to realize that outside of the reference to meaning we ascribe to an object –the
massiveness we perceive in all objects does not pertain to any direct materiality. Even the
language with which we describe and interpret our world, as Wittgenstein notes, is endlessly
fallible: “Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way
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about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about.”5
Instead of imaging our ontological negativity as utter hopelessness, how can we consider the
dissolution of the social edifice a movement toward what Alenka Zupančič terms an ethics of the
real? The ethical act, Zupančič argues, cannot look for guarantees. Rather, it must define ethics
itself. Ethics, according to Zupančič, cannot define what is ethical because what is ethical is what
breaks and remakes the parameters of ethics.6 Such an ethics is imagined as the final degradation
of the educational apparatus, a radical pedagogy that opens the possibility of enunciating the lack
of the big Other through a shared understanding of alienation within all facets of education. As
such, deadlock is not hopelessness and the ethical is not only an act of resistance but beyond
resistance: it redefines the parameters of what is and is not an act of education. Similarly, it does
not presuppose any notion of the good but determines what is good. The ethical act, as such,
cannot simply disobey, or break, the rule; rather, it must change the rules and redefine the nature
of education itself– by changing the parameters of what is possible. The ethical act is a return to
Leninist politics: a revolutionary act not authorized by a fantasmatic big Other but by the subject
him/herself - ne s'autorise que de lui-même.

A Violent Love
What we see of ourselves in the eyes of Alexander is that there is no short cut here and
there is no guarantee of a successful outcome either. Instead, it is a universal recognition that we
are all in the same shit. No matter how ideological committed I am to a cause, will that
commitment ever outweigh the love I see in the face of my wife or my students? Using Žižek’s
defense of Paulian Christianity, I truly arrive back at the beginning, and question why. In Žižek’s
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dialectical materialist reading of Christianity, he establishes the foundation for the revolutionary
act by extolling violence as a work of love through a Che-ification of Christ. Beginning with the
famous lines from Che Guevara’s diary: “Let me say, with the risk of appearing ridiculous, that
the true revolutionary is guided by a strong feeling of love. It is impossible to think of an
authentic revolutionary without this quality.”
Citing several passages from the Bible (Matthew 10:34-9; Luke 12:49-53), Žižek’s
outlines how Christian love is an inherently violent passion and it is through this love that we are
able to introduce radical difference into the Symbolic, to privilege the object of love at the
expense of some other.7 Žižek argues that Christian love as agape is a form of political love that
allows the subject to “unplug from the organic community into which [they] were born.”8 Agape
thereby enjoins all people to love the excluded Other in all her Otherness. The capacity for
violence and cruelty is, in fact, what gives love its power. “Love without cruelty is powerless,”
according to Žižek, and “cruelty without love is blind” It is, in fact, its link with violence which
enables love to transcend the natural limitations of man. This is what Žižek calls love in the
fullest “Paulinian” sense: “the domain of pure violence, the domain outside law (Symbolic), the
domain of violence which is neither law-founding nor law-sustaining, is the domain of love.”9
This Paulinian love is, for Žižek, how we must interpret revolutionary violence even as it
reaches it outer limits. To this end, Che’s statement that “the true revolutionary is guided by a
great feeling of love” cannot be disassociated from his more problematic statement on
revolutionaries as “killing machines:”
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Hatred is an element of the struggle; a relentless hatred of the enemy, compelling
us over and beyond the natural limitations that man is heir to and transforming
him into an effective, violent, selective and cold killing machine. Our soldiers
must be thus; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy.10
According to Žižek, Christ is similarly cited at multiple points throughout Bible making
overlapping comments: “if anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and his mother, his
wife and children, his brothers and sisters–yes even his own life–he cannot be my disciple”
(Luke 14:26). What both Christ and Che exhibit is an agape love, “an unconditional equalitarian
love for the Neighbor”11 which necessitates an absolute commitment to the cause–even when we
are forced into violent resistance. This movement is a passionate attempt to “introduce a
Difference, a gap in the order of being, to privilege and elevate some object at the expense of
others.” Such violence is already evident in the form of a love “which tears its object out of
context, elevating it to the Thing.”12 This elevation involves the violence of the teacher ripping
themselves free of the system, of rupturing old relationships, opting for a different future, and the
destruction of all aspects of our self-identity that we hold dear. The violence we should seek
must begin with a striking out against ourselves, a will to force ourselves to pay the price for our
transgressions. This violence untethers our thinking from all previous modes of knowing. It is a
reflexive gesture through which the space opens for people to not only “realize their old
emancipatory dreams… [but] reinvent their very modes of dreaming.”13
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